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RESUMO 
 
A Ucrânia está afundando nos abismos sócio-econômicos e demográficos, e não é 
nada mais do que o bem-estar de seus cidadãos hoje e o futuro do país que está em causa. A 
complexa análise institucional e macroeconômica desta tese é feita no âmbito do programa de 
mestrado no campo do desenvolvimento econômico e tem um duplo propósito. 
Por um lado, procura perceber e aceitar uma parcela justa de autocrítica em relação 
aos erros cometidos; e também compreender a insuficiente participação quantitativa e 
qualitativa da sociedade civil na sua percepção adequada e em seu modelo de resposta aos 
desafios das autoridades de todos os tipos e níveis. 
E por outro lado, contribuir de forma construtiva para a visão abrangente das 
reformas sincrônicas iniciais destinadas a restaurar a economia, a esfera social e a demografia 
do país; bem como a restauração de sua imagem internacional, fortemente manchada pela 
corrupção e crescente desconfiança de parceiros em todo o mundo. 
O capital humano — é o principal recurso do mercado de trabalho de qualquer país 
e seu motor principal. O artigo parte do contexto histórico, onde a causa principal de todos os 
males do país reside por mais de um quarto de século - nas pessoas, que foram responsáveis 
pelo fracasso da economia planejada desde a era soviética, capazes de manter o poder sabotando 
a lustração desde a independência, que cometeram uma distribuição coletiva criminosa da 
capacidade de produção do país por meio de privatizações questionáveis e opacas e que, em 
última instância, não realizaram reformas abrangentes e oportunas no período de transição, em 
contraste com países como a Polónia e da Hungria (do antigo campo socialista) ou Lituânia e 
Geórgia (ex-repúblicas soviéticas). 
No contexto geral de um declínio sem precedentes da produção, onde a maior parte 
do PIB do país pertence aos sectores primário e secundário com uma economia orientada para 
as exportações, a estrutura ineficaz do emprego é preservada com uma política estatal 
predominantemente passiva sobre o desemprego. Há um retrocesso do país para o período de 
desindustrialização em vez do apoio ao desenvolvimento pós-industrial, marcado pela 
economia paralela (quase metade do PIB) com evasão em massa de impostos e emprego 
informal arraigado, que representa um quarto de população economicamente ativa. 
O Estado também não prestou atenção necessária à demografia do país: de 1993 a 
2016 a população diminuiu quase um quinto. A Ucrânia une as tendências negativas que 
caracterizam os países desenvolvidos: envelhecimento e comportamento não reprodutivo da 
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população, bem como tendências para os países em desenvolvimento - alta mortalidade e baixa 
expectativa de vida. 
A análise macroeconômica retrospectiva desta dissertação analisa o conceito da 
política estatal mais recente da Ucrânia formada por quatro componentes complexos imediatos 
do desenvolvimento social e econômico do país: aumento da produtividade econômica, 
reestruturação do emprego, remuneração do trabalho e reformas institucionais. 
 
Palavras-chave: mercado de trabalho, emprego, Ucrânia
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ABSTRACT 
 
Ukraine is sinking into the socio-economic and demographic abysses, and it is 
nothing more than the well-being of its citizens today and the future of the country in the coming 
day. The complex institutional and macroeconomic analysis of this thesis is made in the 
framework of the Master’s program in the field of economic development and serves a dual 
purpose. 
On the one hand, to realize and accept a fair share of self-criticism regarding 
mistakes made; and also to understand the insufficient quantitative and qualitative participation 
of civil society in its adequate perception and its response model of behavior to the challenges 
of the authorities of all suites and levels. 
And on the other hand, to make a constructive contribution to the comprehensive 
vision of the initial synchronous reforms aimed at restoring the country’s economy, social 
sphere and demography; as well as restoring its international image, which is strongly tainted 
by corruption and a growing distrust of partners around the world. 
Human capital – is the main resource of the labor market of any country and its 
main engine. To do this, the paper begins from the historical context, where the root cause of 
all the evils of the country lies for more than a quarter of a century – is the personnel, who were 
responsible for the failure of the command-planned economy since the Soviet era, who were 
able to retain power by sabotaging lustration since independence, who committed a collective 
criminal distribution of the country’s production capacity through questionable and opaque 
privatization and who ultimately failed to carry out timely comprehensive reforms of the 
transition period in contrast to their counterparts from Poland and Hungary (the former socialist 
camp) or Lithuania and Georgia (former Soviet republics). 
On the general background of an unprecedented decline in production, where most 
of the country’s GDP belongs to the primary and secondary sectors with a pronounced 
commodity export-oriented economy, the inefficient structure of employment is preserved with 
a predominantly passive state policy on unemployment. There is a rollback of the country to 
the de-industrialization period instead of post-industrialization development backing staged by 
the formed permanent shadow sector (up to a half of own GDP) with mass evasion from taxes 
and entrenched informal employment, which accounts for a quarter of the economically active 
population. 
The state also did not pay needed attention to the demographics of the country: from 
1993 to 2016 the population decreased by almost one fifth. Ukraine unites the negative trends 
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that are characteristic for developed countries: aging and non-reproductive behavior of the 
population, as well as trends for developing countries – high mortality and low life expectancy. 
A retrospective macroeconomic analysis of this thesis suggests the concept of the 
nearest state policy of Ukraine formed by four complex immediate components of the country’s 
social and economic development: increasing economic productivity, employment 
restructuring, labour remuneration and institutional reforms. 
 
Keywords: labor market, employment, Ukraine.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of the problem. I would like to address in this thesis the labour market 
peculiarities in Ukraine, driven by the sequence sets of (conscious) policies been implemented 
by the state decision makers, often with the connivance or insufficient adequate respond efforts 
of civil society, that derived the country to structural negative regularities and foresee coming 
up crucial socio-economic challenges in front of its’s own population. 
 
Objective of the research. This research seeks to reach primer dual aim. Firstly, 
to objectively present the deep structural changes and modern general state of the labour market 
in Ukraine as my contribution into raising awareness among civil and scholar international 
communities, using the Global Labour University (GLU) platform run by devoted 
CESIT/UNICAMP program. 
Secondly, to motivate progressive-thinking communities for solidarity support of 
Ukrainian people on international arena, condemning destructive policy been implemented by 
national authorities via the necessary constructive and frankly just criticism, and further 
formation of subsequent recommendations for development of a comprehensive detailed 
program to address current socio-economic disaster. 
 
Hypothetical statement. For each decision, taken within a country, that influences 
the course of events and leads to certain results, concrete individuals or groups of people stand 
behind, who are guided by their individual or collective interests (priorities): humane or selfish, 
or mixture – everything depends on subjective (personal) criteria, on the level of professional 
qualifications (education) and experience. The task of the particular society within the 
framework of a concrete state that wants economically and socially succeed – is to take an 
active part in all spheres of the country’s life: that is, to know and to execute its own rights and 
to fulfill its duties. 
The society forms traditions, those traditions shape the country. I see the ingrained 
tradition of reluctance on a big part of most fellow citizens to improve themselves in the theory 
and practice of executing own civil rights and freedoms. Historically, the tradition of 
performing the front of individual work has been permanently a poor quality. There is no 
voluntary or compulsory motivation to build the state decently for the future generation. 
Connivance, irresponsibility and impunity of the political elite preserves. 
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Each subchapter of the first part of the thesis is a self-sufficient investigation topic 
and as a whole subchapters form a comprehensive picture for understanding of the main 
processes of state policy and macroeconomics behavior of the labor market in Ukraine. 
To change the situation is only capable by critically thinking and critically acting 
civil society. Instruments of qualitative improvement of the socio-economic life of the country, 
as a starting point, can be: 
1) expansion of the base (category) of public information, uncovering of the 
covered up socio-economic sphere of the country; 
2) raising up the access (currently low availability) to public information (online), 
in particular the removal of restrictions on the publication in timely manner of financial reports 
and access to the exchange of official correspondence of state institutions (the experience of 
Sweden); 
3) the transparency of making decisions on personnel appointment through the 
organization of public hearings on compulsory basis with broadcasting (recording) online 
(similar to the best practices of the US and the EU). 
Such an approach will form a more extensive and productive exchange of 
information, which will invariably improve the quality of development of collegial or 
compromise decisions within the country, and, most importantly, will widen and intensify the 
civil society involvement. In the CIS region, Georgia was the first country that excelled better 
than others in the socio-economic field, Poland – in the EU. The Ukrainians, in proper 
overcoming political and economic sabotage and corruption, will have allies on behalf of these 
countries and on behalf of the world community, if they follow straightly these 
recommendations constructively and transparently. 
 
Methodology. I will use, at my best possible, practical acquisitions of quantitative 
and qualitative method obtained during GLU Master course (2015), with the help of modern 
statistical tools of the ILO, the EUROSTAT and the World Bank Development Indicators (WB 
DI). Also, I have to rely a lot on, even outdated in terms of web technology and organization, 
but methodologically the only reliable State Statistic Service of Ukraine (SSSU). Major 
estimations and charts were reproduced by me, owing to the user-friendly Google Cloud 
Platform, in some cases combining all of statistical sources at once for greater visibility and 
comparison purposes. 
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Theoretical framework. Empirical research by macroeconomic approaches to the 
study of the labor market theory is represented by six main concepts known in modern science: 
Classical, Marxist, Neoclassical, Institutional, Keynesian and Monetary. I will mention here 
fundamental economists which influenced my general understanding of the labour market and 
economy as such and, definitely, influenced on my macroeconomic vision within Ukraine. 
Classical concept. Scottish economist Adam SMITH (1723-1790) revealed most 
notable ideas of modern free market division of labour and the “invisible hand” in his work 
“The Wealth of Nations” (1776). British classical economist David RICARDO (1772-1823) 
worth mentioning on his contribution to the labour theory of value in his most famous work 
“Principles of Political Economy and Taxation” (1817). 
Marxist concept. Karl MARX (1818-1883), Prussian-born economist and more, his 
theories about society, economics, and politics (collectively understood as Marxism) hold that 
human societies develop through class struggle; in capitalism, this manifests itself in the conflict 
between the ruling classes (bourgeoisie) that control the means of production and working 
classes (proletariat) that enable these means by selling their labour for wages. This author is 
also typically cited as one of the principal architects of modern social science. 
Neoclassical concept. Alfred MARSHALL (1842-1924), British economist, is 
known among founders of neoclassical economics, his book “Principles of Economics” (1890) 
brings the ideas of supply and demand, marginal utility and costs of production. Another British 
economist Arthur Cecil PIGOU (1877-1959) worked on analysis of a range of labour-market 
phenomena studied by subsequent economists, including collective bargaining, wage rigidity, 
internal labour markets, segmented labour market and human capital. 
Institutional concept. Thorstein Bunde VEBLEN (1857-1929), was a Norwegian-
American economist, he explains the concept in his work “The Theory of the Leisure Class” 
(1899). Within the history of economic thought, this author is considered the leader of the 
institutional economics movement. John Thomas DUNLOP (1914-2003), was an American 
government official and labor scholar, he produced a considerable body of articles, books, 
reports with his work “Industrial Relations Systems” (1958) regarded as his biggest 
achievement, where he studied over how relationships among labor, management and 
government were structured, and evolved over time. John Kenneth GALBRAITH (1908-2006), 
was a Canadian-born economist, in his work “American Capitalism: The Concept of 
Countervailing Power” (1952), he concluded that the US economy was managed by a 
triumvirate of big business, big labor and an activist government. His major proposal was a 
19 
program he called “investment in men” – a large-scale, publicly funded education program 
aimed at empowering ordinary citizens. 
Keynesian concept. John Maynard KEYNES (1883-1946), was a British economist 
whose ideas fundamentally changed the theory and practice of macroeconomics and the 
economic policies of governments. Most famous work is “The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money” (1936). 
Monetarism concept. Milton FRIEDMAN (1912-2006), American economist who 
received the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his research on consumption 
analysis, monetary history and theory, and the complexity of stabilization policy. Famous for 
his critique of the concept of the natural rate of unemployment (1968), stated that in the long 
run unemployment will be determined by the frictions and imperfections of the labor market. 
Fritz MACHLUP (1902-1983), an Austrian-American economist, was one of the first 
economists to examine knowledge as an economic resource and is credited with popularizing 
the concept of the information society. Lionel ROBBINS (1898-1984), British economist, is 
known for his proposed definition of economics and for his instrumental efforts in shifting 
Anglo-Saxon economics from its “Marshallian direction”. 
 
Background to the problem. The Independence Day is a quarter century behind 
(back to 1991) and the most recent events in social, economic and political dimensions of my 
country signaling that we missed the proper opportunities for the implementation of coherent 
concept for the labor market policy. Which resulted to a transition delay from a centrally-
planned economy to a market-oriented in due time. Today we are the only backward country in 
the region. Worldwide and regional economic climate of 1990s and 2000s drastically changed, 
thus reform pass experience of neighbor most successful countries, purely as a stencil, is not 
applicable — neighboring markets simply became stronger and more competitive, formed 
stable trade interconnections and we need to reconsider, and re-shape approaches under the 
curtain of 2010s. 
Very crucial for our story is the modern state of the labour market and its 
institutional adaptation driven by political concern through observed decades. Retrospective 
analysis is more eloquent when studying curve dynamics of economy performance and social 
security variables through the decades. Also, similar starting points, a similar historical past, 
comparable transitional results among former socialist-background countries that today 
managed to evaluate closely to the level of developed ones are another expressive argument. 
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Arrangement of chapters. Thus, for evaluation of institutional provisions to the 
labour market in Ukraine, I will dedicate the first chapter, starting form the background to the 
problem, which provide conceptual vision for economic and political development trends 
afterwards. Statistical and comparative research as a background for the main trends analysis 
through the all subchapter’s labour market categories such as: initial institutional framework 
installment and development; types of property and forms of management assessment, 
evaluation and main phases of privatization processes; overview of macroeconomic 
performance and fiscal balance of investments estimation; state course on defensive 
restructuring, informal sector and shadow market; supply and demand imbalances, human 
capital deterioration; unemployment politicization; wages’ polarization, taxation and social 
security; and institutional weakness – all these observations will lead us to certain conclusions. 
To my belief, conclusions of the first chapter will serve us as a good basement for 
shaping recommendations for the state policy concept formation and for policy makers’ 
implementation in favor of balanced approaches for the sake of the labour market improvements 
in Ukraine — this is our second chapter is all about. I will try to deliver in this chapter weighted 
conclusions and recommendations for the possible practical use by decision making bodies and 
authorities in Ukraine in favor of the well-being of the country performance. Qualitative 
coherent improvements cannot be imagined without synchronous four focal pillars as a 
departure point in Ukrainian context, these are: productivity enhancement, employment 
restructuring, reform of labour remuneration and proper institutional reforms. All this should 
be proceeded within our hypothetical statement’s proposals explained above. 
In our final section we conclude on our observations about immature, unbalanced 
and ineffective organizational climate of the Ukrainian labour market and propose to follow 
vital solutions of our second chapter observations and recommendations for urgent 
improvements to be done. 
I would like to emphasize in this introduction also, that such a disastrous situation, 
described in chapter one, cannot last forever as it will intensify macroeconomic imbalances 
further in the form of rising inflation and the current account deficit under the current 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) program with Ukraine1, since competitiveness is a 
challenge not only for enterprises, but also for individuals and society (Bob DEACON, 1997 
and 2007), that there is also an urgent need for better strategies in education and training, health 
care, demography and migration labour policies.  
                                                          
1 NBU / bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=38126683; 
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CHAPTER 1. INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
1.1 Background to the problem 
 
Ukraine got its independence with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in 1991, which was really sudden for the majority of the population (69 
years2 under the Soviet propaganda), despite it was clearly anticipated by the historic breakup 
of the whole socialistic camp – the first signal of which arrived when the Berlin Wall fell in 
November 1989. 
Such neighboring nowadays European Union’s (EU) countries as Poland (joined it 
since 2004), Slovakia (2004), Hungary (2004) and Romania (2007), which directly border 
Ukraine, have never been a part of the USSR but were solely under centrally planned economy 
system directed by respective communist regimes. We mention them for the strong historical 
context presented here for evident comparison purpose. 
Apparent failure of the market socialism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
countries well studied, for instance in Hungary (Janos KORNAI, 1986) and Poland (Hartmut 
LEHMANN, 2012). Sum-up of numerous forced attempts to apply market principles to 
centrally planned economies during 1980s by respective communist governments, who were 
desperately trying to preserve the then political system, measurably failed for at least by two 
reasons. 
Firstly, centrally planned economy bureaucratic coordination is the only principal 
mechanism, prescribed by law, that organizes economic and political (even cultural and social) 
spheres of life instead of relying on market coordination practices and approaches. Communist 
so-called “nomenclature” jealously guarded its economic and political monopoly, thus 
coexistence of bureaucratic and market coordination is counterproductive, especially 
where the public ownership of the means of production strongly dominates. 
“Whenever there is a conflict between bureaucratic and market 
coordination, the former wins since the main agents in a centrally planned economy, i.e. central 
bureaucrats but also firm managers, are foremost members of a bureaucratic apparatus that 
has as its main aim the preservation of its monopoly position in society”3. 
                                                          
2 On 28 December 1922, a conference of plenipotentiary delegations from the Russian SFSR (Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic), the Transcaucasian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR approved the Treaty 
on the Creation of the USSR; 
3 Hartmut LEHMANN (2012), The Polish Growth Miracle: Outcome of Persistent Reform Efforts, Policy Paper 
No. 40, University of Bologna and IZA, pg. 8; 
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Secondly, price signals determine a more efficient allocation of resources, which 
strongly influence the behavior of buyers and sellers. Since prices and the interests of 
bureaucrats from the center, managers and workers are hardly interlinked in a centrally 
planned economy, price signals cannot make a really due influence on the behavior of the agents 
under such conditions. 
“For example, the well-being of a manager directing a firm depends 
[primarily] nearly exclusively on plan fulfillment and [secondary] not on profits achieved by 
maximizing the difference between the price and the costs of production since loss making firms 
are always bailed out by the center. So, there are no [to some extent] incentives for this manager 
to respond to price signals and to economize on the costs of production. Thus, trying to 
incorporate market coordination via prices into a centrally planned economy turned out to be 
rather futile”4. 
This failure of market socialism is important for our study, since economists in 
Ukraine were not involved in the reform efforts associated with market socialism in due time 
as their counterparts did in Poland and Hungary. Lessons were not learned about the hard way 
that half-and-half reforms, that took place in Ukraine, of the central planning system did not 
lead to sustainable increases in efficiency: nether in the short and no in the long term. That is 
the main reason why in Poland, and in other comparably successful CEE transition countries 
after the collapse of communism, those directly working on economic reform saw only one 
sensible reform path — the direct transition to an economy, based on market principles and on 
predominantly private ownership of the means of production. 
Sudden change of entire political system in Ukraine together with a weak traditions 
of wide active participation of the civil society derived to the worst scenario of economic and 
demographic performance among former USSR and the CEE transitional countries. Belgian 
economist Gerard ROLAND (2002) arrives to the conclusion about striking difference between 
Poland, where two powerful organizations— the Catholic Church and the [Independent Self-
governing] Trade Union Solidarity — counterbalanced the communist elites, upheld civic 
virtues, who engaged “in a frenzy of asset grabbing once it was clear that the communist regime 
was dead”5. 
Absolutely opposite happened to Ukraine, where former communists managed to 
held power simply “repainted” themselves into democratic “colors”. 
                                                          
4 Ibid; 
5 Gerard ROLAND (2002), The Political Economy of Transition, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, 
pg. 47; 
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“In most respects the Verkhovna Rada's [Ukrainian Parliament] 
organization and composition was the same as the USSR Supreme Soviet” 6. 
Even enormously delayed, in September 2014, law on government cleansing (so-
called “Lustration Law of Ukraine”7) — miserably failed, according to the recent official 
Brussels’ documental opinion8. Firstly, concerning the collective nature of responsibility in the 
process of lustration, contrary to the instructions of the Resolution № 1096 of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. Secondly — decentralized nature of the procedure, which 
to my strong belief, was intentionally written down in the norm of the law, making it difficult 
to adequate control over it. Recent published legal review of respectful English edition’s 
Ukrainian newspaper9 supports insolvency of this very law. 
Similar draft bills on lustration were unsuccessfully submitted to the Ukrainian 
Parliament in 2004 (outcome of the “Orange Revolution”), 2005 and 2012. As of March 2017 
the Unified State Register of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine consist only of 935 people to 
whom the provisions of the Law were used10. Above all is the fact, that lustration is not equal 
for all: President of Ukraine had the right to manually cancel lustration provisions of top 
military and security officials11. Also, there is a discussion in society, for example, judges’ 
lustration considered as not restoring confidence rather banal revenge and the re-construction 
of a totalitarian state. 
“The role of the social safety net in helping overcome political 
constraints is quite clear. In the case of central European countries like Poland and the Czech 
Republic, the social safety net has helped to mitigate the negative effects of transition on income 
inequality, especially for the most vulnerable proportions of the population”12. 
Let me highlight, that such “productive” civic virtues were absent in the USSR with 
the exception of ideological activity of really prominent world known dissidents — Alexander 
SOLJENÍTSIN, Andrei SAKHAROV; and the Soviet Helsinki Groups’ activity, including 
Ukrainian branch – the “Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki 
                                                          
6 Sarah WHITMORE (2004), State Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990-2003, Routledge; 1 
edition, pg. 27; 
7 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1682-18; 
8 Venice Commission (2015), Final opinion. On the law on government cleansing (lustration law) of Ukraine, 
European Commission for Democracy Through Law, p. 20; 
9 Hanna MALIAR (2016), Fake Lustration, English version of newspaper “Ukrayinska Pravda” / 
pravda.com.ua/eng/columns/2016/06/14/7111719/; 
10 Ministry of Justice of Ukraine / lustration.minjust.gov.ua/register; 
11 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/132-19/paran2#n2; 
12 Gerard ROLAND (2002), The Political Economy of Transition, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, 
pg. 45; 
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Accords on Human Rights”13. The Ukrainian Group was founded in November 1976 and was 
active until 1981 until all members were jailed. 
British academic Bob DEACON (1997) comprehensively described position of 
some immature civil societies of developing countries, to my understanding seen as one of 
the main reasons of lustration failure in Ukraine and, unfortunately, seen today as between “a 
hammer and an anvil”: nationally and internationally. 
“Opportunity created by the collapse of communism for the global 
actors to shape the future of social policy has been grasped enthusiastically by the dominant 
liberal tendency in the World Bank. In alliance with social development NGOs [non-
governmental organizations] who are being given a part to play especially in zones of 
instability, a social safety net future is being constructed. This NGO support combined with the 
political support of many southern and some East European governments is challenging 
powerfully those defenders of universalist and social security based welfare states to be found 
in the EU, the [International Labour Organization] ILO and in smaller number in the [World] 
Bank”14. 
A quarter century has passed since its independence and Ukraine today even has 
not got back to the pre-transition level of its gross domestic product (GDP). 
 
Chart 1. GDP of 2013 compare to 1990 (%) 
 
                                                          
13 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe / www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true; 
14 Bob DEACON (1997), with Stubbs, P. and Hulse, M., Global Social Policy: International Organisations and 
the Future of Welfare. London: Sage, pg. 197; 
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Definition: GDP, according to the WB DI, – is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Source: these calculations was presented by Mr. Rudolf TRAUB-MERZ (2015), the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) in Russia representative during the Conference: “Trade 
Unions in Russia”, on 3rd November 2015 at “Auditório Jorge TÁPIA”, Institute of Economy, 
UNICAMP 
 
Chart above demonstrates how Ukraine’s economy is seen among international 
scholar society, in this case by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [Academic Foundation] (FES), 
which is one of the Germany’s oldest (1925) organisation, that promotes democracy, political 
education and promote students of outstanding intellectual abilities and personality. 
Ukraine inherited from the USSR confident industrial and agricultural growth as 
economy basement. Moreover, extreme political opponents of the Ukrainian state, frankly, 
pro-Russian, states: 
“Newly independent Ukraine [1991] had: the world’s 10th economy, 
40% of the Soviet military industry, 60% of the heavy industry, well-developed agriculture and 
the most fertile land in the world, unlimited potential for transit, proximity and borders with 
prosperous Europe, positive demographic picture, highly trained work force and modern half 
a million-strong army, cheap energy subsidies from Russia”.15 
These are only “pros” listed in the quote above, but what about “cons”: they must 
be, if we considering free market with its inherent and frequently changing completive nature?! 
No doubt, Ukraine occupied a very important place in the former USSR, especially when we 
consider military-industrial complex agony that was embedded in the Ukraine’s whole 
economy and other related sectors. 
By the time Ukraine regained its independence, the bulk of outputs from its 
industrial sector could find markets only in the neighboring republics from the former socialistic 
camp, moreover via personal governments’ interlinks and even those markets were rapidly 
disappearing: welcome to the reality of a free market. Definitely, the majority of products, 
especially consumer goods, were not competitive with Western European markets: due to 
price or quality, or both; evident example – is the difference in the overall standard of living 
                                                          
15 “Russia Insider” news media platform / russia-insider.com/en/politics/ukraine-had-every-opportunity-after-
collapse-soviet-unionbut-they-blew-it/ri7150; 
26 
of the Eastern and the Western newly unified parts of Germany in 1989. Breathtaking 
exhibitions of the DDR Museum16 and Stasi Museum17 reveals overwhelming gap between two 
Germanys, and this is despite the fact that the USSR tried to make a showcase from the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), exporting only best goods and providing economical subsidies 
there and favorable treaty to propagate its ideology and economic “superiority”. 
Marta DYCZOK (2000), Canadian researcher, discovers that construction, 
metallurgy and the military-industrial complex accounted for 74%18 out of total Ukrainian 
industry, and that consumer demand could not be satisfied as a result, because domestic supply 
of consumer goods was not forthcoming. 
I have managed to find the detailed interview of the former Ukrainian President 
Leonid KRAVCHUK back to 1995, where he successfully, in my opinion, addresses today’s 
idealization of the Soviet legacy inherited by Ukraine: explains, mainly, why Ukraine failed. In 
this article former President essentially omitting own mistakes made by the decision-making 
authorities, which we explain by discrepancy between the institutional environment and 
economic realities, opaque privatization, shadow market and defensive restructuring in chapters 
1.3, 1.4 and 1.6: 
“Firstly, 90% of Ukraine’s “domestic” product was not controlled by 
Ukraine itself, but by various ministries of the central Soviet government. This product was 
brought to 80% completion in Ukraine, and then sent (most often) to Russia for the final stages 
of production. A third of the USSR's military-industrial complex was situated in Ukraine, 
accounting for 2,5 million jobs. 
Second, it should be kept in mind that this product was not sold on any 
market, it was simply delivered. Once the Soviet system fell apart, the orders dried up, and 
Ukraine's economy plunged into crisis. 
It is quite paradoxical that Ukraine’s malaise was greater than that felt 
in countries that relied primarily on their raw materials, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
despite its broader industrial base”19. 
Thus we have sufficient evidences to summarize here about the sectoral 
imbalances and broke up of the chains of semi-finished products: both latter sources’ 
                                                          
16 www.theguardian.com/travel/blog/2013/mar/13/gdr-museum-berlin-east-germany; 
17 www.ddr-museum.de/en/collection/exhibition; 
18 Marta DYCZOK (2000), Ukraine: Movement Without Change, Change Without Movement, Harwood 
Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, pg. 33; 
19 The Ukrainian Weekly Newspaper (1995), Interview: Leonid KRAVCHUK on Ukrainian politics and 
society, № 4, Kyiv, P. 20 / ukrweekly.com/archive/1995/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1995-04.pdf; 
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observations accentuate the predicament that confronts Ukraine’s inherited industrial sector. 
Semi-finished products destined for other plants, not for consumer markets. As dictated 
according to the Soviet interpretation and implementation of the Marxist capital structure and 
by central planning administrators in Kremlin, goods were produced step-by-step in highly 
specialized and highly coordinated series of plants. Now that there is no longer core directing 
this cumbersome process, and now that these plants are dispersed across all fifteen different 
former Soviet republics, the chains of production disintegrated from single compound cluster 
and consequently industrial production has essentially declined (see chart’s 3 decline between 
1989 – 1999). 
Another feature is the population’s demand for employment that traditionally was 
fully satisfied: even if sometimes provided with obligatory or limited choice of the first 
workplace (virgin soil for instance). Before 1992 unemployment was not observed as 
significant statistical phenomenon. Back to the USSR, employment avoidance was a 
publishable crime, job placement for youth was guaranteed by the state provisions 
(especially first place of employment). The challenge at the time was how to keep a young 
specialist at his or her first place of work, not how to enter the labour market itself. 
Thus, dismantling of the socialist centrally planned economy revealed range of 
weaknesses in the national economic system: an overemphasis on the manufacturing of 
products for military purposes and the domination of the mining and metallurgical 
industries (Eastern Ukraine), to the detriment of other machine building sectors and the 
manufacturing of consumer products. 
As for agriculture, it required an excessive consumption of energy, water and, 
due to technological backwardness, larger labour resources. Energy consumption levels 
(Aigul ABSAMETOVA (2013) in CIS countries dramatically exceeded those in developed 
countries, Ukraine is in 2,5 times consume more, which had a negative influence on the 
competitiveness of the region’s economies, and in the 1990s some of these indicators 
deteriorated even further. 
The situation was exacerbated during 1990s by the fact that almost 70 %20 of 
Ukrainian enterprises had no markets beyond those established through the historical integrated 
production chains of the USSR and the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic 
                                                          
20 Ella LIBANOVA (2013), Labour market transitions of young women and men in Ukraine, Work4Youth 
Publication Series No. 11, ILO, pg. 3; 
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Assistance (COMECON)21. The rupture of economic links between the former USSR and the 
Central and Eastern European countries complicated interior political and social 
transformations (privatization and the establishment of state and market institutions) and led to 
a severe economic crisis, which was multiplied by the world financial crisis in 1998 and 
consequently Russia – the main trading partner of Ukraine. 
For the Ukrainian economy, initial stage began from stagnation of industrial 
production and negative trade balance intensifying, high (hyper) inflation (chart 9), mass 
external migration, defensive (chaotic) restructuring of economic sectors (chapter 1.6), declines 
and delays in wages and growing (including non-registered) unemployment (table 8). The end 
of state mechanisms to regulate private enterprise, which evidently due to former background 
officials’ preservation, led to the elimination of well-established links between education 
and employment, resulting in the termination of first job guarantees for graduates of learning 
institutions. 
Anders ASLUND (2015), Sweden leading specialist on economic policy in Eastern 
Europe, especially on Russia and Ukraine, argues the following: 
“Ukraine’s economic structure in 1989 was surprisingly similar to 
Poland’s, one could guess that its structure will evolve as Poland’s did if Ukraine’s reforms 
and integration with Europe are successful. Initially, Poland exported more steel and 
chemicals, but soon these industries went into decline. Ukraine’s chemical industry produces 
primarily fertilizers from previously cheap Russian gas and looks like a sunset industry. 
Ukrainian steel exports are likely to decline in the short term, but Ukraine enjoys evident 
comparative advantages and can presumably remain a competitive steel producer after 
substantial modernization. Agriculture and food processing are currently the boom industries, 
as Ukraine is restoring its position as the breadbasket of Europe”22 
Indeed, comparing these two countries for “GDP per capita” as our measure of 
economic performance, we witnessing skyrocketing positive dynamic for Poland. 
Deep transformation shock on Ukraine’s path from command to a market-oriented 
economy went through a period of extraordinary inflationary bouts and hyperinflation, brought 
on by a wage-price spiral growth, was characterized by pervasive shortages, large shadow 
                                                          
21 Economic organization from 1949 to 1991 under the leadership of the Soviet Union that comprised the 
countries of the Eastern Bloc along with a number of communist states elsewhere in the world; 
22 Anders ASLUND (2015), Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, DC, pg. 50; 
29 
sector (chapter 1.6) and high budget deficits: in 1993 consumer prices beat a new record 
reaching 10250%, year later the overall budget deficit totaled 15 % of GDP23. 
Chart 2. GDP per capita (current, USD) for Ukraine (bottom line) and Poland  
between 1989 — 2015 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the WB DI; retrieved: 03/23/2017 / 
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
 
Disintegration of production, broken trade links between former Soviet republics 
and enormously opaque privatization (chapter 1.4) by those “repainted into democratic colors” 
ended up for Ukraine among the least unsuccessful transition economies. The most attractive 
enterprises and other industrial capacities were artificially brought to bankruptcy, and then they 
were redeemed at underpriced prices through parliament's influential groups of those who 
afterwards “evaluate” and whom we call our days the “big business of Ukraine”. 
The first wave of privatization (we devoted separate chapter for this topic further) 
of state-owned enterprises that commenced in Ukraine as independent state in 1992 and the 
creation of private firms brought about dramatic changes in the ownership structure of 
employment. The state sector’s share of employment decreased from 60,6% in 1992 to 27,2% 
in 200624, a decrease that was offset by corresponding increases in the shares of municipal and 
private enterprises. 
See comparison of statistic estimation available online since 2008 by form of 
management enterprises and registered share of employment in the next table below. 
                                                          
23 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
74; 
24 Ibid, pg. 32; 
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Table 1. Wage employees (%, registered) by organizational forms of economic activities  
in 2008 and 2015 
Form of management 2015 2008  
Total (million) 8,064 11,389 
State enterprise 3,3% 4,3% 
Municipal enterprise 3,9% 3,9% 
Corporation 13,1% 13,3% 
Limited liability company 23,2% 17,0% 
Separated subdivision (without legal status) 12,0% 15,3% 
Private company 3,3% 3,2% 
Public authority 7,7% NA 
Local government 5,6% NA 
State organization 9,7% NA 
Communal organization 13,7% NA 
Other 4,5% 43,0%* 
 
* For this cell data provided by the SSSU includes all “NA” above; 
Sources: SSSU’s Yearbook (2009), Labour Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 176 / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/katalog/pracia/Pracsa.zip; SSSU’s Yearbook (2016), Labour Market in Ukraine, 
Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 113 / ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/zb/08/zb_pu15pdf.zip 
 
Chart 3. Annual real GDP growth (%, bars) and GDP  
(constant LCU*, %, 1989=100%, line) in Ukraine 1989 — 2015 
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* Constant local currency unit (LCU) series show the data for each year in the value of a 
particular base year; 
Source: author’s calculations, data from database of the WB DI; retrieved in May 2017 / 
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
 
Chart above demonstrates that GDP growth recovered only after a decade of 
continuous decline in 2000. For the sake of the argument, economic growth resumed in 1992 
in Poland (Chart 2), in 1993 in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, in 1994 
in Hungary, Bulgaria and the Baltic States, in 1996 in Kazakhstan, in 1999 in Russia (WB DI, 
retrieved in March 2017). 
The main undisputable message I recalled as widely discussed in Ukraine in 2004 
was that majority of factories and other industrial capacities that did not operate during 1990s, 
caused by opaque privatization, afterwards recycling of industrial capacities, brought us a single 
one benefit — the ecology environment has improved significantly. The Kyoto Protocol25 on 
Climate Change was ratified in Ukraine the same year and government even was negotiating 
selling relevant national pollution quotas, since remained industrial complex and plants showed 
moderate economic dynamics. 
In addition, tendency for increased world demand and rising prices for metals, new 
wave of depreciation of national currency contributed to fueling growth in real exports, 
favorable external conditions like transiting a cheap gas supplies. Also, intensified investment 
demand as a consequence of ongoing industry modernization and booming construction, 
especially in transport industry (2002 — 2004) and tourism. Ukraine is transit country with 
advantageous geographical position allows for the location of a number of International 
Transport Corridors on its territory, in particular: Pan-European transport corridors № 3, 5, 7, 
9; Rail Co-Operation Corridors (ORC) № 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and European Transport Corridors — 
Caucasus — Asia (TRACECA) and Europe — Asia. Any tendency for increased demand within 
Ukrainian specified region is beneficial for cargo transit. 
We draw the line here for the purpose of background to the problem block of the 
very first chapter by presenting catastrophic demographic decline that only remained uncovered 
yet, which was admitted even by my supervisors back to 2015 GLU Master course at 
UNICAMP, as it looks like prolonged civil war happening in Ukraine. 
                                                          
25 An international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
which commits its Parties by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets / 
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php; 
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Chart 4. Total population (million, left axis) of Ukraine between 1990 — 2016: 
urban, rural, men and women 
 
Source: author’s calculations according to the SSSU official data / ukrstat.gov.ua 
 
Notably, that total population in 2016 equals to total of 1960, drastic reduction of 
population between 2014 and 2015 explains with recent annexation of Crimean Peninsula, 
increased Ukrainian migrants and refuges which, according to the Global Conflict Tracker, 
estimates to 1,1 million26 after war conflict first erupted in early 2014 on Eastern border 
(Donetsk and Lugansk region) of Ukraine. For the 25 years’ period slight positive dynamic was 
observed between 1990 and 1993, afterwards was steady decline resulted in net loss of 
population which constitutes to 9,4 million out of its historical maximum that equals to 52,2 
million people back to 1993. 
 
1.2 Disclaimer on the national statistics standard 
 
Definitions for the labour market of Ukraine corresponds in general to those defined 
by the ILO and used by the EU member states. In accordance with the State Statistic Service of 
Ukraine (SSSU) “Methodological Notes”27, sample survey (known in international practice as 
“Labour Force Survey” (LFS) for economically active population implemented since 1995. 
According to the SSSU, “employed” defines as a person who: 
                                                          
26 Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker / cfr.org/global/global-conflict-
tracker/p32137#!/conflict/conflict-in-ukraine; 
27 SSSU / ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2006/rp/met_u.htm ; 
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a) worked employed for at least one hour in the course of surveyed week for 
remuneration in cash or in kind, individually (solely) at individuals’ or at personal (family) 
business; worked for free at a company, at personal venture, belonging to any of the household 
members, or at private peasant venture [subsistence agriculture] for the purpose of products 
sales, produced as a result of these activities; 
b) were temporarily absent from work, that is formally had a workplace, own 
venture (business), but did not work during the surveyed period for some reason. 
LFS before 2004 in regard to parameter of item “a)” definition stated “30 hours” 
norm instead of “one hour”28. Also, since January 2006 military personnel was added to this 
statistical calculation29. This phenomenon in Ukraine is known as “statistical artefact”, which 
of course influenced “sudden” growth provided by LFS in due time. 
Before we proceed further into labour market pattern research, let me indicate other 
serious methodological drawbacks that are exist. Most labour indicators are estimated only for 
a fraction of employed people: it excludes people employed in statistically small enterprises, in 
entrepreneurs-physical people, under civil law contracts (sub-contractor agreements) and 
military personnel.30 
Statistically small [also micro differs by the law] enterprises in Ukraine are 
enterprises in which the average listed number of employees during a reference financial year 
does not exceed 10 and gross revenues do not exceed an amount equivalent to 2 million EUR 
(calculated according to the average yearly National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) EUR/UAH 
exchange rate). 31 Since the SSSU survey registers only official information given by 
enterprises, it misses out on important information about labour and wages in the informal 
economy. According to the Ukraine Law on State Statistics (chapter V, article 21)32, raw firm-
level data are not available to researchers and other interested parties because of their 
confidentiality. 
Until 2009 inclusive survey did not covered employees in statistically small 
businesses and individual entrepreneurs, in 2010 — workers of small enterprises with number 
of employees less than 10 persons and individual entrepreneurs. Due to changes in the 
organization and supervision units’ coverage survey, direct comparison of 2010 and the 
                                                          
28 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
7; 
29 Decree (2005) of the SSSU / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1442-05; 
30 See section: “Methodology and classifications” on the SSSU web-page / ukrstat.gov.ua/; 
31 Economic Code of Ukraine, chapter 2, para 6, article 55 / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/436-15; 
32 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2614-12; 
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following years with similar data from previous years is incorrect (Methodological 
Explanations (2017)33. 
The first, and the only so far, all-Ukrainian census of the population was carried out 
in December 2001, covered more than 48 million people, next was scheduled for 2011, then it 
was rescheduled for 202034. Political opposition blames the other day the ruling party on census 
postponing, arguing that the reason is not entirely financial issue, rather afraid of the peoples’ 
concern that may raise afterwards the official conclusion, hinting evident demographic 
catastrophe. 
Developed and implemented by the SSSU, LFS for the first time was conducted in 
1995 as we already mentioned, until 1998 inclusively was conducting on yearly basis, 
afterwards — quarterly, starting from 2004 and further — monthly. LFS divides the working 
age population into three mutually exclusive groups — employed, unemployed and 
economically inactive (not in the labour force). The LFS sample is nationally representative, 
covers the civilian, non-institutionalized population between the ages of 15 and 70 according 
to provisions of the Law of Ukraine on Employment of the Population35. 
The Ukrainian LFS in comparison with the surveys conducted in other countries is 
disadvantageous by absence of information on wage rates, union status, employer’s form of 
ownership and the means of subsistence. 
Worse mentioning that the coefficient of variation is less than 5 %,36 thus almost 
all LFS estimates are reliable not only at the national level, but also by regions and socio-
demographic characteristics. 
The value of the coefficient of variation (CV) is often used as an indicator of the 
suitability of the data for analysis. According to the SSSU Method (2006) 37, if CV <= 5%, the 
assessment is considered accurate; if 5% <= CV <= 10% — rating suitable for quantitative 
analysis, but its accuracy is not high enough; if 10% <CV <= 25% — rating suitable only for 
qualitative analysis and should be used carefully (sometimes data is published for which the 
CV is 30% or even around 40%). 
                                                          
33 ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2006/rp/met_u.htm; 
34 SSSU / ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/; 
35 ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=90529&p_classification=08 ; 
36 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
7; 
37 ukrstat.gov.ua/metod_polog/metod_doc/2006/639/metod.htm; 
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The least reliable estimate is the unemployment rate by age, educational attainment 
and regions, in some cases coefficient of variation reaches 50%, thus we double check these 
scope of target group with alternative sources38. 
Concluding on this brief statistic methodology intervention, let me argue technician 
side of the SSSU official web-site “www.ukrstat.gov.ua” as of April 2017, in terms of 
transparency and easy-of-access it should be improved or even re-develop appropriately to their 
analogs used by the ILO, the EUROSTAT39 or the WB DI, which we already cited. First of all, 
you can’t cite a reference by unique link to the data of your research (source), even key labour 
market indicators data is hidden behind identical “home” web-link. Secondly, export to tabular 
is very limited and chart construction is absent, thus preparing promptly descriptive research 
material requires senseless extra routine that should be avoided. Finally, search tool is not 
available within the content. 
 
1.3 Institutional framework of the labour market installment 
 
According to the Law of Ukraine on Employment of the Population (2012): “labour 
market — is a system of legal, social and labour, economic and organizational relationships 
that arise between job seekers, workers, trade unions, employers and their organizations, and 
public authorities in the course of meeting the workers’ need for employment and the 
employers’ need for recruitment according to legislation”40. 
According to recent official Ukrainian educational program on labour economy, 
modern legislative basis which regulates labour relations in Ukraine, consist of more than 120 
laws and great amount of connected subordinate legislation (Liubov SEMIV, 2013). On 
practice it means overregulation by combination of numerous legal and administrative 
limitations together with weak legal and disciplinary mechanisms called for its fulfilment 
control. 
Very visual is the USSR Supreme Soviet [Parliament] quantitate legislative output 
of the first nine consecutive convocations compare to Ukrainian Parliament law-making 
initiative of the incomplete eight consecutive convocations since 1991 (last session will be in 
                                                          
38 Ukraine Longitudinal Monitoring Survey / ghdx.healthdata.org/series/ukraine-longitudinal-monitoring-
survey; 
39 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. Its mission is to provide high 
quality statistics for Europe / ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/browse-statistics-by-theme; 
40 Author’s translation based on official web-source of Ukrainian Parliament / 
zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5067-17?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYBG.ZiJltbw2HI4cQs80msh8Ie6; 
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November 2019). Thus, USSR [Parliament] produced in total 1732 laws within 41 years 
(legislative acts, decrees, declarations, statute laws and other subordinate legislation), which is 
in average 42 of all kind of regulatory laws per year41. Ukrainian Parliament, in turn, 
produced in total 5850 laws (803 expired already out of total) within 25 and a half years, 
which is in average 229 of all kind of regulatory laws per year42. For detailed review, see a 
summary table compiled by the author on the basis of public data of the Ukrainian Parliament 
in Annex 1 “The law-making activity by Ukrainian Parliament 1991 — q1 2017, quantitative 
indicators”. 
Core defining legislations today for labour relations in Ukraine are: the Constitution 
of Ukraine43 (1996), the Labor Code of Ukraine44 (1971), the Law of Ukraine on Labour 
Protection45 (1992), the Law of Ukraine on Collective Agreements46 (1993), the Law of Ukraine 
on Labour Remuneration47 (1995), the Law of Ukraine on Leave48 (1996), the Law of Ukraine 
on Employment of the Population (2012). The new one Labor Code of Ukraine (2017) is 
expected to be adopted finally by the Parliament this year, which will replace the current one, 
foreseen date is not visible yet. 
At the beginning of transitional process in Ukraine, we inherited relatively balanced 
system of legislative basis, that was “run-in” and tested for decades, which we simply adopted 
to the new unbalanced realities (we will speak below about the broken production links). 
The process of institutionalization of social dialogue in Ukraine happened through 
the Concept and the Program of the U-SSR transition to a market economy, which were based 
on the provisions of the “Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine” (1990) and the Law of 
the U-SSR “On economic independence U-SSR” (1990). Notably, that initiated formation of 
the concept of labor market institutions, capital goods, finance, labor, and housing part of social 
and cultural life were given the status of the goods, their formation and use of subordinated 
laws of commodity-money circulation. 
Thus, for the purpose of setting a new labour market pattern of Ukraine we actually 
“imported” a standard set of institutions that operated in developed countries with rich traditions 
                                                          
41 Daniel N. NELSON, Stephen White (1982), Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, Macmillan 
Press ltd, pg. 145; 
42 Author’s calculations based on official data from Ukrainian Parliament / 
zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/tt1001; 
43 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254к/96-вр; 
44 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/322-08; 
45 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2694-12; 
46 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3356-12; 
47 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/108/95-вр; 
48 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/504/96-вр; 
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of social dialogue, despite we were warned by international organizations, especially ILO and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to have a 
comprehensive approach. Thus, minimum wage was introduced (July 1991), but the ILO 
Convention 131 (1970) on Minimum Wage was ratified much later (October 2005).49  
The basis for the organization of wages is a tariff system of remuneration (uniform 
tariff grid50), which includes tariffs, tariff rates, salaries schemes and tariff-qualification 
characteristics (reference) for budgetary wage workers was set up. An indication of the 
complexity of the work is the category under which charged some work; however, the category 
is also an indicator of the skill level of the worker. Relevant article of the Labor Code (№ 96) 
changed seven times already (1991, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2004 and 2016), each time through 
the adoption of a special law in the Parliament. 
Conditionally for visual perception, see two following passages divided on 1990s 
and 2000s — 2010s. 
1990s / Governmental programs providing employment implemented and system 
of unemployment security installed: the Coordinating Committee for Employment (1991), the 
Law of Ukraine on Public Associations (1992) adopted, was signed the first agreement between 
the Government and trade union associations (1992), the National Council for Social 
Partnership (1993) established, the Law of Ukraine on Collective Agreements (1993) adopted, 
concluded the first tariff agreement between the government and trade union associations, 
endorsed the concept of social welfare of the population (1993) and established the National 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (1998). 
2000s — 2010s / As for development of the social dialogue in Ukraine, it arrived 
with a great lag: the Law of Ukraine on Trade Unions, their Rights and Guarantees (1999) 
adopted; the Law of Ukraine on the Employers' Organizations (2001) adopted; was signed the 
Decree of the President of Ukraine on Social Dialogue in Ukraine (2005); government adopted 
the order “On approval of a Plan for the Development of Social Dialogue in Ukraine” (2006); 
the Law of Ukraine “On the Cabinet of Ministers [government] of Ukraine” adopted (2010), in 
accordance with article 20 of the law, the government is “a party [side] of social dialogue at the 
national level; the Law of Ukraine on Social Dialogue in Ukraine (2010); and the Law of 
Ukraine “On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Definition of 
the Parties of Collective Bargaining” (2012, the levels of collective bargaining defined and their 
parties). 
                                                          
49 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/993_149; 
50 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1298-2002-п; 
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Thus, associations of employers were established, trade unions reorganized, 
National Tripartite Social and Economic Council was created (December 2005) as the supreme 
interest’s humanization body according to the Law on Social Dialogue in Ukraine (December 
2010). 51 
All these were happening in spontaneous manner, even by timeline judgement, 
since received limited financial provisions (current state of Ukrainian statistics in chapter 1.2) 
and was developing in traditional for Ukraine absence of political consensus. The tragic 
(suspicious) deaths of weighty (presidentially ambitions) political opponents (Viacheslav 
CHORNOVIL (1999); Heorhiy KIRPA (2004) during or before elections; two revolutions 
(2004, 2013-2014), extraordinary parliamentary elections (2004, 2007); annexation of Crimea 
and a civil war called ATO (since 2014). 
 
1.4 Types of property evaluation and privatization overview 
 
In terms of horizontal structural approach52, modern science recognizes public, 
private, (collective until 2004) and state basic types of ownership in Ukraine. Since the mid-
1950s in some regions of the world economy, particularly within the European Economic 
Community (now European Union) began to form a fifth type of ownership – supranational. 
Thus Ukrainian legislative framework are changing today for the purposes of the 
Association Agreement between the European Union [and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their member states], of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, that was 
signed by two occasions: political part took place on 21 March 201453, the economic part – June 
27, 201454. 
Institutional framework of legislation development for the category “ownership” 
went through certain milestones. Our starting point is the Law “On Property of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]” (1990)55, which defined three forms of ownership: by the 
Soviet citizens, collective and state property. Later on, definition “forms” of ownership instead 
of “types” migrated to the Law of U-SSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic] “On property” 
                                                          
51 ILO’s unofficial translation reference / ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=86106; or Official 
web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2862-17; 
52 This concept determines the classification of economic types of ownership, as well as its forms; 
53 General Secretariat of the European Council, Conclusions, Brussels, EUCO 7/1/14 REV 1, pg. 2 / 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf; 
54 European External Action Service (EEAS), Quick Guide: EU–Ukraine Association Agreement / 
eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/071215_eu-ukraine_association_agreement.pdf; 
55 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v1305400-90; 
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(1991)56, which was terminated only in 200757 by revising specific provisions of the Civil Code 
of Ukraine (CCU, came into force in 2004)58. The establishment of an entity for business 
(management) activity is governed by article 56 of the Economic Code of Ukraine (ECU, came 
into force in 2004)59. 
According to the horizontal structural approach, stated within provisions of articles 
325-327 of the CCU, from the variety of property relations in Ukraine we separate three main 
types of property: state, municipal and private. By the way, by variety we mean 35 economic 
entities by organizational forms plus one entity without legal status and 11 subcategories of 
entities plus two without legal status respectively within these three main according to the State 
Statistic Service of Ukraine (2017, SSSU) data60. Also, both in the CCU and in the Constitution 
of Ukraine, the concept of collective ownership was terminated since 2004. 
In addition, significantly different is the definition of the private property from 
established before in the law (1991), under which private property was determined as property 
of individuals and private businesses, and farms based on the property of one individual 
citizen. Private ownership determined today, since 2004 in accordance with the CCU and the 
ECU, based on the property of one or more individuals, or of legal entity property. 
Objects of the ownership rights of the private ownership is a property of 
individuals; private and other types of businesses; agricultural companies; cooperatives; 
organizations, institutions and establishments — excluding state and municipal ownership 
among listed here. 
Thus any statistical comparison must rely on the changes of the “Classification of 
Ownership”61 and of the “Classification of Legal Forms of Managing”62 (business doing) within 
legal types of entities — between 1994 and 2004, and since then (2004) changes that were 
implemented in the light of mentioned the two codes. Classification of ownership was revised 
                                                          
56 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/697-12; 
57 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997-16; 
58 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/435-15; 
59 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/436-15; 
60 SSSU, retrieved on 4th April 2017 / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/edrpoy/ukr/EDRPU_2017/ks_opfg/ks_opfg_0317.htm; 
61 1994: by the Information-Analytical Center LIGA / search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/FIN442.html and 
2004: search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/FIN26480.html; 
62 1994: by the Information-Analytical Center LIGA / search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/FIN443.html and 
2004: by the SSSU / ukrstat.gov.ua/klasf/nac_kls/op_dk002_2016.htm; 
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three times by now: in 200563, 200764 and 200965, what hugely influenced our statistical 
findings. 
According to the official position of the SSSU66, with a purpose to improve 
accounting corporate rights of the state and to fulfill provisions of the ECU, definitions of state 
and municipal sectors in the classification of types of ownership were widen by the new 
positions in 2004: state corporate ownership and communal [within municipal sector] 
corporate ownership, and the classification of legal entities was included with state (public) 
joint stock company. 
This was done, according to law makers conclusions, by two reasons. Firstly, it’s 
inclusion would facilitate the organization of the state corporate rights’ accounting; thus 
relevant designation was provided by the governmental Decree “On the Consolidation of the 
Basic Conceptual Approaches to the Implementation of Corporate Rights of the State” (2004)67. 
Secondly, harmonization of the statutory statistical information for the state and municipal 
sectors of the economy is highly valued, what imposed by articles 22 and 24 of the ECU. 
Exhaustive explanation according to the Ukrainian legislation of the private 
ownership is provided, thus remained, in traditional understanding, the aggregate public: state 
and municipal. 
Business (management) entities of the state sector are entities that act only on the 
basis of state property also subjects where the state share (authorized capital) in the authorized 
fund exceeds fifty per cent or constitutes the value that provides the right of decisive influence 
on economic activity for these entities. 
Business (management) entities of the municipal sector are entities that act only 
on the basis of communal property also subjects where the communal share (authorized capital) 
in the authorized fund exceeds fifty per cent or constitutes the value that provides the right of 
decisive influence to the local governments on economic activity for these entities. 
Additionally, two classifiers exist in Ukraine since 2004 simultaneously: the 
Unified State Register of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Community Groups of 
Ukraine68 and the Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine69. 
                                                          
63 Information-Analytical Center LIGA / search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/FIN18658.html; 
64 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v4330500-07; 
65 Information-Analytical Center LIGA / search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/FIN49919.html; 
66 SSSU / ukrstat.org/en/druk/coment/answer/answer6.htm; 
67 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ru/155-2004-п; 
68 Ministry of Justice of Ukraine / usr.minjust.gov.ua/ua/freesearch and the law itself: 
zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/755-15; 
69 SSSU / ukrstat.gov.ua/menu/edrpou.htm; 
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In general, as historical practice reviled, qualitative characteristics of successful 
transition economy country would be transparent private sector privatization and afterwards 
it’s effective employment development. Ukraine lags behind other transition economies 
with respect to transparency and effectiveness. Waves of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises that commenced in Ukraine resulted in creation of private firms that brought about 
dramatic changes in the ownership structure of employment, so called “opaque privatization”. 
Ukrainian rhetoric use expression “rozderzhavlennia” (in Ukrainian “роздержавлення”), 
which in our language literally (and ironically) used as a synonym to privatization process itself 
and may be seen as “deterioration of state”, I consider this meaning fits the most to the outcome 
of privatization in Ukraine during 1990s and 2000s, and 2010s. 
The state sector’s share of employment decreased from 60,6% in 1992 to 27,2% in 
200670, a decrease that was offset by corresponding increases in the shares of municipal and 
private enterprises for the corresponding year. Since we explained above the types of ownership 
and legal forms of management changes that were applied in 2004 with optional mixed share 
of capital, thus by to 2008 and 2015 we observe pure share of “state enterprises” equal to 4,3% 
and 3,3% correspondingly. Category share for “municipal enterprises” accounted equally to 
3,9% (2008, 2015) and pure “private companies” — 3,2% (2008) and 3,3% (2015), rest are 
mixed and separated by statistic approach. 
Given that the public sector consists of both state-owned and municipal 
organisations and enterprises, it dominated the Ukrainian economy back to 2006 with a share 
of 51,7% in average within the listed number of staff employees in 2006; recent open statistical 
data (2008, 2015) below is confusing in terms of clear demarcation between public and private 
sectors considering form of management changes in both: Ukrainian law and statistic 
approaches. 
We have to bear in mind disclaimer (chapter 1.2) on the national statistics, since the 
Labour Force Study data does not include information about employer’s ownership type. Data 
for 1992 and 2006 here based on the European Training Foundation (ETF, 2009) calculations, 
which is not publicly available and was obtained during the cooperation with the SSSU. On the 
contrary, we have public access to the data starting from 2008 and 2015, which includes military 
personnel (unlike before 2006), but again excludes people employed in statistically small 
enterprises (below ten workers), by natural persons — entrepreneurs or under civil law 
contracts. 
                                                          
70 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
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Chart 5. Employment (E, million) by ownership type (% of average listed number of staff 
employees) in 1992, 2006, 2008 and 2015 in Ukraine 
2015 2008 2006 1992 
E — 8,0647 E — 11,3895 E — 11,43371 E — 24,125172 
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Description:        State enterprise;         Municipal enterprise;        Corporation; 
        Separated subdivision;        Private company;   * Public authority; 
  ** Local government;   *** State organization;    
        Limited liability company; **** Communal organization and       Other 
Sources: author’s calculations based for 2015 on the SSSU’s Yearbook (2016), Labour 
Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 113 / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/zb/08/zb_pu15pdf.zip; for 2008 on the SSSU’s 
Yearbook (2009), Labour Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 176 / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/katalog/pracia/Pracsa.zip; for 2006 and 1992 according to the European 
Training Foundation (ETF, 2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, 
Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 33 
 
Correspondingly, the private sector represented 48,1% in 2006 in Ukraine, a share 
lower than years ago in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland: for instance, by 2000-2002, 
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72 Nearest available data is for 1995 only, SSSU / 
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the private sector share of total employment for these countries was between 61-75%73 
(Philippe EGOUMÉ-BOSSOGO et al (2006). 
To make the picture complete, let’s summarize the main, now historical, stages of 
privatization and draw the line under the current privatization proposals of the country. 
Description for the table below. For the all years of privatization has changed 
ownership 113371 objects of small privatization and social facilities (SP), 5192 assets under 
construction (UC). As a result of privatization of state property were created non-state sector, 
which includes 11556 public companies (JSC). For all the years of privatization of state 
property state budget received (P) roughly 10,77 billion USD by 2015 (current exchange 
rate according to the NBU at the end of each year). 
Table 2. Key dynamics of privatization by quantitative and fiscal assessment  
in Ukraine, 1993 — 2015 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
SP 2707 6375 13053 16235 7048 4024 4217 4080 5027 5294 5689 5389 
UC  72 50 307 384 349 453 662 685 568 472 331 
JSC   340 801 1828 3121 3009 1179 784 243 131 32 
P       230,55 381,91 402,38 108,04 378,07 1774,59 
Continuation of the table 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SP 5095 4813 5164 5191 4225 2783 1304 1452 993 676 2537 
UC 288 248 95 32 47 30 36 30 20 11 22 
JSC 7 9 4 12 7 6 5 17 8 2 11 
P 4098,85 103,54 486,79 62,43 101,09 137,35 1436,88 846,15 185,15 29,61 6,31 
 
SP — Number of privatized objects of small privatization (groups “А” and “Ж”);  
UC — Number of privatized assets under construction (group “Д”);  
JSC — Creation of joint stock companies;  
P — Proceeds (USD, million) from privatization of state property to the general fund budget 
of Ukraine; Initial data for beginning year is cumulative. 
Source: author’s calculations based on the data of the SPFU (2015) official report / 
www.spfu.gov.ua/userfiles/pdf/zvit-2015_7389.pdf 
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Ukraine inherited a huge public enterprise sector (1991) and privatization became 
a priority. Following independence, (mainly industrial) privatization in Ukraine was conducted 
in the following stages (Oleksandr PASKHAVER et al (2003); Vladimir DUBROVSKIY et al 
(2007); CASE (2007); BAKER and McKENZI (2008); SPFU (1999, 2002, 2015): 
1) 1987-1991. The first stage of privatization rooted to the USSR 1987 year during 
the so-called “perestroika”74 (verbally “reconstruction”). According to the USSR Law “On the 
State Enterprise (Association)” (1987)75 managers and staff of public enterprises were given 
autonomous right to access foreign market, to direct income to develop production or to 
increase wages to employees. On practice it failed, since majority of companies followed wage 
increase without long term growth provisions for scientific and technical potential. Law did not 
foresee market responsibility (state funds to cover losses were available): loss-making 
enterprises should be closed, and the output that is not in demand — stopped. Thus no stimulus 
for production efficiency and competitiveness. 
The Law “On the General Principles of Entrepreneurship in the USSR” (1990)76 
allowed to open more than 30 private companies per types of industrial activity, rental 
companies etc., what actually legalized large sector of the “shadow economy”. 
Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the Concept of Transition to a 
Regulated Market Economy” (1990)77 and related legislation were adopted that envisaged 
gradual monopolization, decentralization and privatization, creation of joint stock companies, 
reform of credit and pricing policies and systems of retail equipment and raw materials, 
electricity, private enterprise etc. But it was too late: started growing shortage of the most 
necessary food; nationwide there were cards (vouchers) that regulate the distribution of 
foodstuffs; military spending significantly undermined the economic potential of the country; 
political instability finally postponed the reforms for another Soviet year, which never arrived. 
2) 1992-1994. Was decided small-scale voucher privatization model: typically 
implying the leasing and subsequent purchase of state property by the management and 
employees of the companies. Basic laws, governing the privatization, came into force in 1992, 
for instance, Law “On Privatization of Small State-Owned Enterprises (Small Privatization)” 
(1992)78. During these years (Volodymyr ZAPLATYNSKYI (2002), Special Control 
                                                          
74 Term means scale changes in the ideology, economic and political life of the USSR in the second half of the 
1980s. The goal of the reforms was comprehensive democratization of the socio-political and economic system 
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75 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v7284400-87; 
76 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v1529400-90; 
77 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001460-90; 
78 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2171-12; 
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Commission for Privatization in Ukraine) were privatized 9082 state-owned small objects, 2650 
large and medium enterprises and 122 unfinished constructions79. Lease of state enterprises 
with subsequent redemption took place. Rent with redemption especially widely used for 
privatization of such mobile industries as construction and trade, which have a significant 
turnover of capital. As a result, by 1995, about 650080 enterprises had been transferred to the 
private sector through a buyout. Privatization was carried out spontaneously, within 
noncompetitive methods, organizational complexity hampered the use of privatization property 
certificates. For these reasons outlined objectives of privatization, especially its mass flow, 
has not been reached. So in late 1994 and early 1995 a number of decrees of the President of 
Ukraine were adopted, which initiated next phase, called phase of “certificate privatization”. 
3) 1995-1996. Literature determine this period as mass privatization. The most 
common type of selling shares in the privatization process has been selling shares in certificate 
auctions. Established at the end of 1994 beginning of 1995, the National Network of Certificate 
Auctions (NNCA) enabled every citizen of Ukraine directly or through financial intermediaries 
to participate in the privatization process. For the sale, through the NNCA for privatization, 
property certificates were offered to over 13 thousand shares of different companies of Ukraine, 
a total value of which by 1999 consisted about 3 billion UAH (which roughly constitutes 
between 575 and 875 million USD due to exchange rate devaluation that years).81 Through the 
center certification auctions had been invested more than 32 million property privatization 
certificates of the citizens of Ukraine. 
Another poorly reported side is the Russian privatization pattern82 that was 
applicable in Ukraine: non-payment of wages to force personnel to sell shares, CEOs trusts; the 
beginning of the struggle for corporate control, including the “dilution” of the authorized 
capital, parallel meetings of shareholders, duplicating management bodies, drawing law 
enforcement agencies into corporate conflicts. Mortgage auctions, depriving the budget 
revenue, the struggle for registrars. 
Price for Ukrainian certificate (private share of a citizen in the privatization of state 
property) on the black market (legal sale was not permitted) never exceed 10 USD and quickly 
                                                          
79 Vitaliy CHEPINOGA (2011), Economics, Textbook, Yurinkom Inter Publishing Company, Kyiv, P. 656; 
80 Volodymyr ZAPLATYNSKYI (2002), Peculiarities of Privatization in Ukraine, Problems of Management 
Theory and Practice, International Journal, No. 4/02 / vasilievaa.narod.ru/12_4_02.htm; 
81 SPFU (1999), Report of the State Property Fund and the Implementation of the State Privatization Program, 
Kyiv, pg. 13 / www.spfu.gov.ua/userfiles/pdf/1999.pdf; 
82 Alexey FEDOROV (2010), Raiding and corporate blackmail, Wolters Kluwer Publishing Company, 
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fell to 2 USD83. Financial intermediaries, which most citizens entrusted the right to dispose of 
their certificates did not fulfill its obligations massively and uncontrolled. Most of the 
population could neither sell nor receive income on their shares. For certificates were sold more 
than 47% of the assets of small and medium enterprises in 1992-200184. 
4) 1997-2002. Large-scale cash privatization, aimed at raising revenues for the 
state, with the government transforming medium and large companies into joint stock 
companies and selling minority stakes through auctions and competitive tenders. From the end 
of 1998, Ukraine began putting out to tender both block and majority stakes in blue-chip 
companies. 
So, the State Property Fund of Ukraine (SPFU) in 1997 signed agreements with 260 
entities, in 1998 — 390 and in 1999 with 496, employing more than 1300 certified appraisers 
that time. At the beginning of 200085 received investments totaling 641,3 million UAH and 
368,2 million USD dollars, including the strategically important enterprises with share of 58.6% 
those local currency and 82,4% in USD out of total received investments. Adoption of the State 
Privatization Programme (2000)86, aimed at privatizing strategic industries, monopolies, 
infrastructure sectors and large technological complexes, which had advanced considerably by 
the end of 2002 in terms of revenues raised and the sale of stakes in large-scale enterprises. 
By 1999, the relationship between performance of the industry within ownership 
types was not statistically significant, in 2000 the first significant result arrived: first 
increase production by non-state sector more rapidly than the state. For three quarters of 
2002, 54,1% of capital investments utilized by enterprises of collective ownership; 6% — 
private, 6,4% — municipal and 1,4% of foreign companies, which focused mainly on food 
processing and processing of agricultural products (16,9%) and wholesale and mediation in 
trade (15,8%) out of total investment87. 
5) 2003-2004. Rush sales of state property to business groups connected with the 
authorities and to government officials (on-request privatization), marking the start of the 
crisis in the privatization process. Disappointment of Ukrainian people with results of small and 
mass privatization. Justice was requested in the privatization on behalf of the country's 
                                                          
83 CASE (2007), Center for Social and Economic Research, Analytical Reference, Questions legitimization of 
privatization results in the perception of the general public, Kyiv, pg. 5 / www.case-
ukraine.com.ua/u/db/79eb698848f4b2b2f1ab406494ba2b23.pdf; 
84 Ibid; 
85 SPFU (1999), Report of the State Property Fund and the Implementation of the State Privatization Program, 
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86 Official site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1723-14; 
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population as an urgent task in the destruction of the basic foundations of the political regime, 
which was formed under President Leonid KUCHMA. 
Table 3. The proportion of the population that opposes privatization (%,  
of total respondents, beginning of each year) in 1994 — 200588 
YEARS / 
COMPANIES 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
SMALL 18,3 19,0 19,3 22,0 20,9 22,9 18,7 18,7 21,4 22,7 25,2 23,3 
BIG 38,4 45,8 45,5 49,0 54,0 52,4 51,4 51,8 55,1 51,8 56,1 60,9 
 
6) 2005-2007. Privatization crisis even worsen: lack of trust between different 
political forces (outcome of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine), which was characterized by 
the absence of a new privatization mechanism, leading to a sabotage of the whole privatization 
process (except for small-scale sales and less covered by media), given that there was a fear 
that re-establishing a selective approach or preferences in privatization could favor competitors. 
Ukrainian re-privatization — is return of privatized objects in public ownership to further fair 
resale. Unfortunately, more populist political process, which aimed to punish opponents 
politically (the oligarchs and big business groups) that unjustly enriched by privatization, close 
to the old regime of KUCHMA. Against sellers — government officials who carried out the 
“custom” sale of state property – was not carried out proper criminal proceedings. 
7) 2008-2014. This period characterizes with world economic crisis and ever worse 
Ukrainian economic policies since independence — stagnation and booming of corruption. 
Viktor YANUKOVYCH’s (former President of Ukraine in 2010-2014) family and close 
associates allegedly enriched itself during its four-year reign through energy subsidies, 
embezzlement from the state, privileged privatization, public procurement in manual mode, 
fraudulent refunds of value-added tax to exporters, extortion and corporate raiding (i.e., forcing 
a businessman to sell his enterprise involuntarily at a low price). Overwhelming evidences 
described above are subject to numerous articles and investigations coverage by press after 
regime fall (international as well) and supranational organizations worldwide. 
  
                                                          
88 Natalia PANINA (2006), Ukrainian Society 1994-2005: Sociological Monitoring, Kyiv, Institute of 
Sociology NASU, pg. 21; 
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Chart 6. The corruption perceptions index ranking of Ukraine and certain countries 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations according to the Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 
countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A 
country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a 
scale of 0 — 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means 
it is perceived as very clean / 
www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 
 
Just two self-explanatory examples from state monopolies to have some visions 
why table above is so true in regard to Ukraine. Example one: gas trade has remained a major 
source of unjust privileged enrichment: Ukrainian state oil and gas company “Naftogaz” used 
to buy during Viktor YANUKOVYCH’s rule around 17 billion cubic meters of natural gas per 
year domestically produced by partially state-owned companies at the fixed low price of 
53 USD per 1000 cubic meters (price was kept so low allegedly to provide consumers with 
cheap gas), but these gas flows were not properly recorded — was leaked to the commercial 
sector, where gas prices were based on the Russian price of 410 USD per mcm. 40 percent of a 
total volume of 17 billion cubic meters of gas (worth 2,5 billion USD)89 was spirited away in 
that “fashionable” way. 
“Naftogaz” served as a pretext, resulted to beginning of entire mess in 2014 — 
battled with Russian counterpart “Gazprom” (famous court events to Hague etc.), Viktor 
                                                          
89 Anders ASLUND (2015), Ukraine: what went wrong and how to fix it, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, pg. 93; 
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YANUKOVYCH rejected a European trade deal in favor of a cheaper long term contract for 
Russian gas: now we clearly understand why. Notably, according to Forbes, today overall 
increase of gas tariffs is a whopping 590% since 201490. Utility prices in general increased 
twice since then and increasing. 
Example two: Viktor YANUKOVYCH distributed large infrastructure projects, 
notably those connected with the Euro back to 2012 soccer championship but soon almost 
everything, at his discretion. Only 35 percent of public procurement91 by value used competitive 
methods in 2013: in general, the government is perceived to have paid twice as much as needed 
for such projects, so should generate a few billion dollars a year in corrupt revenues. Notably, 
during the matches in Ukraine, most of the fans from the EU used to hire charter flights and 
each time flew to Ukraine only for matches, but generally lived in Poland — it was much 
cheaper, then to pay accommodation in Ukraine. Ukrainian hotels were not fully overbooked, 
thus “some” oligarchs lost greatly, frankly, because of greedy. 
Corporate raiding is a proper definition instead of use of the term privatization for 
this period. 
8) 2015 — recent days. As seen from chart 6 — almost nothing changed in terms 
of fighting against corruption, just 3 points attempt for positive dynamic after just coupe. But 
still, the cosmetic “makeup” the current authorities are compelled to carry out, at least, in front 
of the undertaken obligations to the IMF creditors and the pressure from the European Union 
institutions. We should start from breaking the bonds between companies and the state. When 
President of Ukraine KUCHMA in distant 2002 addressed Ukrainian Parliament92 he stated, 
that the most dangerous is the strengthening of the position of oligarchic capital, its merging 
with the state bureaucracy, trends of subordination economy and the state in general to the 
corporate interests. Ironically, those words came true shortly under KUCHMA’s reign and that 
document calls “European Choice. Strategy of Economic and Social Development of Ukraine 
for 2002 — 2011”. Those correct words are very relevant in today’s blossoming corruption. 
“The privatization experience of Estonia, another former Soviet 
republic, shows how privatization could diminish graft in Ukraine. Neil A. ABRAMS, a political 
risk consultant who’s writing a book on Ukrainian corruption, argues that, in Estonia, 
eliminating subsidies to all firms ended the privileged position of so-called “political 
                                                          
90 www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/12/28/naftogaz-ukraine-euromaidan-russia-
poroshenko/#2bf32a114251; 
91 Anders ASLUND (2015), Ukraine: what went wrong and how to fix it, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, pg. 93. 
92 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001100-02; 
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capitalists” and helps explain Estonia’s clean governance today. Corruption is more deeply 
entrenched in Ukraine than it ever was in Estonia, but that only makes aggressive action like 
mass privatization all the more necessary”93. 
In regard IMF’s provisions in exchange on fourth tranche to Ukraine, the SPFU 
obliged to follow up six main conditions in privatization94: 
a. Classification (grouping) of all SOEs – so called “triage”95. Generally, standards 
of statistics, codification, optimization, standardization and electronic document circulation 
requires major changes at the national level: European and US experience will be useful. For 
example, data in table 2 calculated and prepared by the author out of four different annexes 
from the Fund report (2015), a separate allocation of which hampers visibility (should and must 
be avoided). 
Also, there is an element of bureaucratic pending and approvals of the triage by 
departments, ministries and the Government. Just 13 objects out of 155 transferred to the Fund 
in 201696. 
b. Simplifying the procedure of liquidation of bankrupt state enterprises. The 
necessary legislative framework needed – the Law97 has not passed yet. More than 1700 
enterprises today require rapid elimination, since operating procedure takes more than two 
years. 
c. In regards to improvement of the legal framework for privatization. The new draft 
law (bullet above) can replace seven old ones. This particular IMF provision has delayed for 
more than a year already. 
d. Regarding the expansion of enterprises for privatization – over 1400 objects are 
prohibited for privatization (the IMF filed two bills). Most of these companies have either 
corruption component or generate losses, or have both the above problems. 
e. Regarding procedural changes of privatization of small enterprises and small 
assets: offers from independent appraisers are very inflated, it complicates the sale of a 90 % 
bulk of privatization from the initial bid. Small privatization goes through the electronic system 
                                                          
93 Josh COHEN (2015), Smart Privatization Can Save Ukraine, Foreign Policy Reviewer / 
foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/05/smart-privatization-can-save-ukraine; 
94 SPFU official page / www.spfu.gov.ua/ua/news/Vikonannya-Memorandumu-MVF-v-chastini-privatizacii-
zalezhit-vid-spilnih-zusil-vsih-gilok-vladi-2731.html; 
95 Synonyms: sorting, picking; 
96 SPFU (2017), Explanatory Note, P. 7 / www.spfu.gov.ua/userfiles/files/poiasn27(1).pdf; 
97 Law (2017, draft) “On amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine (Regarding simplify the process of 
privatization)” / www.spfu.gov.ua/userfiles/files/proektzakon27(3).pdf; 
51 
“ProZorro” 98 (in Ukrainian literally means “transparently”), which is designed to prevent 
corruption and operates on the basis of procedures without a paper circulation; 
f. Sales accelerating of privatization objects of large state-owned enterprises listed 
in the Memorandum (2016) 99 and the SPFU Prospectus (2016/2017) 100. However, each of these 
issues require support at the political level and coordinated actions of all departments, 
ministries, the Government and the Parliament – all are involved in the privatization process. 
For example, privatization hurry of the energy sector (regions, centers) of Ukraine 
that technically is obsolete. The SPFU states:  
“Privatization will begin only after the Parliament of Ukraine adopt 
the Law on Electricity Market and only after NCSREU101 adopt and announce a bid stimulating 
RAB-tariff102. This is the official recommendation of the Working Group on Privatization of the 
Government, which in particular includes the IMF representatives103. 
Current privatization bid104 proposes 296 objects, top ten out of which are fertilizing 
giant company in Odesa, a bank, a hotel and objects in power distribution and generation energy 
sector (mentioned above), it is planned to attract about 6,33 million USD. 
“To ensure that privatization helps Ukraine’s reforms rather than 
discrediting them, the private sector and civil society must be involved from the start in breaking 
the bonds between companies and the state. The corrupt Ukrainian state has been by far the 
greatest impediment to the country’s success, and government officials simply cannot be trusted 
to run a graft-free privatization without oversight”105. 
Today, after all privatization stages concluded in Ukraine, which we conditionally 
divided into eight phases, it is still relatively substantial amount of employed remained in 
SOEs (3,3%) and municipal companies (3,9%) out of total (8,065 million)106 of the statistically 
                                                          
98 Public e-procurement system that has replaced old paper-based state tenders / prozorro.gov.ua/en; 
99 IMF (2016), Letter of Intent: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum 
of Understanding, Kyiv, P. 75 / www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2016/UKR/090116.pdf; 
100 SPFU Prospectus (2016/2017), Privatization in Ukraine 2016-2017, Kyiv, P. 34 / 
www.spfu.gov.ua/userfiles/pdf/privatization-in-ukraine-2016-2017-eng_2108.pdf; 
101 National Commission for State Regulation in the Energy and Utilities (NCSREU); 
102 Regulatory Asset Base — is a system of long-term tariff formation, the main purpose of which is to attract 
investments in the expansion and modernization of infrastructure; 
103 www.spfu.gov.ua/ua/news/Vikonannya-Memorandumu-MVF-v-chastini-privatizacii-zalezhit-vid-spilnih-
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105 Josh COHEN (2015), Smart Privatization Can Save Ukraine, Foreign Policy Reviewer / 
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registered/observed labour force. 296 and expected over 1400 objects to be privatized should 
finally be done in transparent and efficient way in 2017. 
Conditions of civil war, social unrest, absence of inner political consensus and more 
then critical position of international partners (direct allegations in corruption) are really last 
warning for qualitative change to be fulfil. Participation of civil society through the agency 
of trade unions and NGOs’ side are compulsory condition, since, unfortunately, there is 
no more trust to authorities. 
Even now, there is no understanding (or deliberate resistance) from the SPFU. For 
instance, the Explanatory Note107 to the draft of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine (regarding simplification of the privatization process)”108 
contains two mutually excluding conceptual factors in section 8 and 9. 
Conceptual problem. Section 8 states that public discussion of the draft law 
provided by publication on the official website of the SPFU in order to receive comments and 
suggestions from individuals and legal entities, associations according to the Law of Ukraine 
“On Principles of Regulatory Policy in Economic Activity”. 
In contradictions, section 9 states that the position of the social partners regarding 
draft of the law does not apply to social and labor sphere and does not require approval by the 
competent national unions, their associations. 
In my opinion, the position of the social partners on draft law applies directly to 
social and labor sphere – more than half a million workers employed – and requires the approval 
of authorized representatives of national trade unions and their associations. 
Technical issue. The search engine of the site does not work properly. Interactive 
tools for public discussion of the draft law as referred in section 8 of the explanatory note is 
absent! Again, intentions of the SPFU are declarative in nature, a specific mechanism within 
“software” (forum, interactive form or equivalent) is not provided. 
For the sake of transparency, all state companies should be sold at open electronic 
auctions, with the bidding and results publicly available for anybody to see, especially 
accountings. Transparency International Ukraine, an anti-corruption watchdog, helped create 
e-auction system for public procurement “ProZorro”. This system (or a like) should be used to 
privatize the country’s enterprises of all sizes. 
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Corruption component. The other side of the problem is overwhelming 
corruption, which clearly demonstrates by the corruption perceptions index ranking and 
practices of the bureaucratic regulation, mentioned even by the SPFU official statement. It is 
not conducive to attracting investors both domestic and foreign. There is also the issue of 
corruption and regulatory proceedings within controlling authorities, law enforcement agencies 
and court system, which is subject to further findings, but for sure, seen to be overcome by 
active involvement of the civil society and trade unions for the better qualitative change. 
“It's hard to overstate how challenged Ukraine is. Its economy has 
actually shrunk since communism ended in 1991. Or since 1992. Or even 1993. That's because 
communism never really did end. Ukraine just traded party bosses for oligarchs. Sure, it 
privatized companies and introduced markets, but Ukraine didn't shed its Soviet-era corruption 
or inefficiency. There was barely any rule of law, tax rates had to be jacked up to make up for 
all the wink-wink, nod-nod tax evasion, and, as a result, even more of the economy entered the 
shadows. The IMF estimates that Ukraine's underground—and non-tax-paying—economy is as 
much as 50 percent of GDP”109. 
 
1.5 Preservation of poor economic performance. Fiscal balance of investments 
 
We have observed how relatively slow institutional frame was set up for the 
labour market, now distinction should be made on operational mechanism’s complications of 
the labour market regulatory framework itself: 
1. Overregulation (chapter 1.3), frequent and depending of political conjuncture 
legislative changes, weak and lagged institutional environment; 
2. Weak fulfillment or execution (chapter 1.10) of the law itself together with 
macroeconomic flaws causing by poor economic performance resulted by opaque privatization 
(previous chapter 1.4), which resulted by preserving the previous functionaries (no “lustration”) 
of the state apparatus and characterized by lack of decent interference into this process of the 
Ukrainian civil society. 
Main aggregate inner (national-wide) causes of macroeconomic flaws today to my 
understanding are: 
a) need for structural changes in the country's economy (chapter 1.6); 
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www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/01/ukraine-unofficially-has-272-percent-inflation; 
54 
b) high shadow component (chapter 1.6, see, more specifically, Friedrich 
SCHNEIDER (2004, 2012), Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
of Ukraine (2015); 
c) cheap labour (Chart 8); 
d) poor working conditions (ILO (2013), Decent Work Country Profile);110 
e) low productivity (Charts 2, 3). 
Ukrainian labour market characterized by discrepancy of the employment 
dynamics to the production. 
Chart 7. GDP per capita growth (annual, %) and total labour force (million) 
in Ukraine 1988 — 2016 
 
 
National definition: economically active population (EAP, marked here as the “labour force”) 
according to the ILO concept of labor – is the population of both sexes aged 15-70, which for 
a specific period ensures the supply of labor for the production of goods and services. 
Economically active population is considered to be engaged in economic activity that brings 
income (employed) and unemployed individuals. 
Source: author’s calculations based on data retrieved from the WB DI for GDP; labour force 
data retrieved from the WB DI (aged 15+) is until 1994 and from the LFS (aged 15-70) is since 
1995. Labour force data from 2014 exclude occupied Crimea, since 2015 – excluding ATO 
zone. 
First transformation years shows employment correlates to production curve, 
afterwards, starting from 1999, this tendency changes to unstable fluctuations: growing GDP 
and declining employment and vise-versa — desync of these macro variables. 
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Employment losses were much lower than output losses in early transition period 
up to 1998-1999, then followed by moderate period of recovery up to 2008 crisis and steep peak 
down since 2014. Route chosen by Ukraine, like major counterparts from Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), in contrast to CEE, was with lagged substantial restructuring in 
the economy and a law degree of labour reallocation across jobs, sectors, industries and 
geographic regions resulted in a fairly slow decline in employment compared to large falls in 
GDP after the early transition years. By 2000, when the transition-associated depression had 
bottomed out, official GDP (in current USD) had fallen to about 53,9% (chart 2) of its 1992 
level, whereas employment had only fallen by 7,4 % (chart 7). Open unemployment on a 
massive scale was slow to emerge and labour turnover appeared to be considerably lower 
(situation changed since second half of 2000s, table 9). 
Major theoretical and empirical literature (Lutz BELLMANN (1995), Valentijn 
BILSEN (1998), Atanas CHRISTEV (2008) and Vladimir DUBROVSKIY (2007) put forward 
various explanations for the divergent labour market adjustment paths between CEE and CIS 
countries. The transition literature attributes asymmetries to the differences in economic 
policies, particularly in terms of tightening budget constraints on state enterprises. It is now 
clear that rapid reforms were on the whole better than gradual reforms111. 
Under conditions of soft budget constraints, rigid employment protection 
legislation and strong political support, many unprofitable enterprises in CIS countries tried to 
keep redundancies to a minimum at the cost of lower real wages and productivity. 
After Ukraine came out of its prolonged and severe transition depression in 2000, 
its economy restoring each year (with the exception of 2009 and since 2014) at a relatively high 
rate in terms of real GDP: by 2007, GDP had reached 72% of the 1990 level. However, total 
employment has not increased substantially since then, approaching about 90.8 % of its 1992 
level in 2007 (chart 7). The dynamics of wage (registered) employment was much poorer, 
showing a continuous decline and representing a total loss of 10,6 million jobs between 1990 
and 2005 (or nearly 43% of all wage and salary jobs for 1990)112. Only in 2006 — 2007 did 
this trend stabilize, at the level of a total number of registered jobs was around 14 million. There 
is evidence, therefore, of jobless growth in Ukraine — a fairly common phenomenon among 
transition economies. 
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The major reasons, widely discussed in the literature (see, among many others, 
World Bank, 2006a), include113:  
a) labour hoarding inherited from the 1990-s and defensive restructuring 
(chapter 1.6) of large state-owned and privatized enterprises representing the old sector. 
To become more competitive, firms improve productivity and reduce total labour 
costs by shedding redundant labour or improving the utilization of existing production 
without hiring new workers; 
b) switching to new labor-saving technologies, especially in the manufacturing 
sector; and 
c) the small size of the new private sector and its slow growth due to administrative 
barriers, a burdensome tax system, high tax rates, corruption, regulatory policy 
uncertainty, poor access and high cost of finance, which constrains enterprise creation and 
growth. As a result, the number of new jobs created has been insufficient to absorb all 
previously displaced workers. 
Chart 8. Average monthly wage (USD) of staff (registered) worker and GDP per person 
employed/month (constant 2011 PPP, USD) in Ukraine 1996 — 2014 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WB DI (GDP per person employed/month constant 
2011 PPP $), National Bank of Ukraine (exchange rate at the end of each year) and the SSSU 
average salary/USD/month of staff worker (last month of the year, data among enterprises with 
10 employed and above) 
 
                                                          
113 Ibid; 
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“Ad notam” to the graph above: SSSU does not provide data of the average salary 
per month of a staff worker before 1996 (explained in the chapter 1.2). NBU has open data on 
exchange rates in Ukraine since 1993. Currency reform happened in Ukraine: temporary 
currency was introduced since January 1992 and planned to be operated for about half-a-year 
period, then derived with hyperinflation record in coming year (over ten thousand 
percentages)114, thus was in operation until modern Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) finally was 
introduced since August 1996. 
“Take a big country (52m people), give it an atrocious government, 
watch the economy go to pot, throw in nuclear weapons and a restless Russian neighbor – and 
start to worry”.115 
“At present [1993] the minimum wage is 4 USD, while 10 eggs cost 
over 1 USD”. 116 
Chart above clearly demonstrates unjust distribution of national income, which 
roughly shows wage share to corresponding GDP, which constitutes 3,8% in 1999 up to 
27% in 2013. This calculation supports domestic scholars’ discussions that wage share in GDP 
consist maximum to 30 % in Ukraine, when developed countries demonstrates wage share 
between 50%-70% of corresponding GDP. Low wages in Ukraine are still breaking labour 
efficiency, productivity growth and competitiveness, since such level of remuneration does not 
sufficiently recreate labor force itself definitely pushing them to find some extra sources of 
income, including shadow activity (see informal sector and shadow market in chapter 1.6). 
Karl MARX (“Das Kapital”) words come to my mind: “The real barrier of capitalist 
production is capital itself”. I let myself rephrase this words for them to suit best to the situation 
described applicably to Ukrainian political, so-called, “elites”: “The real barrier of state 
development is state itself”, if we mean state as “oligarchic capital that merged with state 
bureaucracy”. 
There is proverb in my country also: “One time is an occasion, more than two —
statistics”. Transparency International (2004), ranked in “the top ten” the former Ukrainian 
Prime Minister (1996-1997) Pavlo LAZARENKO (allegedly) embezzled between 114-200 
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million USD (equals to 766 USD GDP per capita of 2001)117. José UGAZ, former chair of the 
Transparency International visited Ukraine in 2016, marked most recent former President of 
Ukraine Viktor YANUKOVYCH (2010-2014) as “the world champion of corruption”: 
according to the dedicated web-page “saga of ex-President Viktor YANUKOVYCH”, he and 
his cronies stand accused of stealing 7,5 billion USD118. Today, recent former president and his 
former Prime Minister Mykola AZAROV (2010-2014) are in hiding and under investigation 
both: nationally and internationally. 
Chart 9. Inflation, consumer prices (annual, %), in Ukraine in 1996 – 2016 
  
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the WB DI / 
databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx; 
 
Observing enormous price growth made absolutely impossible any long-term 
decision planning, Ukrainian government applied austerity measures resulted in lowering 
inflation at least to dozens instead of hundreds by 1995. The consequences were severe: 22,5% 
drop in GDP per capita in 1994 (Chart 2) and a similar drop in private incomes. In August 1996 
the inflation lowered enough allowing introduction of Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH) instead of 
“temporary” transitional “Coupon Karbovanets” currency that replaced Soviet ruble in 1992 (at 
one to one exchange rate). One hundred thousand coupon karbovanets was exchanged for one 
hryvnia. Since hryvnia-denominated average wage in 1996 was UAH 126 (67 USD, previous 
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118 Transparency International official source / 
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chart above) while in 1985, when the “perestroika” started, it was 168 Soviet rubles, for the 
decade (if one assumes roughly similar real wages) the cumulative price increase reached one 
hundred thousand times. 
Widely used adjustment mechanisms such as administrative leaves and forced 
short-time work (next two charts), wage arrears and payment in kind helped enterprise 
managers and the government to avoid sharp employment reduction despite large production 
losses. 
Chart 10. The level of involuntary part-time employment for certain types of economic 
activity in 2008 (% of average number of staff (registered) workers) 
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Legend: blue bar is administrative leave; red bar – shorter working day (week); 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU’s Yearbook (2009), Labour Market in 
Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 20 / ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/katalog/pracia/Pracsa.zip; 
 
Chart 11. The level of involuntary part-time employment for certain types of economic 
activity in 2015 (% of average number of staff (registered) workers) 
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Legend: blue bar is administrative leave; red bar – shorter working day (week); 
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Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU’s Yearbook (2016), Labour Market in 
Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 18 / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/zb/08/zb_pu15pdf.zip; 
 
Both charts above prove continuous tendencies of unpopular government 
measurements when shaping deficit of the payroll fund by sharing loses among total labour 
force to mitigate fiscal challenges aiming to preserve electorate. 
Growth in labor productivity as a whole depends on three main factors: investment 
(chart 15) and saving in physical capital, new technology and human capital. Thus, 
macroeconomic variable of international comparisons of GDP per person employed, constant 
2011 PPP/USD”119 shows only in average relationship between outputs as compare to 
inputs needed to produce those outputs. Ukraine is significantly behind on this 
macroeconomic indicator not only compare to OECD, but even post-socialistic countries — 
Poland, Lithuania, Hungary. Moreover, Ukraine in 2008 consisted only 42% of this parameter 
(output productivity) of Russian Federation, which is lesser succeed among chosen here, see 
the graph below. 
 
Chart 12. GDP per person employed constant 2011 PPP/USD for Ukraine, Poland, 
Lithuania, OECD, Hungary and Russia in 1991 — 2014 
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Source: author’s calculations based on WB DI, retrieved in March 2017 
 
Notably again, that back to 1989-1990 (chart 2) Ukraine and Poland’s performance 
on GDP per capita had close to similar starting positions. In 1993 Poland equaled with Russia 
by productivity, afterwards outstripped, also this coincides with growth recovery we discussed 
earlier, but for Ukraine it was steady fall here and productivity stagnation between 1996 — 
2000. 
Two more macroeconomic variables I would like to present also – GDP structure 
and investment (foreign and domestic) into respective sectors. 
GDP structure for the recent half-decade demonstrates slow but steady growth in 
primary sector presented by agriculture between 8,4 % and 14,2 %. Secondary sector stagnated 
mainly by industry after tangible decline from 25,7 % in 2010 to around 23 % and with evident 
shrinking of construction from 3,7 % almost by 1,5 %. Similar tendency is observed for “trade 
and transport” category mirrored by similar pattern of finance and insurance (tertiary sector). 
Growth in information and telecommunication presented only by 0,8 %. 
 
Chart 13. GDP structure (%) of Ukraine in 2010, 2013, 2014 and 2015 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Legend: “1” – Agriculture, forestry and fisheries; “2” – Industry; “3” – Construction; 
“4” – Trade; transport; residence, catering; “5” – Information and telecommunication; 
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“6” – Finance; insurance; “7” – Real estate; “8” – Science and tech, administrative 
assistance;“9” – State governance; defense; education; healthcare; “10” – Other services 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU data / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2016/so_ek_r_u/soekru_u/arh_soekru_16.htm 
 
Thus, Ukraine seemed to preserve status of export-oriented and purely commerce 
country, whose primary and secondary aggregate sectors activity constitutes around 40 % of 
own GDP. Relatively heavy is subsidized state governance and defense share: 4,8% out of GDP 
itself; compare to 4,2% for education and 2,6% for healthcare. 
Chart 14. Share of capital investment by economic activity, Ukraine, 2010 — 2015 
 
 
 Industry  Other 
 Trade; transport; residence, catering  Construction  
 Agriculture, hunting, forestry; fishing  State governance; defense; education; 
   healthcare 
Total capital investment120 for 2010 is 22680,52 million USD; 2011 – 30199,25;  
2012 – 34186,91; 2013 – 31261,53; 2014 –13915,03 and 2015 – 11379,53 
 
Source: author’s calculations, data retrieved from the SSSU / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2013/ibd/ibd_rik/ibd_u/ki_rik_u_e_bez.htm 
Investors’ preferences are coming back on track within short-term cycles (mainly 
export-oriented) due to events since 2014 with ATO. Industry seemed to look most attractive 
but not significantly due to aggregate investments balance sheet composed of 22,68 billion USD 
in 2010 and declined by double to 11,38 billion USD in 2015, which is 13,7%121 of GDP itself. 
                                                          
120 USD retrieved from UAH according to exchange rate by the end of each year; 
121 Author’s calculation based on the SSSU open data / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2015/vvp/vvp_kv/vvp_kv_u/vvpf_kv2015_u_n.htm; 
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Thus, by 2015, 1/3 are investments within industry, same share as in 2010, roughly 
1/10 is for agriculture (harvesting with subsequent sale), construction shrank by 0,5 % 
(generally most paid off business in Ukraine) and category “trade; transport; residence, 
catering” – 10%. 
Now let’s study the source nature of recent half-decade investments. 
 
Chart 15. Capital investments share by the sources of funding, Ukraine, 
2015 (to the left) and 2010 (to the right) 
 
 State budget  Regional budget 
 Own funds of enterprises  Bank loans, etc. 
 Foreign investors  Public funds for housing 
 Other   
Total capital investment122 for 2010 is 22680,52 million USD  
and 2015 – 11379,53 
Source: author’s calculations based on open data of the SSSU / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/ibd/iokjf/iokjf_u10-13_bez.htm 
Foreign investors do not invest in “developing” Ukraine, or we may call it increase 
from 2,1% in 2010 to 3% in 2015 – outcome of opaque privatization (see the previous chapter). 
Unfavorable investment climate, traditionally taxation (table 15) and overregulation (chapter 
1.3), was worsen by political instability in 2004 and 2014. All this resulted in limited and 
manual mode access of privileged (3%) of foreign investors. Local 67,5% investors, mainly 
presented by governmental influential groups, do not introduce long-term investment with high-
tech or transparent management (EU) standards. Focal objects are within primary and 
                                                          
122 USD retrieved from UAH according to exchange rate by the end of each year; 
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secondary sectors: exporting raw materials and light manufacturing as it guarantees fast 
payback. 
Unfortunately, there is no open Ukrainian data for making update myself of ETF 
(2009) research concerning annual steel prices, where it is unconditionally evident, for instance, 
synchronal correlations of Ukrainian GDP growth and change of steel prices worldwide – 
another strong argument to export-oriented economy of Ukraine: 
“Despite sharp falls since 2004, real exports still have a profound 
impact on GDP growth. The indirect effects of trade performance on growth (via expanded 
investment in export industries, increased demand for domestic inputs, transfers of new 
knowledge and technologies etc.) remain significant. However, poor export diversification 
makes growth quite sensitive to changes in demand and the price of steel on the world 
market” 123. 
Finally, increase (“+”) and decrease (“-“) dynamic on the trade of goods and 
services (%, to the previous period) for the discussed period here as well. 
Table 4. Export and import dynamics (%) of goods and services in Ukraine in 2010-2016 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Export –19,3 +30,3 –0,1 –6,9 –14,3 –27,0 –4,1 
Import –22,3 +32,6 +2,9 –7,1 –27,1 –29,3 +3,7 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU data / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2016/so_ek_r_u/soekru_u/arh_soekru_16.htm 
 
In general, we can say that the labor market in Ukraine is liberal and self-
regulating. However, natural adaptation to market conditions and the almost complete absence 
of state regulation of the labor market has resulted in a steady “institutional traps”124 that affect 
the labor market. According to Victor POLTEROVICH (1999), the cause of these “traps” were 
“dramatic changes in macroeconomic conditions, transfer of transitional annuities to 
individuals, the lack of state control, and macroeconomic policy aimed at suppression of 
inflation “at all costs / by all means”. 
 
                                                          
123 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
75; 
124 In scientific use the term “institutional trap” was introduced by Russian Economist Victor POLTEROVICH 
to describe the unexpected but persistent negative consequences of the decisions taken at the macroeconomic 
level in Russia in the 1990s; 
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1.6 Defensive restructuring. Informal sector and shadow market 
 
Unbalanced conjuncture of the Ukrainian labour market unite opposing tendencies: 
labor shortage and the redundant labour. In Ukraine it is manifested in the existence, on the one 
hand, involuntary part-time employment, on the other – redundant employment. Support for 
employment at a stable level is achieved by reducing the duration and intensity of labor. In this 
case, the costs of adaptation are not concentrated on a small group of unemployed, but 
are distributed on a substantial number of individuals whose potential is only partially. This 
is the phenomenon of “involuntary part-time employment”, which is widely distributed 
(charts 10 and 11). The high proportion of part-time employment with comparable 
unemployment rate according to the ILO are evident. This means that an exacerbation of the 
problems of the labor market reinforces the administrative burden on businesses from 
coercion to preserve employment, business meets cost savings in the form of a sharp reduction 
in wages.  
These processes mean that Ukraine practiced during 2000s and practice in 2010s 
legal (underemployment) and illegal (hidden delayed wages) adaptive mechanisms of the 
1990s, when the crisis costs apply to all workers through lower wages and not through 
localization costs through mechanisms of release followed then by state support for the 
unemployed. This way allows for specifically Ukrainian idea of moderate social and political 
stability, but leads to a deterioration of human capital (best competitive labour force simply 
emigrates abroad or turns to the informal sector) and the preservation of inefficient labour 
organization (see previous chapter), even if it is hard-working labour process, thus, slowing 
the economy modernization at the stage of going out from the crisis. And forced 
underemployment have clear institutional framework in the form of a transfer to part-time 
work or administrative leave. 
Admittedly, there is nothing irrational in the phenomenon of sticking in (temporary 
“on hold” mode) the workforce. In all economies, employment responds to changes in output 
behind time. In the short term the company will always be prone to sticking labor if adaptation 
to adverse shocks by varying the number of employees associated with higher costs than adapt 
by changing the length and intensity of labor. However, in Ukraine the scale and sustainability 
of excess employment is extremely high. The explanation for this phenomenon may be the 
following assumptions. 
The cause of excess employment is the existence of formal and informal 
arrangements between companies and authorities to abandon mass release of workforce. 
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Confirmation of participation of the state in maintaining employment are excessive number of 
governmental regulations, including Ukrainian government Resolution “On the Definition and 
Application of the Minimum Wage in the Hourly Rate” (2010)125 defines cases in which hourly 
minimum wage legally enshrines part-time work, particularly in enterprises of budgetary 
institutions. Such government support helps preserving such employment (see the previous 
chapter). 
The trend of employment growth in self-employment sector has been generated by 
the growing number of workers in private households. Owing to spread of employment in 
the private farms, agricultural production remained predominant activity of the informal 
sector — above 70% of employment in this sector between 2000 and 2012, afterwards shrank 
to less than 40% offset by expanded of “trade; repair; hotels, restaurants” category to 22% from 
13% (2012) and by construction to 16% from 4,7% in 2000. Sudden jump in construction could 
be explained by privatization policy we discussed in previous chapter and outer factors, like 
EURO’2012 football tournament hosted by Ukraine and Poland. Notably, between 2000 and 
2007126 agriculture remained stable with slight fluctuation within 4%; trade – 5% and slow but 
steady climbing up of construction – from 4,7% to 9%. 
 
Chart 16. Informal (i) employment (E) by economic sectors (s) in 2000 (top left),  
2012 (top right), 2014 (bottom left) and 2015 
 
 Agriculture, hunting, forestry; fishing  Other 
 Trade; repair; hotels, restaurants  Industry 
 Transport and communication  Construction 
 Transportation and storage  Accommodation; food service 
2000, total “E” is 20,175127 (million); no 
open data for “iE” 
2012, total “E” is 18,7369 (million); 4,6516 
“iE” =  1,6042 employees + 3,0474 self-
employed 
  
2014, total “E” is 18,0733 (million); 4,5409 
“iE” = 2,1293 iE of formal “s” + 2,4116 pure 
iE 
2015, total “E” is 16,4432 (million); 4,3033 
“iE” = 2075,1 iE of formal “s” + 2228,2 pure 
iE 
                                                          
125 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/330-2010-п; 
126 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
105; 
127 SSSU / www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/rp/ean/ean_u/osp_rik_07u.htm; 
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Source: author’s calculations for 2015, 2014 and 2012 based on SSSU open data / 
www.ilo.org/public/libdoc//igo/P/76338; for 2000 — ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market 
reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 105 
 
This trend is supported by the Law of Ukraine “On Subsidiary Farm” (2003, 
changed in 2008, article 8): 
“The members of the private farms are persons who are self-employed 
and under the Law of Ukraine “On Employment” belong to the employed population, provided 
that work in this sector is a main for them”128. 
Excessive expansion happened to informal and shadow sector by employment in 
unregulated, potentially promising and self-employment in technologically primitive forms of 
economic activity. 
 
  
                                                          
128 Official website of Ukrainian Parliament, translated by the author / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/742-15; 
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Table 5. Shadow economy share to GDP (current/USD) and illicit financial flows  
of Ukraine in 2004 — 2013 
 
Year 
GDP, current 
(USD/billions) 
Shadow 
economy, 
MEDT* of 
Ukraine 
 
Shadow economy, 
Schneider’s (2004, 
2012) method 
Illicit Financial 
Flows, 
(USD/billions) 
2013 183,310 35%  no data yet 13,911 
2012 175,737 34%  44,0% 21,001 
2011 162,706 34%  44,6% 17,949 
2010 135,567 38%  45,1% 13,843 
2009 114,383 39%  46,2% 10,574 
2008 123,124 34%  46,2% 16,922 
2007 142,719 28%  46,8% 7,175 
2006 107,753 28%  47,3% 5,381 
2005 87,416 28%  47,8% 5,626 
2004 65,049 28%  48,8% 0,438 
 
Since 2010 GDP data are based on methodological principles of International Standard System 
of National Accounts (SNA, 2008). Since 2010, data exclude temporarily occupied territory of 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Since 2014 — part of the ATO zone. 
* Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) 2010 — 2013 data based on integral 
index129 methodology (2009). MEDT data for 2004 — 2009 is provided by National Institute 
for Strategic Studies (2011). 
Source: SSSU for GDP (current/USD) data; Global Financial Integrity (GFI)130 for Illicit 
Financial Flows (USD/millions) data / gfintegrity.org/issue/illicit-financial-flows 
 
According to calculations of Austrian economist Friedrich SCHNEIDER (2004, 
2012), methodology based on illegal employment and household production of goods and 
services, size of the shadow economy relative to current GDP in 2004 was 48,8 %131 in Ukraine 
(excluding underground criminal economic activities and the informal household economy), 
which roughly constitutes up to 31,7 billion USD. Roughly, since certain share of shadow 
                                                          
129 Calculation of the integral index of the shadow economy in the national economy as a whole is carried out 
by construction estimates for the methods “spending - retail turnover” financial, monetary and electric in the 
general index. Preference is given to a method that is more stable estimates for the last five years; 
130 A non-profit, Washington DC-based research and advisory organization; 
131 Friedrich SCHNEIDER (2004), Shadow Economies Around the World, Working Paper, CREMA, pg. 12 / 
crema-research.ch/papers/2004-03.pdf; 
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economy income is used by the population in the consumer market, and can therefore be taken 
into account by the official statistics (GDP) in terms of consumption. 
Shadow economy and informal sector connected with formal sector, this may 
happen via sets of operations and money transfer chains: “production — income — 
consumption/savings — investment — production”. The fact is that, none of the modern 
approaches provide us with clear distinction between which part of the value added created in 
the shadow sector contained in the official GDP figures. 
Only illicit financial flows are the end-fragment of the chain described above and 
visibly separated from GDP. Table 5 derives us to assumption of actual completion of the 
restructuring of shadow economic activities within the country by presence of the following 
characteristics: 
a) constant share (%) of the shadow component within actual economy on the 
provided above time axis (2004 — 2013); 
b) constant grow of illicit financial flows, heated and even increased by crisis in 
2008. 
Thus, according to the Global Financial Integrity (GFI), 11,95% of aggregate GDP 
was withdrawn from Ukraine by now. 
Friedrich SCHNEIDER “marked” Ukraine as still a mostly communist dominated 
country together with Russia and some former soviet republics. Similar marker we observe 
from Gérard ROLAND (2002) in his work “The political economy of transition”: where he 
forcefully made the point that to fully understand the successes and failures of reform policies 
we need historical context of civil society activity (discussed in chapter 1.1). According to some 
Western expert’s rhetoric, it is critical to the country's annual turnover in the shadow sector at 
15-35% level of GDP. If the shadow business turnover exceeds 30% of GDP, while the number 
working for it – 40% of employment, the economy is losing control. 
According to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine (2015), 
the level of shadow economy in Ukraine is high. In 2009 the level of shadow economy 
amounted to 39 % of official GDP, increased compared to 2008 by 5 % percentage points. 
Record was set in 2014 — 43% and decreased by 3% the next year. 
The lack of a clear boundary, that separates the formal sector from the informal, is 
also one of the major structural features of the labor market in Ukraine. In terms of production 
processes of concentration of capital can assume that the flexibility of informal employment 
can be a useful in terms of mitigating the short-term market cycles, but it is unable to support 
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sustainable organizational and technological development for the purpose of deindustrialization 
and reaching developed country level. 
Similarly, self-employment, formed mainly in the form of micro-enterprises 
without their inclusion in a network of powerful industrial clusters (previous chart) objectively 
rolled back to archaic organizational and technological considerations. 
“A fairly low proportion of employers (1% in Ukraine compared to 
4,5% in the EU-27) reflects poorer start-up conditions, significant barriers to doing business 
and to firm growth and, in general, a less favorable investment and business environment than 
in Western economies”.132 
As a result, significant labor resource potential is used to reproduce and expand 
low-and non-progressive sectors of the economy. 
Table 6. Quantitate dynamics of legal entities by organizational forms  
in Ukraine in 2013 — 2016 
№ Organizational form 1.XII.2016 1.XII.2015 1.XII.2014 1.XII.2013 
1 Limited liability company 528318 485045 516947 513235 
2 Private company 202397 201921 259997 278395 
3 Public authority 101432 102306 109356 113883 
4 NGO 75478 69686 75414 77065 
5 Separated subdivision (without legal status) 44533 38808 47610 49562 
6 Farm 44348 43665 47349 49132 
7 Union, federation 26534 26298 28851 29609 
8 Cooperative 26388 25677 29635 33854 
9 Condominium 25754 16831 15904 16098 
10 Religious organization 23965 23142 24895 25393 
11 Charitable organization 16726 15234 15708 14901 
12 Political party 15810 15534 18234 19183 
13 Corporation 15266 15630 23178 24912 
14 Subsidiary company 12275 12376 17029 18208 
15 Municipal enterprise 11672 11436 13792 15006 
16 Consumer company 4403 4334 5030 5166 
17 State enterprise 3987 4022 5579 5951 
18 Other 267 5109 73507 79795 
 TOTAL 1179553 1117054 1328015 1369348 
                                                          
132 ETF (2009), Black Sea labour market reviews, Ukraine country report, Working document, ENPI 08-14, pg. 
29; 
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Description: since 2014 data is excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Row “5” between 2013 and 2015 was without legal status 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/edrpoy/ukr/EDRPU_2013/ks_opfg/arh_ks_opfg_13.htm 
 
Modern types of employment (telecommuting, outsourcing, staff leasing) often get 
into the labor market through the informal sector. Therefore, the main reaction of market 
participants of the labour market itself lead to results that less predictable and unexpected. 
In 2009 4,5 million people in Ukraine between the ages of 15-70 worked in the 
informal sector, what is equivalent to 22,1 % of total employment. The great bulk (61 %) of 
this informal employment is in private agricultural production units, including unpaid family 
workers; but another third one corresponds to wage workers under oral agreements in the non-
agricultural sector; and the remainder refers to unpaid family workers and self-employed 
outside agriculture133. 
Distorted structural changes in employment caused specific flow of the process of 
systemic transformation of labor markets, depending on the coherence of actions and common 
vectors focus on restructuring and re-allocation. 
A characteristic feature is the dominance of “defensive restructuring” in the 
structure of employment restructuring, which means passive adaptation of enterprises to 
new economic conditions and low rates of employment re-allocation. Significant 
institutional constraints of the national labor market led to priority use of innovative 
mechanisms (global trends) to adapt to market conditions such as flexible duration maneuvering 
of the work process or even wages, instead of employment restructuring. 
Preserving excessive number of employed workers in these enterprises has caused 
widespread practice of part-time employment, authorized by administration the existence of 
significant duration of employees’ leave at own expense (charts 10 and 11). 
Adverse trends in changes in the age structure of employment in the economy and 
its sectors and the phenomenon of growth without job creation. The employment rate was not 
affected by the famous slogan of creating one million jobs yearly claimed as a priority of state 
                                                          
133 World Bank (2011), The Scope and Main Characteristics of Informal Employment in Ukraine, Technical 
Note for the Government of Ukraine, pg. 2 / 
siteresources.worldbank.org/UKRAINEINUKRAINIANEXTN/Resources/455680-
1310372404373/InformalEmploymentinUkraineEng.pdf; 
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policy in 2005-2009 or during next program for 2012 — 2017 when claimed to reach 
employment by 21,4 million134 (compare with chart 5).  
In theory, the creation of even a million of decent jobs would be able to change the 
international specialization of Ukraine. The issue of new jobs had to answer geo-economic 
strategy for Ukraine, finding a new place in the international division of labor (at least in the 
region). 
Contrary to what was reported about annual creation of one million jobs since 2005, 
employment growth was reached almost by increasing rural employment within retirement age. 
Thus, from 2004 to 2013 rural employment rate of the total population increased by 7,4%, and 
among the working age population — by 3,4% (see the corresponding table of annex 2). 
However, the total employment rate among persons aged 60-70 years increased from 19,7% to 
23,8% (see below calculations based on the Annex 2 data). 
Table 7. Employment (total, rural, urban, male, female) NET change (%) of the 
population by age in 2015 versus 2004 
 
Total 15-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-70 
Working 
Age 
TOTAL 0 -5,7 -2,9 -1,3 0,6 1,2 -5,2 0,1 
RURAL -1 -5,1 -4,6 -3 0,2 0,4 -7,8 -2,4 
URBAN 0,5 -6,8 -2 -0,75 0,9 1,6 -3,3 1,3 
MALE 1,3 -5 -1,3 0,7 -0,2 1,6 -5,1 2 
FEMALE -1,2 -6,5 -5 -3,4 1,2 0,7 -5,3 -1,5 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU. Working age for all tables: in 2004 — 2011 
for men/women is 15—54/15—59 respectively; 2012 — men/women is 15—55/15—59; 2013 —
2014 for men/women is 15—56/15—59 and in 2015 for men/women is 15—58/15—59; In bold 
are min and max values. Net is subtraction 2015 and 2004 
 
The main problem for the domestic labor market was to lesser extent unemployment 
rather low cost of the labor (chart 8). Thus, in 2006 the SESU registered over 2,3 million 
vacancies — this is a huge number, considering this at that time, officially registered 
unemployed by ILO was 1,5 million people (the number of registered unemployment in the 
SESU is two times less). 
Summarizing briefly, focal reasons are: the lack of investment, inadequate labour 
records, lack of conceptual vision and practical mechanisms to create jobs. For example, EU 
                                                          
134 Program to promote employment and stimulate job creation for the period until 2017 / 
zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1008-2012-п; 
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budget foreseen investments for growth and job creation with transparent division onto five 
main pillars in 2015135 specifically: 
1) less developed regions (regional convergence); 
2) transition regions; 
3) more developed regions (competitiveness); 
4) outermost and sparsely populated regions; 
5) cohesion fund (including contribution to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). 
Overall budget was 48,28 billion EUR, primarily targeted on less developed — 
57,7%, cohesion fund — 25% and for the competitiveness of the more developed ones — 
15,7%. 
According to Ukrainian reports in 2005 — 2006: 2,37 million of new jobs were 
established in the country. At the same time, employment had increased by only 0,575 million 
of people. Also, the number of registered unemployed was 1,5 million people (2005 — 2008; 
2012 — 2013, see table below), but most — people with limited adaptive capacities, with low 
levels of skills and market adaptation, which could hardly be a resource for quality changes. 
Also, there was no clear division between policy on unemployment and structural policies on 
jobs creation. 
Table 8. Employed, retired, employed to retire ratio, unemployed, registered 
unemployed and aid beneficiaries in Ukraine in 1995 — 2016 
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2016 16,28 12,31 1,32 1,68 10,31% 0,39 0,32 
2015 16,44 12,15 1,35 1,65 10,06% 0,49 0,40 
2014 18,07 12,53 1,44 1,85 10,22% 0,51 0,41 
2013 19,31 13,64 1,42 1,51 7,82% 0,49 0,40 
2012 19,26 13,82 1,39 1,59 8,25% 0,51 0,39 
2011 19,23 13,74 1,40 1,66 8,64% 0,48 0,37 
2010 19,18 13,72 1,40 1,71 8,94% 0,54 0,41 
2009 20,19 13,75 1,47 1,96 9,70% 0,53 0,41 
2008 20,97 13,82 1,52 1,43 6,80% 0,64 0,65 
                                                          
135 European Commission Budget page / ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm; 
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2007 20,90 13,94 1,50 1,42 6,78% 0,64 0,47 
2006 20,73 14,05 1,48 1,52 7,31% 0,78 0,56 
2005 20,68 14,07 1,47 1,60 7,74% 0,89 0,64 
2004 20,30 14,35 1,41 1,91 9,39% 0,98 0,68 
2003 20,16 14,38 1,40 2,01 9,96% 1,02 0,68 
2002 20,09 14,42 1,39 2,14 10,65% 1,03 0,76 
2001 19,97 14,45 1,38 2,46 12,29% 1,06 0,67 
2000 20,18 14,53 1,39 2,66 13,16% 1,18 0,74 
1999 19,95 14,52 1,37 2,61 13,11% 1,20 na 
1998 23,00 14,53 1,58 2,94 12,77% 1,04 na 
1997 23,76 14,49 1,64 2,33 9,81% 0,68 na 
1996 24,11 14,49 1,66 2,00 8,28% 0,39 na 
1995 24,13 na na 1,44 5,96% 0,16 na 
 
Description: since 2014 — excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. 
Source: author’s calculations based on data from the SSSU and the Pension Fund of Ukraine 
/ pfu.gov.ua/pfu/control/uk/index and ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2004/rp/pres-
reliz/rp080404.html 
 
Along with the growth of employment we witness increasing need of enterprises 
for employees. Thus, in 2016 in the whole Ukraine, the figure increased by 10,1 thousand of 
people (table 10). The increase in needs of workers by enterprises while decreasing employment 
in general could mean that there is a phenomenon of growth without job creation if only we 
didn’t observe negative net of employment. The increase in employment (2008, 2011-2013) is 
mainly within the “residual” sector consisting of small businesses, self-employed, and also the 
access to the labor market of people of retirement age, forced by social-economic deprivation. 
Should be mentioned the curvature of the sectoral structure of employment between 
2000-2008 (chart 17). Assessing the overall dynamics of the employment structure can be 
noted, at first glance, progressive changes: the relative increase in the share of the services 
sector and a corresponding increase in the share of services in GDP and employment, which 
brings the value of production and non-production sectors in Ukraine to similar parameters 
characteristic of developed countries. 
However, the causes of structural changes in Ukraine is different and contained in, 
especially, the rapid dissemination of mass “privatization” of enterprises, development of 
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“microscopic” entrepreneurship, deregulation and liberalization, which led to economic 
crushing of integrated technology systems that have lost their competitive edge. The 
structure of the industry is clearly traced by regressive shift direction which does not change 
with the onset of economic recovery. Overall, social structure for food-issue gradually shifts 
toward raw materials and semi product of low level processing. Curvature of the sectoral 
structure of employment is a manifestation of the following trends: 
a) high economic efficiency is not observed in those areas that provide growth of 
productive forces through production of high-end products and goods of public consumption, 
and due to commodity products, primarily extractive industries (metallurgy, coal mining, 
deforestation, etc.); 
b) in the range and volume of marketable products we see not actively growing role 
of engineering industries, production of consumer goods for the population, food, textile and 
wood industries development; 
c) increase of the production of high-tech engineering products (production of 
industrial equipment, agricultural machinery, aerospace, automotive and shipbuilding, 
production equipment etc.), food products, the development of financial, trade and other service 
industries do not significantly affect the structural changes in areas of the formation of post-
industrial economy and does not ensure the sustainable development of the entire set of regional 
reproductive system, limited mainly by old industrial areas. 
Thus, changes in the employment structure as a whole reflect the negative changes 
in the structure of production. 
The lack of structural policy and labor market segmentation has taken place. 
Ukrainian labor market has significant inherent structural imbalances. It consists of isolated 
segments weakly related (chapter 1.1). At each of them there are significant discrepancies in 
supply and demand for labor (see the next chapter). 
Most prosperous of the Ukrainian labor market represented by a relatively closed 
market that is monopoly regulated. It is the labor force employed in export industries, 
electricity, fuel industry, production and distribution of gas and construction, financial sector, 
the administrative apparatus that has traditionally paid above average (table 17). In this segment 
of the labor market, there is a persistent excess of demand over supply. Revenues of enterprises 
are not determined by production efficiency in the industry and not the cost of reproduction of 
the worker, and the parity of external and domestic prices for natural and raw material 
resources, the monopoly position of these enterprises and institutions, giving them the 
possibility of redistribution in their favor different non-institutionalized rental income, the value 
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of which, by some estimates, reaching 10-15% of GDP. But for all the apparent prosperity of 
this segment in it there are some very negative trends136: 
a) high monopoly profits from the use of resources discourages rationalization of 
production; 
b) most of the low-skilled workers and the extensive nature of the employment 
structure do not form an effective price of labor, does not guide the employee on training, so 
little profits are invested in human capital (see the next chapter); 
c) increasing input prices on the international market can cause a significant 
reduction in demand for labor in the energy-intensive components of this segment of the market 
and lead to a rapid deterioration of the conditions of reproduction. 
The rest of the Ukrainian labor market is represented by two segments which do not 
compete with each other. These include high- and low-skilled workers, mainly concentrated in 
light industry, agriculture, forestry and the social sphere. These sectors characterized by excess 
supply of labor, often in the form of “latent unemployment”, and as a result — extremely low 
wages. The workforce reproduction in many cases provided by informal sector, which is the 
path of development that is almost unmanageable. The essential problem is that in this part of 
the market is concentrated most labour-excess part of highly qualified scientific personnel, 
underfunded workforce reproduction which has led to a sharp reduction in the most promising 
part of the workforce. 
Chart 17. Employment (thousand, registered workers) by economic activity 
in Ukraine in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2015 
 
                                                          
136 Olga PYSCHULINA (2010), Systemic flaws in labor market of Ukraine and its reform priorities, Analytical 
report, National Institute for Strategic Studies, pg. 12; 
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Shares (%) are in the same order as the bars for 2000 is 22%/23%/4%/15%/36%;  
2004 – 20%/20%/4%/20%/36%;  2008 – 16%/18%/5%/23%/38%;  
2012 – 17%/17%/4%/22%/40% and  2015 – 17%/16%/4%/21%/42% 
 
 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries  Industry 
 Construction  Trade and repair 
 Services; other   
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU. Data between 2000 — 2008 according to the 
Coefficient of Economic Activity (CEA, 2005 [National Classifier of Ukraine]) and data since 
2012 — relying on CEA 2010 
 
Chart above reflects stagnated preservation of labour force share throughout 
decades, proving, made by us, defensive restructuring assumption: slight increase in services 
and commerce are only observed with sharp decline in absolute digits due to demographical 
decline. 
According to the Analytical report (2016) of the Annual Message of the President 
of Ukraine to the Parliament of Ukraine, in the structure of industrial production and 
merchandise exports Ukraine, almost 95% of the volume of production belong to the third 
(60%) and fourth (35%) technological paradigm, the share of higher is 4% for the fifth and 
0,1% — for the sixth137.  
Economic growth in 2000-2008, was caused by not improving the structure of the 
national economy, rather above all favorable foreign economic conditions and based on the use 
of cheap labor as a competitive advantage. The current Ukrainian reality namely tough labor 
market segmentation is the biggest obstacle to an efficient market economy. 
Too slow nature of changes in the productive forces and the imbalance of economic 
space of the country lead to regional disparities development of productive forces, including 
preserved: 
a) highly industrialized Eastern regions (before ATO in 2014) with the most 
productive role, which form the basic industries of the Ukrainian economy in economic 
structure and in which a large proportion is the most energy intensive and environmentally 
harmful industries — fuel and energy, metallurgical and chemical complexes; 
b) regions of agro-industrial specialization (West, South and North of the 
country) — whose contribution to the national economy are smaller. 
                                                          
137 Analytical report (2016), On the internal and external situation of Ukraine, NISS, Kyiv — pg. 246 / 
en.niss.gov.ua; 
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In the eastern areas concentrates more than a third out of the total employed 
population in the economy within the country (before ATO in 2014). Average workforce 
characterized by the concentration of supply and demand in the East. Significant migration 
increase has only Kyiv city, and the outflow of the working population is typical for all regions 
except Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv oblasts and former Crimea. Western 
regions: Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, Zhytomyr regions are characterized by a long 
persistence hotbed unemployment, while in other regions there is a shortage of labor (see the 
Map in the next chapter). 
 
1.7 Supply and demand imbalances. Human capital deterioration 
 
The volume of internal migration is significant in Ukraine, despite the fact that, 
since independence at the beginning of 1990s, organized movement and recruitment of the 
labour force, typical for the Soviet times, disappeared. While immediately prior to the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, three million people138 undertook internal migration, it has been increased 
then, especially taking into account overall decline of the labour force, anyway increased to 
3,338 million in 2007 with statistically observed historical minimum later on of 2,057 million 
or 12,6% out of total employed population in 2016 (see table 8). 
Table below reveals intensive idle turnover and negative net balance, mainly 
explained by long stand decreasing national demographic trend; such turnover is taking place 
even despite the high costs of hiring and firing. 
Table 9. Internal mobility (turnover, thousand) of the labour force in Ukraine  
in 2006 – 2016 
Y Accepted Dismissed NET 
A, % 
of E* 
 Y Accepted Dismissed NET 
A, % 
of E* 
2006 3221 3417 -196 15,54  2011 3021 3260 -239 15,71 
2007 3388 3501 -113 16,21  2012 2798 3206 -408 14,53 
2008 3224 3736 -512 15,37  2013 2582 2945 -363 13,37 
2009 2400 3056 -656 11,89  2014 2045 2714 -669 11,32 
2010 2722 3019 -297 14,19  2015 1932 2436,1 -504 11,75 
      2016 2057 2299,5 -242,5 12,64 
* Accepted (A) as % out of total employed (E); 
                                                          
138 IOM (2016), Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures, IOM Mission in Ukraine, Kyiv, pg. 7 / 
www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/ff_eng_10_10_press.pdf; 
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Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU published data: series of SSSU’s yearbooks 
“Labour Market in Ukraine” for corresponding years / before 2015: 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/Arhiv_u/11/Arch_pu_zb.htm 
and after 2015: www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/bl/04/bl_upnp_2015pdf.zip 
 
Such high negative net turnover on practice means counterproductive high labor 
mobility, since it not improves the use of labor potential, it is also typical in general as well as 
typical in isolate for territorial, professional and sectoral dimensions (see chart below).  
For instance, between 2013 – 2015 aggregate average regional turnover was near 
to abreast level with 5,8% negative net difference: 24,5% (accepted) and 30,3% (dismissed). 
Out of total 24 regions the lowest acceptance mobility share starts from 17% (2013) and maxes 
at the level of 32,5% in the capital of Ukraine compare to the same year139. 
Gross turnover ratio, defined as the sum of the coefficients of employment and 
dismissal, reaches up to 54,2% for the whole economy and 49% for the industry itself, while 
maxed for aggregate agriculture and retail sectors: 96,2% and 103,3% correspondingly in 2015. 
It can be explained having partial seasonal nature for both sectors, also by significant turnover 
(quantitate dynamics) of registering and termination of both: limited liability companies (see 
table 6) and by behavior of individual entrepreneur units as well, that rely on frequently 
changing heavy reporting tax procedures or tax burden itself. 
Recent changes in taxation for individual entrepreneurs – obligatory single social 
contribution even when zero surplus, which equals to 26,5 USD/month140 and 
practically/technically it is paid quarterly, which was implemented in December 2016, – 
resulted in termination of individual entrepreneur units (by April 2017) by 12,8% out of total 2 
million since then141. Thus, aggravation of a new turnover ratio implications is likely to foreseen 
soon for this subject even more. 
See the chart below, which is very typical characteristics for the recent time of 
observed labour force. 
  
                                                          
139 SSSU’s Yearbook (2015), Labour Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 40 / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/zb/08/zb_pu15pdf.zip 
140 704 UAH / 26,560930 (NBU exchange rate in April 2017); 
141 Opendatabot is a service that allows to monitor registration data of Ukrainian companies and court register / 
opendatabot.com/fop; 
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Chart 18. Share (%) of workers’ acceptance and disposal  
for certain type of economy (2015) 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU’s Yearbook (2015), Labour Market in 
Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 39 / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/zb/08/zb_pu15pdf.zip 
 
As the pace of movement of labor, Ukraine is significantly ahead of most countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe: this is achieved by active processes of hiring and firing. 
According to the most recent data obtained during the study conducted by International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2014-2015, the number of internal migrant workers in 
Ukraine exceeds 1,6 million, reaching 9% of the economically active population, and internal 
labour migration may soon increase by about 50%142. 
“According to other sociological studies, for 55% of the internal 
migrant workers their job is permanent, for the vast majority it is their only job. However, only 
20% of the surveyed internal migrant workers are officially employed. The others are working 
as part of verbal agreements, or consider themselves to be self-employed”143. 
Table 10. Registered labour (thousand) supply and demand dynamics in Ukraine  
2007 — 2016 
 
Labour 
supply 
Labour 
demand 
Competition 
per vacancy 
 
 
Labour 
supply 
Labour 
demand 
Competition 
per vacancy 
2007 660,3 169,7 3,89  2012 526,2 48,6 10,83 
                                                          
142 IOM (2016), Migration as an Enabler of Development in Ukraine, IOM Mission in Ukraine, Kyiv, pg. 11 / 
www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/iom_migration_as_an_enabler_of_development_in_ukraine.pdf; 
143 IOM (2016), Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures, IOM Mission in Ukraine, Kyiv, pg. 8 / 
www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/ff_eng_10_10_press.pdf; 
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2008 876,2 91,1 9,62  2013 487,7 47,5 10,27 
2009 542,8 65,8 8,25  2014 512,2 35,3 14,50 
2010 564,0 63,9 8,83  2015 490,8 25,9 18,95 
2011 501,4 59,3 8,45  2016 390,8 36,0 10,85 
 
National definition: demand for labor on the registered labor market – is the number of 
available jobs (vacancies) reported by employers (companies, institutions, organizations and 
individual entrepreneurs) to the SESU; 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU data (end of each year). Since 2014 data is 
without Crimea and since 2015 — without ATO territory. There is no data from the SSSU 
before 2007 / www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2017/rp/sz_br/sz_br_u/piprs_2017_u.htm 
 
For the last decade unemployment (ILO, table 8) grew from 1,42 to 1,68 million 
people, thus table above clearly demonstrates low confidence in the efficiency of the only state 
recruiting intermediary agency – the SESU – by agents of the labour market: employers and 
employees. Aggregate average unemployment for the observed period is 1,65 million, whereas 
aggregate registered labour supply is 0,555 million (only 33,64%) and registered labour demand 
is 64,3 thousand workplaces (or 3,9%, see table above). 
Counterproductive mobility while high rates of turnover back staging by low 
productivity (chapter 1.5), and the existence of inter-sectoral, inter-professional (table below) 
and inter-regional imbalances leading to high migration activity. See the edges of the range of 
different qualification categories on the one hand, among the least low-skilled labor, on the 
other — among the most highly skilled. 
Table 11. Supply and demand of labor force (thousand) by occupational group  
in 2014-2015 
 
Labour supply Labour demand 
Competition 
per vacancy 
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 
TOTAL 487,7 512,2 490,8 47,5 35,3 25,9 10 15 19 
State servants and CEOs 51,6 58,9 67,1 4,3 2,7 1,9 12 22 35 
Professionals 42,6 48,6 43,0 8,1 5,2 3,8 5 9 11 
Specialists 46,7 50,6 49,3 5,4 4,0 2,8 9 13 18 
Technical staff 27,0 29,2 30,2 1,5 1,4 1,2 18 21 25 
Workers in trade and services 72,0 73,9 73,8 6,3 5,0 4,2 11 15 18 
Workers in agriculture, etc. 23,3 24,4 24,3 0,7 0,4 0,3 33 61 81 
82 
Skilled workers with tools 56,5 58,9 48,9 9,0 6,4 5,2 6 9 9 
Workers in assembly equipment 
and machinery, etc. 94,4 94,3 82,4 6,0 5,2 3,8 16 18 22 
Elementary (or no) occupations 73,6 73,4 71,8 6,2 5,0 2,7 12 15 27 
 
Description: data provided for the end of each year. Since 2014 data is without Crimea; since 
2015 data is without ATO; 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU’s Yearbook (2013), Labour Market in 
Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 47 / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2014/zb/07/zb_prU_2013.zip and SSSU’s Yearbook 
(2015), Labour Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 48 / 
ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/zb/08/zb_pu15pdf.zip 
 
Results of allocation adaptability are such, that even in periods of most favorable 
economic activity and most suitable economic conditions (2006-2007) unemployment rate not 
decreased below 6,7% (ILO), which is the historical minimum since 1995 (5,96%). 
Analysis of processes associated with changes in employment structure, suggests 
that Ukraine is not directed to a postindustrial society but towards slow deindustrialization. 
According to the IOM144, the degree of economic divergence between Ukraine's 
regions is significant. For instance, per capita income in the Donetsk Region was USD 683 (in 
the first quarter of 2011), which is 20% higher than the average income in Ukraine (USD 550) 
in that year, while the income in the Chernivtsi region (USD 352) was 37% less than the 
average. These economic disparities and asymmetric development paths between the regions 
have to be perceived as one of the factors explaining the current geographical distribution 
pattern. See the only available visual color map below, dated to 2008, presented by the IOM 
Migration Mission in Ukraine in 2013. Other key factors include EU border proximity, 
established migration networks, and cultural ties. 
  
                                                          
144 IOM (2013), Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures, Second Edition, Kyiv, pg. 6 / 
www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/eng_ff_f.pdf; 
83 
Chart 19. Distribution of Ukrainian labour migrants by regions of origin (2008) 
 
Source: IOM (2013), Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures, Second Edition, Kyiv, pg. 6 / 
www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/eng_ff_f.pdf 
 
Structural imbalances occur under the sectoral structure discrepancy to the needs of 
innovation development of economy and under labor resource deterioration of the needs of 
certain sectors of Ukrainian economy. 
Thus, according to the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting145, 
the 2008 deficit in human resources as the main obstacles to economic development were 
named by 10,8% more of respondents-managers than a year ago and every fourth Ukrainian 
manager believes that the lack of qualified personnel holding back growth. In 40% cases of the 
average level of workers in enterprises for the work performed are behind for about 0,2-0,3 of 
category proficiency class. 
In 2015 the competition on one vacancy at a fixed labor market, registered in the 
SESU, reached 19 persons in total (the previous table). In the various professional and 
qualification groups the figure was significantly different from 9 in the group of “Skilled 
workers with tools” to 81 in the group “Workers in agriculture, etc.”. In the group “State 
                                                          
145 Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting / ier.com.ua/en; 
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servants and CEOs” it was 35 persons per place and two consecutive groups: “Elementary (or 
no) occupations” and “Technical staff” — respectively 27 and 25 people per vacancy. Notably, 
that for consecutive recent years competition per vacancy for such categories as “Professionals” 
increased only on 20% and “Skilled workers with tools” remained at the same level, but 
“Elementary (or no) occupations” almost doubled. 
The labor market was actually “overheated” during first half of 2000s with offers 
of the financial sector professionals, managers, economists and lawyers (me myself remember 
that period since was entering university). Thus a very telling article was published in 2005 
named: “Where to Put Accountants, where to Get Turners?!”146, when in the Chernivtsi 
region one vacancy was claimed by 87 accountants. 
From the table above is evident that total supply exceeds the total demand in 2013 
in 10,2 times, 2014 — 14,5, 2015 — 18,9 and in 2016 in 18,9 times. First and most, this is the 
matter of general economy decline. Secondly, lack of qualified personnel, since education in 
general was commercialized to a lesser extent during 1990s and maxed since 2000s with 
extremely limited quotas for state scholarship (or funding), and are hugely and widely bribed, 
which in Ukraine is well-known practice that does not require any sort of empirical evidence. 
Thirdly, poor mobility abilities of the work force preserved and worsened due to: 
a) undeveloped housing market concerning price and quality; 
b) regional transport underdevelopment; 
c) access to information characterized by absence or weak relativity. 
Grinding and primitivism of vocational qualification basis of the economy exists. 
Changes in the structure of employment by qualification groups showed that economic growth 
was accompanied by rising of employment representatives of the easiest professions and 
workers in services and trade and, conversely, reduction in employment of professionals, skilled 
workers and skilled farmers. 
More calculations with data comparison of 2013 and 2015 shows that in the 
personnel composition of the economy is steadily decreasing demand for the weight groups 
such as professionals and specialists (respectively in 2,1 and 1,9 times) and decreasing in 
general for the rest. While all developed countries increased their professionals’ and experts’ 
share in the EU average for 16% and 18% (by 2010). However, the rapidly increasing 
                                                          
146 Ukrainian business magazine (2005), Where to Put Accountants, where to Get Turners?!, Society, №41 (44) 
31 October 2005 / www.expert.ua/articles/18/0/1098; 
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proportion of people who do not have jobs and take jobs that require no qualifications (23,3%), 
while in the EU it rarely reaches 10% and in Russia it is 11,2% (by 2010)147. 
Inconsistency in the sphere of vocational training to the labor market needs 
manifested in the contradiction between the relatively high educational and professional 
qualification potential of the population (literacy rate is 99,8%, UNESCO (2015) on the one 
hand and structure primitivism of the economy on the other. There is a widening gap between 
the technological complexity of the work and the actual level of professionalism. The 
structure of the vocational education distorted in favor of the share of higher education. 
However, employers need of specialists with higher professional education is lower than supply 
in the labor market. 
Comparison of available vacancies, the number of unemployed and the number of 
graduates in certain professions witnessed increasing proportion of persons with higher 
education in the labor force — from 29,9%148 in 2008 to 35,6%149 in 2013 with respective 
increase share of training for economists, accountants, managers and lawyers. Instead, despite 
the need to provide businesses with highly skilled specialists in engineering specialties that can 
implement innovative principles of economic growth during 2010s, volumes of these categories 
of professionals (vocational education graduates) have been decreased since 1990s, their 
proportion among overall graduates compare (correlation) to complete higher (postgraduate) 
education as follows: 66,5% in 1999, 37,3% in 2009 and 39,5% in 2016 (table below). 
Table 12. Vocational and higher educational institutions of Ukraine in 1990-2016 
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1990 1 246 376,700 742 228,700 149 136,900 13374  
1991 1 251 338,100 754 223,000 156 137,000 13596 503 
1992 1 255 307,100 753 199,800 158 144,100 13992 592 
1993 1 185 307,000 754 198,000 159 153,500 14816 765 
                                                          
147 Olga PYSCHULINA (2010), Systemic flaws in labor market of Ukraine and its reform priorities, Analytical 
report, National Institute for Strategic Studies, pg. 16; 
148 SSSU’s Yearbook (2008), Labour Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 61 / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/katalog/pracia/Pracsa.zip; 
149 SSSU’s Yearbook (2013), Labour Market in Ukraine, Publishing Ltd. Consultant, pg. 56 / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2014/zb/07/zb_prU_2013.zip; 
86 
1994 1 177 288,400 778 204,300 232 149,000 15643 927 
1995 1 179 277,300 782 191,200 255 147,900 17464 1105 
1996 1 156 274,800 790 185,800 274 155,700 19227 1197 
1997 1 003 264,500 660 162,200 280 186,700 20645 1233 
1998 995 259,200 653 156,900 298 214,300 21766 1247 
1999 980 263,500 658 156,000 313 240,300 22300 1187 
2000 970 266,800 664 148,600 315 273,600 23295 1131 
2001 965 278,800 665 147,500 318 312,800 24256 1106 
2002 962 282,400 667 155,500 330 356,700 25288 1166 
2003 953 275,600 670 162,800 339 416,600 27106 1220 
2004 1 011 283,400 619 148,200 347 316,200 28412 1271 
2005 1 023 286,600 606 142,700 345 372,400 29866 1315 
2006 1 021 289,300 570 137,900 350 413,600 31293 1373 
2007 1 022 285,100 553 134,300 351 468,400 32497 1418 
2008 1 018 269,600 528 118,100 353 505,200 33344 1476 
2009 975 239,400 511 114,800 350 527,300 34115 1463 
2010 976 247,400 505 111,000 349 543,700 34653 1561 
2011 976 240,100 501 96,700 345 529,800 34192 1631 
2012 972 202,100 489 92,200 334 520,700 33640 1814 
2013 968 227,300 478 91,200 325 485,100 31482 1831 
2014 814 182,000 387 79,100 277 405,400 27622 1759 
2015 798 165,000 371 73,400 288 374,000 28487 1821 
2016 787 152,800 370 68,020 287 318,700 25963 1792 
 
Description: since 2014 data is without Crimea; since 2015 data is without ATO. Pupils and 
students considered in the table are those who graduated successfully. Data for 1990-1994 of 
vocational schools provided by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (MESU), 
since 1995 - include facilities of the MESU and other ministries (agencies); 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU open data for Vocational and higher 
educational institutions correspondingly: 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2005/osv_rik/osv_u/ptu_u.html and 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2005/osv_rik/osv_u/vuz_u.html; 
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Before we proceed with average monthly salary depending on the level of 
education, let me describe schematically (table below) structural changes took place in levels 
and degrees of higher education in Ukraine before and since 2014. 
Table 13. Levels and degrees of higher education in Ukraine since 2014 compare to 2002 
Law “On Higher Education” (2002) 
 
Law “On Higher Education” (2014) 
 
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
QUALIFYING LEVEL 
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
QUALIFYING LEVEL 
 Third (universities) Ph.D. 
Complete higher 
(postgraduate) 
education 
Master 
Second (universities 
/ academies, 
institutes) 
Master  
(scientific program) 
Master  
(professional program) 
Specialist 
Last admission to the educationally qualification 
level (EQL) of specialists was conducted in 2016 
Basic (graduate) 
higher education 
Bachelor 
First (universities / 
academies, institutes 
/ colleges) 
Bachelor 
Initial (colleges) Junior bachelor 
Incomplete 
(undergraduate) 
higher education 
Junior Specialist 
Last admission to the educationally qualification 
level (EQL) of junior specialists was conducted in 
2016 
 
Source: author’s scheme composed according to the Law “On Higher Education” of 2002150 
and of 2014151 
 
Now let’s proceed to average registered monthly salary depending on the level of 
education (most recently available only for 2012) according to and in compliance with the 
Decree of the President of Ukraine on the “National Strategy for Development of Education in 
Ukraine until 2021”152 and the “Higher Education Reform Strategy for Ukraine until 2020”.153 
Table 14. Average monthly salary depending on the level of education in 2012 
Educational levels 
average staff worker’s 
salary, USD/month 
% to the national 
average salary 
total men women total men women 
Complete higher (postgraduate) 466,16 534,59 416,99 131,6 151 117,8 
Basic (graduate) higher 323,03 376,33 289,88 91,2 106,3 81,9 
                                                          
150 Official web-site of the Parliament of Ukraine / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2984-14; 
151 Official web-site of the Parliament of Ukraine / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1556-18; 
152 Official web-site of the Parliament of Ukraine / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/344/2013; 
153 Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine / mon.gov.ua/citizens/zv%E2%80%99yazki-z-
gromadskistyu/konsultacziyi-z-gromadskistyu/gromadske-obgovorennya-2016.html; 
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Incomplete (undergraduate) higher 313,90 382,71 277,87 88,7 108,1 78,5 
Vocational 285,37 320,78 235,71 80,6 90,6 66,6 
Complete secondary school 280,25 330,66 221,82 79,1 93,4 62,7 
Basic secondary 256,10 305,52 201,30 72,3 86,3 56,9 
Under basic secondary 215,94 255,22 179,03 61 72,1 50,6 
National average 354,06 399,35 314,15 100 112,8 88,7 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU data and the “Higher Education Reform 
Strategy for Ukraine until 2020” 
 
As we see from the table above, the average salary for complete higher 
(postgraduate) category for men is 51% higher than the average salary across country. Instead, 
salary in corresponding category for women is less high than the average – 17,8%. This signals 
us about a gender gap. Also, descending gradation is evident and corresponds strongly from the 
top to the bottom of the Ukrainian educational ladder. 
In addition to the vocational qualification mismatch, attention should be paid to 
the qualitative difference between the national labor requirements of the postindustrial oriented 
model of Ukraine for the future, to prevent: decline of work oriented economic motivation; 
mentally un-readiness for instability and mobility; excessive individualization of social and 
labor relations, resulting in the loss of social skills of collective activity. In this sense, the 
possibility of Ukraine on the choice of its place on the scale of “post-industrial core — periphery 
preindustrial” critically dependent on the quality of labor resource potential of the nation and 
its labor resource validity of own claims to the cultural and civilizational identity. 
In 1979 and 1992 Nobel Prizes in economics were studies in human capital what 
forced the move to subject-subject approach in learning and economic management. Man is 
perceived not only as a consumer of the results of economic growth, but also as its main engine. 
Theodore SCHULTZ154 (Nobel Prize 1979) was awarded the Nobel Prize jointly with Sir 
William Arthur LEWIS for his work in development economics, focusing on the economics of 
agriculture. He analyzed the role of agriculture within the economy, and his work has had far 
reaching implications on industrialization policy, both in developing and developed nations. 
SCHULTZ also promulgated the idea of educational capital, an offshoot of the concept of 
human capital, relating specifically to the investments made in education: estimated that if in 
                                                          
154 Peter PASSELL (1998), Theodore Schultz, 95, Winner of a Key Prize in Economics, The New York Times, 
On this Day, / www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0430.html; 
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twentieth century the accumulation of human capital accounted to 1/4 of the gross national 
product, in the twenty-first century is 3/4. 
In turn, Gary BECKER155 (Nobel Prize 1992) estimated the return on education 
investment at the level of 12-14% of annual profit of companies and states. For example, in the 
US the profitability of primary education reaches 50-100%, high school — 15-20%, higher 
education — 10-15%. BECKER's research was fundamental in arguing for the augment ability 
of human capital. When his research was first introduced it was considered very controversial 
as some considered it debating. However, he was able to convince many that individuals make 
choices of investing in human capital based on rational benefits and cost that include a return 
on investment as well as a cultural aspect. His research included the impact of positive and 
negative habits such as punctuality and alcoholism on human capital. He explored the different 
rates of return for different people and the resulting macroeconomic implications. He also 
distinguished between general to specific education and their influence on job-lock and 
promotions. 
Lack of labor market planning and unbalanced educational sphere leads to 
imbalance existing between vocational workforce and jobs vacancies. Lack of state priorities 
in education, reducing the quality of training, poor linking of training programs with the needs 
of production156, lowers prestige of scientific occupations and technical guidance, too 
widespread paid education while crisis of domestic production caused by problems of structural 
mismatch of future supply and demand of labor in professional qualification section and 
increase the number of uncompetitive jobs. There is a critical value gap increase between 
technological complexity of the work and the actual level of professionalism157. 
In regard to negative demographic trends in the labor market, since 1993 Ukraine 
has a stable dynamics of population decline (chart 4) and reduce of the working age population 
while increasing the population of non-working age. Reducing the number of unemployed, 
increasing the employed and the economically active population, as noted by the SSSU, 
indicates access to the labor market of disabled people, including the retirement age. The 
above trend is a cause of shortage of manpower, especially skilled, and is a significant constraint 
acceleration of economic growth in all sectors of the economy. 
                                                          
155 Gary S. BECKER (1962), Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 70, No. 5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings, pp. 9-49 / 
www.jstor.org/stable/1829103?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; 
156 The proportion of companies prepare the workers themselves for the necessary specialties. They create and 
certify own educational centers such as vocational schools; 
157 In the 60 years of American economists justified the term half-life of expertise, i.e. the period during which 
the knowledge of graduates obsolete half, and the worker is incapable of further work; 
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We should pay attention to the fact that the demographic “pits” of 1990s and 2000s 
result in a significant decrease in the number of pupils of 9-11 grades (secondary school), in 
some schools, graduation is absent, which is the main group of university students of former I 
and II levels of accreditation (since 2016 are colleges, etc.). Graduation in 2016 was lower than 
the number of available places in universities of former III-IV accreditation (since 2016 are 
universities, etc.) institutions, therefore entrance competition is absent. This means that in future 
we may expect: 
a) reducing the number of students of vocational education. The first reason —
common misconception about the compulsory need of higher education and a significant 
reduction in requirements for knowledge and skills of university students (especially those 
gains popular specialty: law, economics, psychology, management, etc.). It also should be noted 
an increase needed in the proportion of colleges students of the graduates of boarding schools, 
pupils of penal institutions, children from disadvantaged families, young people of drugs and 
alcohol addiction (i.e., people who usually do not have sufficient training and employment 
incentives and will not become highly skilled workers); 
b) further reduce of the number of students in fundamental scientific, engineering, 
mathematical, engineering, research and technical, natural specialties due to the low level of 
school training within physical and natural, and mathematical subjects’ cycle, low labor and 
academic motivation, inability (or lack of ability) to estimate the ratio of real labor market needs 
and qualifications, low motivation and cognitive readiness for systematic and complex learning; 
c) the release of a significant proportion of the teaching staff of higher education 
institutions by linking the number of teachers to the number of students.  
Another side of the problem — in recent years has developed an informal practice 
of overstating the estimates is actually refusal to charge students with unsatisfactory level of 
knowledge and skills that do not comply with the academic study (further reduce of the number 
of students may worsen the situation). So in the coming years we should expect a rapid increase 
in the number of graduates who do not have even the basic foundations of their own profession. 
 
1.8 Unemployment politicization 
 
Danger of high unemployment in Ukraine was seen usually as the main threat to 
social and political stability. Especially prior to frequent (extraordinary) elections in Ukraine, 
electorate is rapidly picking up by opposition. Nobody for quarter century sacrificed his 
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political future (or even political dividends) in favor of needed sharp and long-term state 
reforms as Polish counterparts did (see Hartmut LEHMANN (2012). Any ruling party paving 
own course of policy, hugely criticizing and, most importantly, cancelling predecessors’ 
implementations. Therefore, economic policy was based so, as to avoid the mass firings, 
including by maintaining inefficient jobs. As a result, the nature of Ukrainian unemployment 
unusual for countries with a market economy. 
Significant structural unemployment in Ukraine presented above by qualitative 
mismatch (chapter 1.7) characteristics to labor market needs, numerically is with average 
duration of job search up to 5-7 months and traditionally is one-fifth or one-fours part of ILO 
unemployed data158. The reasons for the existence of structural unemployment caused by the 
following factors: 
a) simplification of the processes of labor movement, due to the dominance of the 
factors in multivariate remuneration and motivation system determines the horizontal159 and 
vertical160 mobility; 
b) low chaotic (unregulated) labor mobility, due to underdeveloped capital markets, 
finance, housing that restrict freedom of movement, proclaimed by the Constitution; overflow 
of the labor between the spheres of employment, economic sectors, territories; 
c) unequal status of various professions. Thus, representatives of the “cross” 
occupations (e.g. transport) are free to employment in another field. Representatives of other 
professions (school teacher) increase the amount of structural unemployment. 
In order to mitigate the structural problems of the labor market, prevents insufficient 
infrastructure and institutional development, particularly at the national level. The system of 
recruitment agencies are developed, but mostly designed for employers. And since their 
activities are poorly coordinated with national policy of employment, they come into 
conflict with attempts to mitigate structural inconsistencies. Low unemployment in Ukraine 
determines the current structure of employment: 
a) most of the population works in sectors where the fluctuations were the smallest 
after the last world crisis (2009 versus 2013): 62% to 61,6% — employed in the service sector; 
15,6% to 17,55% — growth in agriculture, 17,5% to 4,8% and 16,4% to 4% — huge decline in 
                                                          
158 SSSU / www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2006/rp/ean/ean_u/brntp_rik_b_u.htm; 
159 The movement of labour from one occupation to another in the same grade or level is called horizontal 
mobility. For example, a bank clerk joins as an accounts clerk in a company; 
160 When a worker of a lower grade and status in an occupation moves to another occupation in a higher grade 
and status, it is vertical mobility. Just as a school lecturer becomes a college lecturer, a clerk becomes a manager, 
etc.; 
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industry and construction accordingly; production in agriculture increases; the decline in trade 
is 1,3 %, which included into service sector here and traditionally composes 37% with no 
visible change for the compared years (Chart 13 and 16); 
b) shock absorption factor was the scope and flexibility of small and shadow 
businesses (according to the SSSU surveys in 2009, the shadow sector employed 4,6 million 
people — 21,5% of the employed population), which comply with requirements of the Labour 
Code, based on social legal agreement. The bulk of the small business concentrated in the 
service sector, which employs 4,56 million people, with only 981 thousand that was officially 
included in the reports on the number of full-time employees (the SSSU data for 2009); 
c) many workers within state sector — is more than 3 million people (2006, Chart 
5) — a long time there were no cuts. Instead, from 2008 to 2009 the number of employees in 
public administration, health and education increased by 15 thousand (ibid, the SSSU data). 
The absence of sharp fluctuations in the growth rate of unemployment is observed. 
The trajectory change rate is smooth, without sharp jumps or distortions associated with access 
to the labor market a significant number of unemployed. Thus, the extent of economic decline 
has not led to a rapid decline in employment. Unemployment is growing slowly and gradually 
between 2002 and 2014. 
The unemployment rate never reaches the peak, typical for the most advanced 
economies. Thus, the number of unemployed by 2009 at overall labor market according to ILO 
was 1,95 million of people — 8,8%. In the fixed labor market, according to the SSSU June, 
2010 there were registered 434,7 thousand unemployed. With a slight economic recovery in 
Ukraine reducing unemployment is much faster compared to other countries. 
The high level of hidden unemployment in functioning enterprises exists. Thus, 
according to the Council of Productive Forces the hidden unemployment reaches 12% of 
workers in registered companies. 
“The number of insured persons who are registered with the Social 
Insurance Fund on Temporary Disability in 2009 was 13,4 million people. At the same time 
consider themselves as employed are 20,2 million of people. Thus, the question arises: what to 
do with 6,8 million of our citizens, what are their level of compliance with the labor rights, the 
revenue they generate and receive? So, there is every reason to believe about their unregulated 
employment or hidden unemployment”.161 
                                                          
161 Olga PYSCHULINA (2010), Systemic flaws in labor market of Ukraine and its reform priorities, Analytical 
report, National Institute for Strategic Studies, pg. 21; 
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The dominance of the practice of voluntary redundancies exists. Dismissal by the 
employer is not disseminated. Layoffs disclaimer for economic reasons leads to lower wages 
and encourages skilled workers to change jobs, the least qualified personnel are 
accumulating a critical mass of incompetence. Voluntary dismissal let you save on the cost 
of dismissal. 
The high level of natural unemployment is evident (ILO, 2016 – 10,3% / table 8) at 
the time the thesis is considered, covers that portion of the population that was in the course of 
getting employment. Or not getting employment, not by the reason for the lack of vacancies but 
due to a change in the profession or requirements for payment terms or since employment, or 
residence takes time. Natural unemployment rate indicates the degree of perfection of the 
functioning of the labor market, how the market is able to bring into line with supply and 
demand. Based on statistics compiled over the years with a minimum level of unemployment 
(q3 for 2007-2008), the natural rate of unemployment in Ukraine was about 6%. It’s too high. 
It shows that even under the most favorable conditions without a thorough reform of the systems 
that provides the mechanism of the labor market, expectations of unemployment reducing 
beyond that limit was impossible. 
Deviations from the standard length of the working week. Characteristic for the 
country would be the dramatic reduction in working hours, which has no economy analogues 
in Western European countries. Equally important is that in terms of time, there is significant 
differentiation. 
Features of the spatial (territorial) distribution of unemployment were formed in the 
era of central planning, where structure of productive forces differs by extremely high degree 
of specialization, therefore the consequences of the transformational crisis for regional labor 
markets were not the same. In its negative impact on employment it had strongest impact on 
regions with high concentration of light industry and mechanical engineering, where the decline 
in production was maximized. Particularly acute problem of unemployment in the economically 
least developed parts of the country, where the possibility of employment was limited. Finally, 
the labor market situation considerably complicated by territorial isolation of a number of 
regions. Accordingly, in a relatively better position of themselves are the rich regions in natural 
resources with a diversified production structure and favorable conditions for the development 
of the tertiary sector (trade, financial services, etc.). 
With the development of the crisis the differences situation in regional labor 
markets deepened and become sustainable, “aided” by low territorial mobility of labor. Its 
major limitations are administrative barriers that remained, the lack of reliable information on 
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job opportunities in other regions, poor housing market, underdeveloped transport network, 
high costs that accompany the change of residence. The action of market forces is insufficient, 
cannot ensure evenly distribution of demand and supply of labor by region. 
To determine the characteristics of spatial distribution of unemployment, so-called 
territorial “mismatch index” is calculated. Data is used from the SSSU of unemployed by ILO 
methodology and the number of vacancies in the reporting enterprises or the SESU data on the 
number of persons who are registered, unemployed and declared by enterprises on the level of 
need for workers. Estimates for the mismatch index showed 0,23-0,34 by first method, the 
second — 0,36-0,44. This indicates that the recorded unemployment at least by 30-40% is due 
to disparities in the territorial structure of demand and supply of labor, which can only be 
overcome by moving employees or business from one district to another162. 
Data between the total and registered unemployment differs. Firstly, the 
unemployed prefer to seek work without becoming registered in the SESU, kind of stigma, that 
individual who ended up there, especially who receiving state unemployment aid tagged for 
hypothetical employer with “suspicious” status as non-competitive. 
Secondly, the fact that people who have jobs (mostly in the informal sector) or are 
economically inactive population often registered as unemployed in order to receive social 
benefits. 
High gap (in two times, table 8) in official and total unemployment in Ukraine 
demonstrates the weakness of economic incentives to register at the employment agency, or 
explained by agents’ disbelief when searching the job on a market, the ability to find these 
services through decent work, as well as insufficient support for the unemployed. Most of the 
unemployed suggests that the benefits offered by the official registration do not outweigh the 
costs associated with it and prefer to search themselves. 
Another non-published practical side of going through SESU procedure is informal 
clerks’ task they are charged with by executives is to “get rid of” applicants to save 
expenditures. For instance, unemployed applicant may be suggested with three consecutive job 
proposals, which may not correspond to his education or last level of salary (be significantly 
lower), which is law obligation. Individual, who doesn’t know his rights (law provisions), may 
sign that he formally refused those three consecutive (unjust) proposals and can be 
automatically deprived of state unemployment financial aid. 
                                                          
162 Ibid, pg. 22; 
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It remains an open question — further threatening of economic restructuring means 
inevitable surge in unemployment? According to the statistics, only the industry has “dropped” 
for the period of economic transformation several millions of jobs. Therefore, expecting 
“blizzard” emission rate in this sector in the future not worth it. 
 
1.9 Wages’ polarization. Taxation and social security contributions 
 
An important mechanism of adaptation for the labor market in Ukraine is policy on 
remuneration. The level of payment in Ukraine is low not only compared with the general level 
of countries with developed market economies, but taking into account actual productivity. 
Despite the fairly substantial increase in the average nominal wage growth and real wages, 
lagging in Ukraine from a number of European countries in these indicators remains. Keeping 
low standards of wages and lack of direct connection between wages and labor productivity 
makes discouraging impact on the growth of economic activity and employment and on 
improving the quality of human capital. 
Standards of wages in Ukraine are too low. The share of average registered salary 
to monthly GDP (constant 2011 PPP USD) in 2009 was 17%, in 2010 this figure became 20% 
(chart 8), while in the EU it is an average more than 60%. Last available data gave us a 
possibility to calculate share of 15,45% for 2015. 
A high proportion of the variable part of the salary structure exists. The high 
elasticity of wages is directly related to the specifics of its structure. Separation of wages on 
permanent and variable part is typical for most large and medium-sized businesses, commercial 
organizations and budget institutions. Thus, the wages of teachers’ constant proportion ranges 
from 60% to 80%, the rest of the supplements are different. The variable proportion of civil 
servants in average is 50%. In Ukraine, according to various estimates, the proportion of 
variable remuneration is on average at least 25-30%163. The reduction (or increase deter) of 
variable share gives the employer scope for flexibility in labor costs. For low minimum 
wage there such a ratio, the smaller the share of the tariff (permanent) particles, the greater the 
proportion above tariff (variable) share of wages. This allows to subject salary to the local labor 
market conditions in its centralized adjustability164. Binding premiums and additional payments 
                                                          
163 My personal case as waged trade union worker — 33% is my variable part according to Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (CBA); 
164 In developed market economies, the share of the variable part is small, mostly of wages tied to the 
parameters of jobs is determined by the time of hiring. As a result, in developed countries the ratio between fixed 
and variable parts of salaries is radically different from the ratio in Ukraine; 
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to economic performance of enterprises allows employers to share the rent as well as risks. In 
the institutional context is a manifestation of the so-called implicit contract165 when the 
installation of variable salary maximum output from the effect of tariff agreements and 
collective agreements. Such system increases the inequality in wages. 
Installing low rates of minimum wages exists. Legislative minimum was and 
remains very low. For instance, the minimum wage from October 1, 2010 was set at 907,00 
UAH, accounting for 38,6% of the average wage for the same month (2349 UAH) and in dollar 
equivalent allowed you to spend an average of one person at almost 3,7 dollars a day, slightly 
exceeding the international criteria of poverty (1,90 USD in 2015’s prices is the same as 1,25 
USD was in 2005)166. In fact, the minimum wage in Ukraine has obtained inappropriate 
functions, becoming a unit of account in determining the size of social benefits, fines, state fees 
and more. 
Although the law prohibited the payment of wages less than the statutory minimum, 
according to the SSSU, out of 10,1 million workers who worked 50% or more of working time 
in March 2010, about 0,7 million people (7,0%) had earnings less than the minimum wage (744 
UAH)167. However, among employees who worked full-time monthly rate (7,5 million 
employees), the figure was respectively 0,19 million people or 2,5%. The largest share of these 
workers was observed in fishing and fish farming, trade and agriculture (26,5%, 19,2% and 
23,5%). 
Unfortunately, the low cost of labor in activities that ensure the provision of socially 
important services exists. Low minimum wage generates low salaries in the public sector (and 
in some industries financed from extra-budgetary funds) and it enhances the imbalances in the 
labor market. Unsatisfactory inter-relationship of official salaries remains. Thus, the level of 
pay was significantly lower than the national average (in December 2016 was 238 USD168): 
agriculture and forestry was 182 USD; construction — 211 USD; education — 181 USD; 
healthcare — 170 USD. 
Low wages in these sectors leads to: 
a) outflow of skilled workers to other sectors of the economy; 
                                                          
165 Nonbinding commitment, such as an employer's offer of continuity of employment, wages, and working 
conditions in the expectation of the employee being sincere in his or her duties and in not looking for alternate 
employment | businessdictionary.com/definition/implicit-contract.html; 
166 WB DI / www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq; 
167 The SSSU data; 
168 Author’s calculations based on SSSU data and NBU exchange rate is 27,190858 UAH per 1 USD / 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2016/gdn/Zarp_ek_m/zedm_16_u.htm; 
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b) reduced demand for vocational training for low-paid professions, i.e. 
reproduction staffing shortages in the future. 
Thus, the monthly salary of budget sphere (as an economic category) does not 
perform its basic functions — even simple reproduction labor and stimulation of labor — and 
actually turned into a version of social assistance, which is almost not related to results of labor. 
Institutional fixed peg of the share of wages to minimum wages and rigid system of 
wage indexation exists. A natural tool to support the lower threshold wage is its statutory 
minimum. However, it is right when monitoring compliance with the legislation on minimum 
wages sufficiently effective. Tight binding rate of growth of nominal wages to the growth of 
prices complicates macroeconomic stability if one of the necessary conditions is to reduce real 
wages. 
In Ukraine, the Law “On Indexation of Money Incomes” (1991)169, excluded 
effective mechanisms for its implementation, thus went into force in 1996. Average wage did 
not index the minimum wage and each subsequent adjustment needed to pass a special law by 
the Parliament and signed by the President, thus the law was terminated in 1992, restored 1996, 
changed in 2002, 2005, 2007, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016. As a result, indexation conducted at 
irregular intervals and out of touch with the dynamics of the cost of living. Importantly, since 
the minimum wage is taken as the basis of the whole system of social security, each increase 
increases load on the expenditure side of the budget. Hence — a direct interest in reducing the 
number of indexing. 
Indexing scheme used in Ukraine remains formal and cannot serve as a factor on 
the structure of relative wage rates. In addition, according to article 5 of the Law of Ukraine 
“On Indexation of Cash Incomes of the Population” (1991)170 it stipulates:  
“Enterprises, institutions and organizations raise wages due to 
indexation of their own funds. Enterprises, institutions and organizations financed or 
subsidized from the state budget of Ukraine, raise wages (salaries) due to indexation of own 
funds and the state budget of Ukraine. Associations raise wages at its own expense”. 
According to the Law of Ukraine “About Remuneration” definition of the total cost 
of labor is the exclusive right of the employer who is responsible for compliance with the 
minimum wage. 
Destruction that introduced in the public sector wage system and the leveling of 
wages exists. In particular, the decision to establish the salary (wage rate) of the employee of 
                                                          
169 zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1282-12?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYBG.ZiJltbw2HI4cQs80msh8Ie6; 
170 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament of Ukraine / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1282-12; 
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the first wage category at a rate lower than stipulated by law on wages and conditions haphazard 
adjustment of wages for some categories of workers. Fixing in 2009 the size of the salary in 
absolute amount below the minimum wage, the government has actually turned to “manual 
control” of wages in the public sector. 
During 2009 the amount of the salary (wage rate) of the employee of the first wage 
category amounted to 545 UAH, or less than the minimum wage established by law for the 
corresponding periods of 10-26,7%. From 1 January 2010 it had increased to UAH 555, from 
April 1 — 567 UAH, July 1 — 570 UAH or about 36% less than the statutory minimum wage 
for the relevant periods. One explanation — the fixing of salaries and wage category in the 
minimum wage required additional budget expenditures amounting to 47 billion UAH, sources 
of financing were not available. 
As a result, in late 2009 the same salaries to the minimum wage was established for 
employees from the first to fifth tariff level, and in 2010 from the first to seventh category. This 
undermines the differentiation of wages depending on qualification, workers are leveling. 
Taxation system in Ukraine in terms of rates and regulations for a long time was 
heavy and complicated. Recent changes called to simplify administration policy and facilitate 
burden of the tax performance. 
Table 15. Paying taxes rankings according to the World Bank doing business 
measurements in 2016, 2007 for Ukraine and selected countries 
Country 
Paying 
Taxes-
Rank 
Paying 
Taxes-
DTF* 
Paying Taxes - 
Payments 
(number per 
year) 
Paying 
Taxes - 
Time 
(hours per 
year) 
Paying 
Taxes - 
Total tax 
rate (% of 
profit) 
Paying Taxes - 
Labor tax and 
contributions (% of 
profit) 
2016 
Ukraine 83 72.99 5.0 346.0 52.2 43.1 
Georgia 35 83.75 5.0 362.0 16.4 0.0 
Germany 47 82.11 9.0 218.0 48.8 21.2 
Lithuania 29 85.46 11.0 171.0 42.6 35.2 
Poland 44 82.77 7.0 271.0 40.3 24.8 
Russia 40 83.09 7.0 168.0 47.0  
2007 
Ukraine n/a 18.08 147.0 2079.0 57.0 n/a 
Georgia n/a 60.00 33.0 387.0 38.6 n/a 
Germany n/a 77.20 12.0 196.0 47.4 n/a 
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Lithuania n/a 79.21 11.0 166.0 47.6 n/a 
Poland n/a 51.65 41.0 420.0 43.2 n/a 
Russia n/a 64.50 8.0 448.0 51.2 n/a 
 
* The distance to frontier (DTF) score helps assess the absolute level of regulatory performance 
over time. It measures the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents the 
best performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the Doing 
Business sample since 2005; 
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank data / doingbusiness.org/Custom-Query 
 
Overall paying tax ranking shows that Ukraine still needs more improvements, 
nevertheless time “wasting” improved in 6 times: from 2079 hours per year in 2007 to 346 
hours in 2016. Also, now it is in average 5 times tax (together with Georgia) allocation instead 
of 147. Tax burden despite improvement on 4,8 % is still the heaviest in this comparison. 
The total employers’ contribution rate in 2010 consisted of pension insurance (33,2 
%), unemployment insurance (1,6%), insurance against temporary incapacity for work (1,4 %), 
and employment injury insurance (0,56 % to 13,5%, depending on 67 occupational risks)171. 
Here should be mentioned experience of lowering tax burden for improving shadow 
economy situation (chapter 1.6): it suggests mixed effects of implementing this measure in 
different countries. Thus, the study of Friedrich SCHNEIDER (2000) and Dominik H. ENSTE 
172 confirm the positive effects of reducing the tax burden on the economy in case of Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Austria and Germany. However, other researchers173 point to a lack of 
binding between the tax burden and the shadow economy. 
Since 2011, a consolidated contribution rate – single social contribution – has been 
collected to finance all social insurance benefits in Ukraine. From 2011 until 2015, employers’ 
contribution rate was between 36,76% and 49,7%, depending on the assessed risk of 
occupational accident and disease, while employees’ contribution rate was 3,6 %. In 2016 the 
single social contribution rate for employers was reduced to 22% and the contribution from 
workers was abolished. 
                                                          
171 ILO (2016), Social security system of Ukraine in 2014–15 and beyond: towards effective social protection 
floors / ILO DWT and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest, pg. 13; 
172 Friedrich SCHNEIDER (2000), Dominik H. ENSTE, Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, No 1, pg. 77-114 / economics.uni-
linz.ac.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/JEL.pdf; 
173 Eric FRIEDMAN (2000), Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 
Countries, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76, No 3, pg. 459-493; 
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Table 16. Changes in single social contribution rates in 2011 — 2015 and 2016 
Categories 2011–2015 2016 
Employers 36,76% -- 49,7%174 22% 
Entrepreneurs working on civil contracts and self-
employed persons 
34,7% 22% 
Budgetary institutions 36,3% 22% 
Employees 3,6% 0% 
Physical persons working under civil contracts 2,6% 0% 
Civil servants 6,1% 0% 
 
Source: ILO (2016), Social security system of Ukraine in 2014–15 and beyond: towards 
effective social protection floors / ILO DWT and Country Office for Central and Eastern 
Europe, Budapest, pg. 12 
 
Labor costs was the most taxed element of production component until 2011, thus 
hidden shadow wages and compensation practices should be mentioned. In fact, it is possible 
to distinguish three main types of shadow compensation: 
a) masking wages under other income. So, companies provide their employees 
bogus insurance policies, offer a friendly bank deposits at high interest rates. This can provide 
significant savings of tax payments if “non-salary” incomes have a lower tax rate compared 
with wages and do not include contributions to social funds; 
b) compensation in cash without documentation. In this case, the payment disguised 
as material costs (fictitious contracts). The difference in the tax burden on the payroll and the 
material costs so high that gives businesses a significant advantage, even with the fee for 
shadow cash withdrawal; 
c) registration of employees as entrepreneurs-individuals who pay only a flat tax. 
This form gained universal distribution in Ukraine within the law. 
Existed tax legislation did not allow effective mechanisms to combat against salary 
minimizers when much of the revenue is outside of the statistical accounting and taxation. Some 
experts estimated savings of expenses on payments under the scheme “a-b-c” above is at least 
20% of payroll, which influenced largely fiscal context of Ukraine. 
Constant tendency to reduce the price of labor exists. “Productive” (i.e. deflated 
producer price index) compared to the “market” (i.e. deflated index of consumer prices) wages 
shows no tendency to return to the level of pre-reform era. Prices of production increased faster 
compared to consumer prices, and as a result, employers in terms of reducing real wages reckon 
                                                          
174 Depending on assessed class of risks of occupational accidents and diseases; 
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even deeper compared to the views of the workers. Thus the progressive reduction of labor 
allows to support the demand for it at relatively high mark, preventing thereby the growth of 
open unemployment. 
The absence of institutionalized system of pricing information in the job market, 
where information is “private” matter of individual companies and are not made public175, 
distorting the situation in wages. Without price transparency, effective functioning of the labor 
market impossible. There is a vicious circle, where the possibility of coordination in the market 
is limited to the lack of information and lack of coordination is not conducive to the emergence 
of information. 
Socially unacceptable increase of inequality in payment. Economic growth and 
modernization processes that took place in Ukraine, accompanied by unprecedented increased 
inequality in the distribution of economic performance. In recent years continued an intensive 
process of redistribution of total cash income for high-groups on a decline in the share of income 
of the poorest population. Inequality in the distribution observed at levels of the enterprise, 
industry, inter-branch and inter-sections. The highest wages are concentrated in the energy 
sector, metallurgy, coal industry, in the fields of finance, credit and insurance, retail, real estate: 
wages are higher than the national average in 2,5 times. This period was characterized with the 
most differentiated wages of bank employees176, the first half of 2008 showed that 10% of the 
highest paid employees gained 40 times more earnings compare to 10 % lowest-paid. Rising 
inequality is not conducive to economic recovery, but rather creates a shady distribution 
processes. 
Thus, differentiation of medium wages and the structure of relative wage rates is 
very deep in the Ukrainian economy. 
The distribution of wages, characterized by high inequality reflects unequal market 
value services of different categories of workers, also contains substantial rental component, 
primarily in the form of compensation to workers of companies that have a monopoly position 
in some areas. Also a source of rents become dominant position of certain groups of staff 
(especially leaders) in the enterprise. 
                                                          
175 Specialized salaries’ reviews conducted by specialized consulting companies, based on small and specific 
sampling; 
176 In the past, Ukrainian journal published from 1990 to 2014. According to the publication “Galician 
Contracts” among people who declared income of USD 1 million or more, managers are Ukrainian investment 
funds and consulting firms, and professionals who have earned on services sales to foreigners of Ukrainian 
banks; 
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Freedom of enterprises in terms of forming their own remuneration policy exists. It 
is important to know what criteria employers are laying into the foundation of the policy and 
how these criteria are objective. The use of state tariffs “in pure form” abandoned many 
industries that mostly went to their systems, for which the state tariff is only a guide. Thus, in 
1994 56% of enterprises are paid salaries according to the tariff of state, in 2010 remained 
22,7%177. 
The lack of any significant restrictions on labor remuneration led to the use of a 
variety of criteria, laid the basis for determining wages. Since most private enterprises belong 
to small businesses owned by non-production sphere (that has a small number of employees 
and faster circulation of money), they are characterized by greater mobility in decision-making, 
which in practice is shown, firstly, in closer ties remuneration to results of financial activities 
of these enterprises, and secondly, a significant subjectivity in making decisions on issues of 
remuneration. 
Despite the priority of factors such as the objective characteristics of the labor force 
and the financial position of the company, it should be noted the growing importance of 
subjectivity in determining the level of remuneration. Employers in all sectors rather attach 
great importance to personal qualities of the employee, not quantifiable measurement: initiative, 
creativity, loyalty to the company, non-conflict behavior, the ability to win, elicit sympathy, 
availability of useful contacts etc. Absence of effective mechanism of regulation makes wage 
largely individual and more dependent on personal attitudes, beliefs and desires of a particular 
employer. 
Let’s see wages at enterprises of different ownership. The private sector is a major 
segment of the economy that presents increasing demand for labor. Despite that majority of the 
working population their shift to work in the private sector seen as a successful model to adapt 
to a new economic conditions, according to statistics of the SSSU wages in this sector are one 
of the lowest. The low level of formal wages typical for private enterprises almost in all 
economic sectors. For example, the industry average wages of the employee in enterprise of 
private property is 48% compare to the earnings of state employee of the company; information 
and telecommunications — 32,4%; construction — 72,7% and average of all sectors is 64%. 
We may skeptically perceive this data, since we described official methodological constraints 
in chapter 1.2. According to numerous independent researches work in the private sector on 
                                                          
177 Olga PYSCHULINA (2010), Systemic flaws in labor market of Ukraine and its reform priorities, Analytical 
report, National Institute for Strategic Studies, pg. 32; 
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average 35% higher than in the traditional (state-owned). See next table data for exhaustive 
analysis. 
Table 17. Average monthly wage (USD) of staff by organizational forms of economy  
and economic activities in 2015 
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Total 175 232 146 259 180 203 107 142 124 153 120 191 
Industry 200 210 146 228 162 237 101 — 83 157 104 187 
Construction 148 165 184 160 128 241 108 - — 151 133 186 
Information and  
telecommunications 296 306 159 541 367 162 99 95 — 174 118 392 
Financial and  
insurance activities 358 294 — 408 348 248 — 765 169 325 275 148 
Education 130 185 178 81 174 134 78 121 114 150 132 122 
Healthcare 119 132 136 97 138 142 86 129 110 137 115 87 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on the SSSU’s Yearbook (2015), “Labor of Ukraine” / 
ukrstat.gov.ua 
 
Meanwhile, employment and wages in the private sector is largely not guaranteed 
for the ordinary worker. Despite the fact that it is most common contractual relations in the 
private sector, these contracts are largely formal. In particular, the actual salary may be different 
a lot from the contract, this is the reason for these discrepancies between independent surveys 
and official statistics. 
Unfortunately, because of information opacity any rigorous analysis in private-
business sector about income differentiation processes in various industries of the economy in 
the current conditions are very difficult. We can only assume that the stabilization of income 
inequality is precisely the voltage line “state — private entrepreneurial” public sector. 
Some comments on the impact of political institutions on fiscal policy payment. 
Ukrainian political environment was one of the factor affecting the level of remuneration. Note 
here at least three important components: political institutions of fiscal policy, the political-
business cycle associated with the election process and configuration of public relations. 
However, the weakness of workers in defense of their rights and institutional improvement of 
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the labor market allowed employers to “tailor” the contractual wages to their capabilities and 
possibilities of the state budget. 
Although public funding of enterprises has decreased significantly, the government 
remains the largest employer. Today, the public sector employs more than half of all employees, 
and the state directly or indirectly affect employment in many privatized and partially privatized 
enterprises through the state order. The fund wages in the public sector is financed from state 
and local budgets and hence are dependent on many variable components of the budget process. 
It depends on the outcome of bargaining between the executive and legislative branches and 
between the center and regions. Wage fund (payroll) is more than half of all budget expenditures 
on education, health, culture and management staff. 
The budget process, and thus determination of the share of labor costs in the budget, 
— is a political process. Strong dependence of Ukrainian budget from external and 
unpredictable parameters (inflation, gas prices, global oil prices, the prospects for refinancing 
and restructuring of debt, etc.) creates additional possibilities for politicization of the problem. 
Misunderstanding of negative socio-economic consequences of low wages leads to 
further unjustifiably low level of the public sector. Salary does not perform the basic functions 
— ensure reproduction of labor and stimulation of labor. 
 
1.10 Institutional weakness 
 
State, issuing laws that govern labor relations, trying to protect labor rights more 
fully in the labor market and to provide appropriate guarantees and incentives to protect the 
rights of workers in a market economy. As we already mentioned, the current regulatory 
framework of labor relations consists of more than 120 laws (chapter 1.3), as well as a 
significant number of by-laws adopted by the authorized state bodies. In terms of legal 
regulation, labor market in Ukraine is overregulated. On the one hand, under the labor laws 
there are numerous legal and administrative constraints. On the other hand — legal and 
disciplining mechanisms that control the performance standards are too weak. 
Excessive overregulation of employment limits the flexibility of labor market 
institutions supplemented by high costs associated with hiring and dismissal. At the inertia of 
employment and slow adaptation to market changes in demand for labor costs is affected by the 
high turnover of labor, which is a kind of brake on its targeted redistribution. In Ukraine, the 
cost of an employee is too high in share equivalent. Thus, in the case of dismissal for 
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redundancy, the employer must pay the employee an indemnity, the amount of which, according 
to the Labor Code, ranging from one to three monthly earnings. Non-monetary losses are also 
high: the employer must notify the worker at least two months prior to the dismissal and have 
to send information to public authorities for employment (SESU), formally agreed with unions, 
especially in the case of mass layoffs and other situations depending on industry’s specific. 
Due to excessive overregulation of employment in the formal sector jobs often 
created on an informal basis or semiformal. Therefore, seemingly positive changes in the 
employment structure, essentially camouflaged processes that indicate its primitivism. There 
are some major negative consequences that can cause excessive over-regulation of the labor 
market: 
a) legislation of Ukraine provides different categories of employees with many 
benefits that financed by the employer. It provides a very high degree of security of groups with 
weak competitive position in the labor market instead of creating training possibilities for 
capacity building of human capital. Various additional obligations on employer increase labor 
costs and therefore reduce demand. Ceteris paribus178, this means reducing the overall level of 
employment and rising unemployment; 
b) “excessive” employment protection also has its negative side. It does not extend 
to the entire economy, but only covers its “core”. The result is segmentation of the labor market. 
Along with the sectors forced to live “by the rules”, were formed enclaves that are more or less 
free from the burden of excessive regulation. Those who are able to settle in protected areas 
(“insiders”) – benefit: they get a stable salary, enjoy a wide range of benefits and guarantees, it 
almost impossible to fire them etc. However, those who engaged in unprotected sector and the 
unemployed (“outsiders”) – lose, their chances to find a “good” job significantly reduced. 
The most negative manifestation of this trend can be considered as the emergence 
of a large informal sector completely free from the effects of formal controls. Where not 
recognized guarantees of employment, written contracts replaced by oral agreements, 
contractual relations between workers and employers characterized mostly as short-term, 
payment is only in cash, taxes are not paid, disputes are resolved without the participation of 
the state or trade unions. 
Excessive concern on the protection of existing jobs is able to hinder job 
creation. Large firms, which are subject to all legislative and administrative restrictions have 
to exercise extreme caution in attracting additional workers, as in the case of deterioration of 
                                                          
178 Ceteris paribus, a Latin phrase, roughly means “holding other things constant”; 
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the economic situation they will not be able quickly and easily escape. In this connection, small 
firms working successfully stopped in its development and does not go beyond a certain 
threshold size, because when it exceeded they become subject to stringent regulatory standards 
and are faced with an abrupt rising of labor costs. This also explains the refusal of many 
businesses that are involved in the informal economic activity to make a transition to the formal 
sector. 
Ukrainian experience makes some adjustments to the common understanding of the 
negative effects that generates excessive employment protection. Weakness of the enforcement 
mechanisms partially neutralized severity of the existing labor laws, standard softening effects 
associated with excessive employment protection. It should be stated that in the case of literal 
compliance with all established rules and norms of social protection the work of the Ukrainian 
labor market could be paralyzed. However, the weakness of mechanisms gave rise to many 
other equally significant issues. 
Outdated rules of the labor legislation exist; the basis is the Labour Code adopted 
in December 1971. More “ribs” in the form of new labor market institutions combined with the 
existence of old legislation and the restrictions that were not lifted. The Labor Code was 
revised 106 times since independence and until December 2016179. 
The current labor legislation of Ukraine is a mixture of legal provisions adopted at 
different times and in different historical and economic conditions, some of it meets the needs 
of the time, but the other — outdated, result of adjustments of socialist legislation to the realities 
of the market economy and cannot adequately regulate the current labor relations180. Thus, in 
the current labor legislation it is not provided the mechanism of protection against 
discrimination of the workplace, if the employer unreasonably denied workers in employment. 
No mandatory provision in written form for employment contract. It is not considered labour 
relations of citizens working abroad, foreigners and stateless persons. 
A characteristic feature of the modern Ukrainian labor law is that it belongs to a 
large number of by-laws that sometimes contradict the laws of Ukraine. 
Weak enforcement system (optional or selective enforcement) exist. The very hard 
labor protection legislation contradicts with rather weak legislation that controls its execution. 
Institutional essence of Ukrainian model is closely coupled with rigid rules, enshrined in the 
law, with mass practice of informal arrangements that circumvent laws. Therefore, Ukrainian 
                                                          
179 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/322-08; 
180 See Annex 1 for quantitative analyzing of Ukrainian legislative initiatives of the Parliament; 
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model of labor market is flexibility not provided by the rules but by the possibilities to avoid 
law enforcement. 
Combining formal flexibility with the actual characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), which has liberal laws, but the laws are 
executed strictly. At the other extreme are some countries in Latin America, where exist rigid 
labor laws, but applies to a relatively small formal sector. Within limits the laws are carried out 
fully, while in the informal sector do not act at all. Both models are sufficiently viable because 
diversify employment relationships, turning them into important competitive advantages. They 
determined the ability of the labor market successfully adapt to the changes that taking place. 
Countries of Western and Eastern Europe characterized by strict legislation that 
regulates the labor market and strict law enforcement. This significantly increases the cost of 
the employer and limits room for maneuver. The European markets not differ with real 
flexibility, which is a significant cause of high and chronic unemployment. 
Thus in Ukraine, ignores the law in force for the timely revision of subsistence 
minimum, which significantly affects the financial well-being of citizens, especially the poor 
part. In particular, this example is the decision to establish the size of the first tariff salary at a 
level below the subsistence wage back to 2009, which contradicted legislation; however, in 
2017 the situation has not improved reasonably: the official salary (rate) of the employee of the 
1st tariff category is 1600 UAH (60 USD)/month when minimum wage is 3200 UAH (121 
USD)181. An increasing number of cases of illegal dismissals of workers, the practice of late 
payment of salaries, a significant number of employees working part-time of working time. 
Many enterprises, especially private ownership, are practicing significant abuses and violations 
of labor laws in the design of labor relations. 
Using the ineffectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, employers are also using 
many informal or semiformal means to minimize costs for manpower, including: 
a) worsening conditions of employment for redundant workers, leading to their 
forced “voluntary” release; 
b) reducing workers’ salaries below the relevant value at the labor market that 
encourages them for voluntary dismissal; 
c) introducing the practice of fixed-term contracts that will reduce the number of 
staff with minimal costs; 
                                                          
181 Information-Analytical Center "LIGA" / buh.ligazakon.ua/news/2017/1/4/154760.htm; 
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According to chapter 2, article 23 of the Labour Code of Ukraine182 fixed-term 
employment contract may be concluded only if the employment relationship cannot be 
established for an indefinite period, given the nature of the work conditions of its 
implementation or the interests of the employee as well as other cases stipulated by legislative 
acts. This limitation possibility of concluding fixed-term contracts is consistent with 
international practice and protects workers from arbitrary employer, but unfortunately, grounds 
for concluding term contracts are rather vague, which sometimes leads to too free interpretation. 
Thus, referring to the special nature and conditions of work, employers sometimes conclude 
term contracts with employees who are employed in hazardous or severe conditions. 
d) the existence of informal employment, for which virtually no effect or 
substantially restricted the scope of the legislation on employment protection. 
Mechanism of regulation of the labor market covers the whole range of economic, 
legal, social and psychological factors that determine the functioning of the labor market and 
implemented through social dialogue. However, the practice of tripartite consultations to work 
out a compromise tripartite agreement of trade unions, employers and representatives of state 
on behalf of the executive branch has certain drawbacks, including: 
a) actual nominal attributes and institutions of social partnership, for the most part 
“shall issue” decisions prepared by the executive; 
b) narrowness of the vague issues proposed in the social dialogue, in particular 
taking into account only social and labor relations; 
c) “selective” principle to attract participants of social dialogue; 
For example, according to the Decree of the President of Ukraine on 2 April 2011 
№ 347/2011183 about the National Tripartite Social and Economic Council, it composes of 
representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [Government], Ukrainian trade unions 
and associations, national associations of employers who are subject to the agreement. 
Therefore, the National Council of Employers can be formed only from representatives of the 
Federation of Employers of Ukraine184, and any association of employers for their right to elect 
a representative to the National Council must sign the General Agreement185, and this, in turn, 
is a violation of the right to collective bargaining which is voluntary, as stipulated by article 4 
                                                          
182 The Labour Code of Ukraine / zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/322-08; 
183 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/347/2011; 
184 The Federation of Employers of Ukraine, official web-site / fru.org.ua/en/; 
185 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001120-16; 
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of the ILO Convention number 98186. Convention was ratified in September 14th, 1956187 by U-
SSR as a part of USSR. 
d) lack of or inefficient coordination mechanism for wage setting at national, 
regional or sectoral levels among participants of social dialogue; 
In many developed countries wage setting mechanisms provide inbuilt existence of 
reducing constraints as well as the rapid increase in wages. So, in terms of lifting the restraining 
wage growth necessary to curb inflation and to protect the profits from “eating away” while 
escalation of labor costs. 
e) excessive politicization of social dialogue in the country. 
Incomplete process of institutionalization of trade unions and their dependence on 
government or business that does not allow them to effectively counter the dominant role in the 
labor market’s demand by employers. National trade union center unites 42 all-Ukrainian 
unions and 27 territorial unions188 today, covers 6,5 employees, which consist 40% of 
workforce. 
To provide income support for unemployed and other vulnerable groups affected 
by the crisis on the labor market it was adopted various measures under the social security 
system. In particular, the measures taken in the system of unemployment insurance to provide 
assistance (payments) in case of partial unemployment, as well as services for rehabilitation 
and retraining of workers. These payments are reimbursed by the Fund of Obligatory State 
Social Insurance against/from Unemployment. 
The current situation in the labor market and workforce management in the country 
is a result of the existence of problems and contradictions that are not resolved for a long time 
and continue to worsen. Currently we state in this work, that Ukraine has no effective state 
policy in the field of employment. Thus, the deteriorating economic situation in the global 
financial crisis has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the state policy on employment, in 
particular the poor performance of the SESU. Increase in the number of calls to the SESU 
showed imperfections of legal regulatory framework for employment in determining the status 
of the SESU, including the inefficiency of spending money of the State Employment Fund 
(obligatory state social insurance of Ukraine) against unemployment and completeness of the 
content of its revenue leading to additional expenses of the Fund in the amount of nearly 600 
million UAH (75,14 million USD) in 2009. 
                                                          
186 blue.lim.ilo.org/cariblex/pdfs/ILO_Convention_98.pdf; 
187 www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243; 
188 Official web-site of the national trade union center / fpsu.org.ua/pro-fpu/chlenski-organizatsiji; 
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Revenue of the Fund shows expenditure with a surplus in 2013, situation changed 
in 2014–15: the size of the deficit was equivalent to 26,8 % of the Fund’s expenditure. The 
Fund has been able to cover its current deficit by reserves. The worsening financial situation is 
due to the declining contribution revenues and increased expenditure. Expenditure increased 
slightly, the size of the current deficit is expected to be at the marginal level of 3,2 % due to an 
increased allocation of the single social contributions to the Unemployment Benefit Fund. 
Table 18. Revenue and expenditure (million, USD) of the Unemployment Benefit Fund, 
2013–2015 
 2013 2014 2015 
Depreciation: 1 USD = *correspondingly UAH 7,993 15,769 24,001 
1. Total Revenue 1,209 0,3927 0,2393 
1.1 Contributions allocated to the Fund 1,2013 0,3904 0,2376 
1.2 Others 0,65% 0,58% 0,69% 
1.3 Transfer from the State Budget 0,001% 0,0113% 0,0017% 
2. Total Expenditure 0,994 0,4366 0,3267 
2.1 Benefits and service costs 0,801 0,3469 0,2666 
2.1.1 Unemployment benefit 0,667 0,32 0,248 
2.1.2 Funeral benefit, material assistance 0,025% 0,0274% 0,025% 
2.1.3 Vocational training and professional 
development for the unemployed 
3,63% 3,72% 2,99% 
2.1.4 Vouchers to persons aged over 45 0,524% 0,342% 0,214% 
2.1.5 Organization of public works 0,539% 0,746% 0,997% 
2.1.6 Subsidy for employers for job placement 10,465% 0,14% 0,0172% 
2.1.7 Information and consultation services 1,075% 1,005% 1,047% 
2.1.8 Vocational guidance services 0,21% 0,11% 0,07% 
2.1.9 Prevention of insured risks, part-time 
unemployment benefits 
0,003% 1,645% 0,025% 
2.1.10 Implementation of measures under 
Article 241 of the Law on Employment 
– – 0,0047% 
2.1.11 Compensation for single social 
contributions for employers 
0,086% 1,26% 1,355% 
2.1.12 Bank commissions 0,228% 0,241% 0,059% 
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2.2 Support for employment service’s information 
systems 
1,068% 1,554% 1,088% 
2.3 Transfer to the Pension Fund for costs related 
to early retirement 
0,697% 0,975% 0,958% 
2.4 Administrative expenses 0,168 0,077 0,0523 
3. Current Balance 0,2147 -0,0438 -0,0874 
Cumulative balance at the beginning of the year 0,363 0,293 0,103 
Cumulative balance at the end of the year 0,578 0,157 0,0147 
Current deficit as % of the total revenue – 11,2% 36.5% 
Current deficit as % of own expenditure  
(excluding the transfer to the Pension Fund) 
– 10,1% 26.8% 
 
Note: in 2014, an additional amount of 1,400 million UAH was transferred from the State 
Unemployment Insurance Fund to the State Pension Fund pursuant to Article 27 of the Law on 
State Budget 2014; 
Source: author’s calculations based on the data of the ILO (2016), Social security system of 
Ukraine in 2014–15 and beyond: towards effective social protection floors / ILO DWT and 
Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest, pg. 23 
 
Unregulated legal provisions of regulations on employment, weaken state control 
over the activities of the SESU and the inefficient use of the Fund exists, including: 
a) the unusual insurance fund expenditures resulting in material support and 
providing social services to uninsured individuals who did not pay premiums (which is quite 
inconsistent with the law and violates the principle of risk insurance). Thus, on measures for 
proficiency training and the payment of unemployment benefits to persons who did not pay 
premiums to the Fund were spent 69% out of total overspent mentioned above in 2009; 
b) absence of the proper Fund registers — all potential contributors reduce the 
revenue budget base of the Fund. Filling the budget of the Fund depends on the receipt of 
insurance premiums, vice versa insurance premiums — the number of taxpayers. The analysis 
showed that the number of contributors to the Pension Fund of Ukraine constantly exceeds the 
number of legal entities payers of insurance premiums to the Fund of the compulsory state 
social insurance against unemployment. For example, as of January 2007 number of taxpayers 
— legal entities registered in the Pension Fund of Ukraine exceeded the figure for the Fund by 
45,2 thousand. Taxpayers as January 2008 — by 88,4 thousand and as of January 2009 — by 
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127,9 thousand of legal entities payers, indicating the probable neglect of additional revenue 
fund189. 
In addition, sufficient misuse of the Insurance Fund, the ineffectiveness of the 
SESU appears in the following: 
c) information of the SESU neglects during the formation of the state order for 
training, what leads to inconsistency of its labor market requirements and additional costs for 
the Fund and funds and budgets of different levels; 
For instance, mislead of the state order for training by 4 professions, resulted to the 
number of unemployed growth, for whom the budget of the Fund allocated about 150 million 
UAH (or 25 % out of total overspent equals to 18,78 million USD) in the form of payment of 
unemployment benefits in 2009. 
d) lack of studying by basic employment centers the market conditions for 
professions and specialties when implement measures for training, retraining and advanced 
training of the unemployed have meant that not all of the unemployed who, were covered by 
the relevant measures, were provided with jobs by professions obtained, since the definition 
scope and specialties of employment centers do not consider the possibility of employers and 
availability of jobs; 
e) uncertainty in state and regional programs of employment for the volumes, 
sources of funding and performance indicators to be achieved, these eliminates its impact on 
employment. 
The high dependence of the economic sphere from the political situation, the lack 
of clear agreed benchmarks of its priorities, the inconsistency of economic policy. Reducing 
the role of government, reducing public confidence in the state socio-economic policy. This 
increases uncertainty and complicates the development and implementation of labor market 
policy. 
Lack of strategic planning in most businesses reveals: the lack of well-defined and 
stable conditions for interaction between business and public sector leads to the fact that the 
main economic activity of small and medium enterprises concentrated in areas that do not 
require significant capital investments that are relatively safe in terms of possible losses 
(programming, accounting services, retail, small footwear or clothing, etc.) bring fast though 
small income (trade, provision of public services, mediation, etc.). Thus business is trying to 
secure mobility, relative independence from sudden changes in state or regional economic 
                                                          
189 SESU / dcz.gov.ua/control/en/index; 
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policy. Obviously, the production, the effective existence of which in essence requires long-
term strategic planning, appears most vulnerable to the constant transformation of public areas 
of economic management. As a result, production appears disadvantageous in terms of material 
and moral terms of investments. 
Short-term focus of economic activity, the absence of major long-term projects with 
little investment of the production sector derives to the aging of industrial base. In the main 
sectors of the economy capital assets have significant physical deterioration. Some companies’ 
deterioration has reached 80% and actually makes them non-competitive. 
The institutional structure also includes labor market institutions. The objective 
function is to promote the latest workforce development and adaptation to structural changes to 
improve the opportunities for economic growth. The main shortcomings of the state regulation 
of the labor market of Ukraine, in our opinion, are: 
a) lack of a transparent mechanism of separation of powers in the field of labor 
market regulation between state and regional authorities, local authorities; 
b) inadequate implementation mechanism of state guarantees on employment of 
persons with limited abilities, persons with disabilities and others. Over the last ten years 
deterioration on protection of the labor rights happened in Ukraine190. The consequences of this 
is the unresolved negative destruction trends of labor potential, lack of efficiency of its use, 
reduced influence of this powerful factor in gaining competitive advantage in today's global 
economy. 
Thus, we can conclude that the labor market remains unbalanced in Ukraine and 
ineffective, and its structure is determined by the inconsistency associated with particular 
contradiction between open, flexible and liberal labor market as such and rigid, glassy state 
standards of regulation. As a result, were formed the crooked ways of adapting to current labor 
market controversial conditions, due to the considerable advantage received by informal forms 
of employment, there was a significant shortage of skilled manpower, permanently worsen the 
dialogue between employers and workers. Consequently, these issues need to be addressed at 
the level of review and reform of the state policy on employment. 
  
                                                          
190 Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FTUU), Official statement adopted by Presidium on 21 March 2017 
/ fpsu.org.ua/; 
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CHAPTER 2. LABOUR MARKET REFORMING TRENDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
 
2.1 Productivity enhancement 
 
State economic policy during the crises in 2008 and since 2014 seemed by 
authorities as politically justified, but not farsighted for Ukraine. Due to a significant 
administrative burden on employers it was possible to mitigate the official unemployment rate 
leap from 6,8% in 2008 to 9,7% the next year with even slight decline for 1% afterwards, but 
since 2014 situation worsen up to 10,3% (table 8, ILO). However, the restructuring of 
employment towards more efficient industries within enterprises has been postponed 
again. 
Employment and unemployment overreached a natural level191 (like in 2007) and 
stabilized within the model of the labor market that currently exists in Ukraine. New macro 
shocks arrived, including Annexation of Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation and 
ATO, thus the situation on the labor market will continue its trend of canning and freezing 
of institutional traps that exist. Jobs in the formal sector will not be created and the quality of 
employment will not improve. Performance of the existing workplaces is really close to the 
extreme limits. 
To change the “Ukrainian model” to the conventional labor market, which adjusts 
employment to shocks, followed by the appropriate state aid procedure (especially active 
unemployment policy), rather than wages, the labor market needs strong institutional 
reconstruction. 
The analysis of the first chapter shows that the reasons behind the problems of 
restructuring of the labor market are the factors that are also outside its own labor market. In 
particular, due to the inefficiency of production process of non-restructured economies, slow 
deindustrialization instead of post-industrialization development, declining productivity, 
energy wasting (Aigul ABSAMETOVA (2013). The lack of comprehensive state policy on 
the labor market is an important factor that affects the efficiency of employment. Our analysis 
shows that in a slow deindustrialization and discrepancy of the institutional structure of the 
labor market to the modernizing economy objectives it is sharply increases the role of the state 
in regulating the processes of restructuring of the labor market. 
                                                          
191 Any unemployment not considered to be natural is often referred to as cyclical, institutional or policy-based 
unemployment; 
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The strategic prerequisite for reforming the labor market and the main strategic 
objective for Ukraine should become productivity enhancement. This is largely due to the 
increase in its capital, that requires intensive investments (chapter 1.5), especially in the real 
sector of production (chart 13). Currently, the domestic economy has the lack of modern 
technologies, which are subject to labor-saving nature that would ensure the growth of 
productivity. 
Following the economic dynamics of the past quarter century of economic sectors 
in Ukraine we may conditionally allocate three groups that differing productivity ratio to the 
national average (chart 13): 
a) above average productivity: industry (including fuel, chemical, petrochemical; 
food) and trade; transport; residence, catering;  
b) average: state governance; defense; education; healthcare and agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries; 
c) below average: construction; information and telecommunication; finance; 
insurance; real estate; science and tech, administrative assistance and other services 
In terms of evaluation of promising trends of changes in labor productivity it is also 
important to share the nature of the industry trend named above. Thus, some industries are 
characterized by a growth in economic productivity relatively to the overall, for others it is 
constant and for the third — drops. 
Table 19. Grouping industries by the nature change of the relation of self-productivity  
to all-Ukrainian productivity based on the chart 13 dynamics 
Growth Constant Drop 
 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries; information and 
telecommunication;  
Industry; trade; transport; 
residence, catering; real 
estate;  
Construction; finance; 
insurance; science and tech, 
administrative assistance; 
state governance; defense; 
education; healthcare and 
other services 
 
During the study of the dynamics of productivity we should take into account that 
changes of this indicator are influenced by a number of factors, especially shadow market 
(chapter 1.6). Thus, a significant impact on industry trends in productivity may have fiscal 
exemption that can both: increase and decrease the relative rank of a particular industry 
regarding nationwide figures. 
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Further steps towards structural changes in the labor market and towards 
improvement of its efficiency can be done on the following priority areas for reform. 
 
2.2 Employment restructuring 
 
The main priority of the state policy on the labor market should be the creation of 
legal, economic and institutional conditions to improve employment. Decisions made in the 
areas of structural policy, formation and implementation of investment programs, incomes 
policy, development of education should be taken forward considering their expected impact 
on employment in Ukraine.  
There are several ways in which the market in Ukraine will adapt to the new 
conditions of market transformation and chooses a particular model of development. One of the 
most effective measures of solving the contradiction between market demands and outdated 
logic behavior of enterprises should be the restructuring process, by conducting a “strategic 
restructuring” of employment on national level, which should be aimed at achieving twin goals: 
a) on the one hand, due to operational measures (reducing operating costs, releasing 
of redundant labor, abandonment of production that are not in demand) to ensure the 
stabilization of enterprises for a short period of time, that hold so-called “defensive 
restructuring” (chapter 1.6), reflecting passive adaptation of enterprises to new economic 
conditions; 
b) on the other hand, at the expense of “strategic restructuring”, which involves 
changing the behavior in general, increase investment to replace outdated technology and 
equipment, the introduction of new organizational and management systems aiming at 
transparency and accountability, would result in increasing the competitiveness of production. 
The result of such action should be qualitative renewal and growth in demand in the labor 
market — in fact human capital is a leading competitive advantage in terms of post-industrial 
economy. 
Another consequence of the restructuring is active release of excess staff. However, 
intensification of the process of establishment of the defined priorities, leading to a significant 
expansion of value-added, naturally leads to increasing demand for labor freed from stagnating 
industries. This process of re-allocation of employment can be characterized as a process of 
active flows of resources (in this case “labor”) from stagnant to innovative sectors. 
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When addressing structural unemployment, we have to overcome the tendency 
of simultaneous shortage of skilled professionals and increasing of unemployment, it is 
necessary to have preventive policy direction to mitigate labor supply constraints which is 
solving the problem of structural unemployment, since structural unemployment is 
characterized by a prolonged stay in a state of unemployment, therefore, specific structural 
unemployment requires employment policy measures. In its absence in the economy remains 
“marginal” contingent of unemployed. Addressing structural unemployment possible through 
a combination of active and passive unemployment policies. 
Active policy may bring results in regions with low employment. Thus one of the 
factors of implementation of active unemployment policy is a model of flexible employment as 
temporary condition aiming to reach full employment afterwards, implementation mechanisms 
of which at the beginning stage can be flexible working hours and workplace, and coherent 
fusion of the labor market policies and working time. Active policies can achieve the prevention 
of unemployment, overcoming structural fracture, establishing a new relationship within 
employment. 
Although, while the economic crisis, can be justified effective passive labor market 
policies pursued in all market-oriented countries instead of (less) non-costly for a small return 
active policy. 
New jobs creation in innovative and high-tech sectors should be considered. 
Currently, the need for job creation acquires relevance because of the need to maintain the 
working capacity and respond to the challenges of the economic crisis. Increase in employment 
reflected at the level of aggregate income. 
If we imagine that reform demands of the economy will actually be carried out, it 
will be unacceptable in regard to the excess number of enterprises, because it dramatically 
lowers production efficiency by competitive environment, saving loss-making enterprises 
become unacceptable, it will accelerate the pace of restructuring. While the number of 
unemployed will increase significantly. In this case, the problem of creating and preserving jobs 
for optimal and high employment will be one of the most pressing economic and social 
problems of the present stage of restructuring of economic relations in Ukraine. 
If the issue of job creation is to match with the spirit of ideology that does not 
include the active position of the state and give priority to self-regulation, we get the growth of 
intermediary services, but in keeping with the deep structural changes — significant changes 
will not happen. Let me state few remarks on the concept of creation new jobs in Ukraine: 
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a) the task of creating jobs should not be understood as final goal but as a means of 
implementing a large-scale national strategy, this must be clearly articulated; 
b) the issue of jobs must meet the geo-economic strategy for Ukraine, finding a new 
place in the international and sub-regional division of labor; 
c) it is necessary to split own policies on unemployment and structural policies 
towards new jobs (investments for development), which is designed to provide a new quality 
of economic growth.  
The number of registered unemployment (as of February 2017) is 439,4 thousand 
of people192, in 2016 it composed only 23,2% out of ILO unemployment equaled to 1,68 million 
(table 8), most of whom are persons with limited adaptive capacities, with low levels of skills 
and market adaptation, cannot be a resource for qualitative changes. Total unemployment aid 
beneficiaries composed 0,32 million or 82% out of all registered in the SESU last year. 
According to the latest published data of the SSSU, the unemployment rate of the population 
aged 15-70 years, defined according to the methodology of the ILO in Ukraine in 2016, 
amounted to 10,3%. 
d) In view of the continuous demographic crisis, that will be acutely felt faster than 
expected and catastrophic dynamics of the aging population in Ukraine, since employed per 
retired ratio is 1,32 today, jobs have to solve the most difficult problem of living costs’ support 
not only for employees, but also for the growing number of pensioners (12,31 million or 75,6% 
out of employed), the ratio of which the time we forecast may (will) equals. New jobs should 
provide a higher than today productivity and large revenue for pension system. 
e) New jobs should be created in areas that can give maximum competitive effect. 
This means that the priority to create jobs must be given to the national business and 
economic role for determining national priorities — to the state. 
f) Program to create new jobs need to be back up with investments. We discussed 
this in chapter 1.6, comparing EU budget for 2015 with five pillars’ division. Ukrainian reality 
appears in a different light. As we see from table 18, subsidies for employers for job placement 
fell hundreds and thousands times recently, while the expense article was reduced only in three 
times: from 10,5% out of total expenditure of 0,994 million USD in 2013 to 0,14% out of total 
expenditure of 0,4366 million USD in 2014, 0,0172% and 0,3267 million USD in 2015. And 
this is not pro-active or preventive policy, rather passive. It is regrettable that the budget of the 
Fund of Unemployment for 2015 was approved with a delay of 4 months, which is traditional 
                                                          
192 SSSU / www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2017/rp/sz_br/sz_br_u/zb_2017_u.htm; 
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characteristic of the Parliament work itself and that responsibility is not foreseen in the 
Ukrainian law for not carrying out of this duty properly and timely. 
Aggregate domestic observations within labour market performance in Ukraine 
make it clearly evident that concrete set of the primary tools of the state influence should be the 
following: 
a) due to almost unlimited capacity of the commodity market, in contrast to 
developed Western States, unmet needs and the large number of poor people in Ukraine, 
currently, there is no economic boundaries for employment expand, since there is no threat of 
overproduction of domestic goods. That is why, jobs must be created in areas related to the 
production of consumer goods; 
b) in order to restore economic growth, the country programs should be developed 
providing intensive economic growth seriously considering more efficient use of resources 
and human labor. The intensification can occur due to new technology, and by the migration 
of labor from companies which created less value added to the production of higher added 
value. Applications reorienting the economy to some extent seen as job creation in high-tech 
industries and folding jobs in those with low positive value. The initial impetus for economic 
growth may be: 
b.1) Development of the internal market through the financing of public 
infrastructure and industrial programs. 
For instance, according to a London-based economic consultancy193, UEFA post 
EURO 2012 related investment over the last four years amounted to 11 billion of EUR in 
Ukraine (1,7 percent of GDP); 
b.2) Development of the transport industry (recovery and modernization of fixed 
assets) corresponding to the state strategy of effectively using its geographical location on the 
trade routes from Asia to Europe: Pan-European transport corridors № 3, 5, 7, 9; Rail Co-
Operation Corridors (ORC) № 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10; European Transport Corridors — Caucasus — 
Asia (TRACECA) and Europe — Asia. It is advisable to create a network of highways, aviation, 
rail, maritime and inland navigation transportation; 
b.3) Construction industry should become basic industry of the state, which can also 
provide impetus to the economy. According to specialists of the Institute of Economics and 
Forecasting of NASU (data for 2009)194, each UAH invested in housing construction made 
                                                          
193 huffingtonpost.co.uk/alastair-whitby/the-ukraine-and-poland-po_b_1665460.html; 
194 Olga PYSCHULINA (2010), Systemic flaws in labor market of Ukraine and its reform priorities, Analytical 
report, National Institute for Strategic Studies, pg. 48; 
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minimum of 2,6-3 UAH additional GDP growth. Each additional job in residential construction 
employs 5-6 workers in other industries. 
c) Clearly define general, sectoral and regional needs in the workplace for the 
current period and for the future, which should be determined on the basis of demographic 
forecasts and comprehensive analysis of data on the size and structure of the employed and 
unemployed, the number and structure of available jobs, study of supply and demand, based on 
the direction and pace of production, choice of priorities of job creation and other factors. 
All this data should be published online in a user-friendly and smart manner, 
since scholars, state policy developers (facilitators) and active civil society representatives 
would provide a feedback and proper monitoring. Agents of the labour market and agencies 
will benefit and shape their duties and use opportunities more efficiently (hypothetical 
statement of Introductory chapter); 
d) Increasing the role of the Unemployment Benefit Fund of Ukraine. Programs 
funded by this Fund are mostly programs to support the unemployed and do not solve the 
challenges of creating new jobs (table 18); 
e) Creating an effective system of territorial and professional mobility (Ronald 
DEKKER (2002) et al) of the workforce, which directly relates to the preparation and training 
of competitive personnel. In Ukrainian realities housing issue is of paramount importance; 
f) Developing national and regional programs of the development of new jobs. The 
starting point of this program should be the definition of socially necessary level of employment 
in the country and within the regions, and establish its numerical value criteria. 
Reform of vocational training and education (Ronald DEKKER (2002) et al), by 
removing structural problems of the labor market also linked to the issue of relationship 
efficiency of employment and vocational training. In the short term there may be a slight 
increase in the proportion of students in total employment (table 12). But the inertia of 
development of vocational education in the medium term may serve as an additional factor that 
inhibits the growth of employment. To bring the scope of vocational training in line with labor 
market needs we should: 
1) review the directions and level of training, taking into account the forecast of the 
demand and supply in the labor market (is not provided properly); 
2) consider executive bodies that are required to promote employment, pay special 
attention to training for occupations-wide, the need for which cannot be met by the existing 
workforce. To solve this problem, it is necessary to focus on the initial system of vocational 
education and retraining programs for the unemployed; 
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3) develop professional standards to improve the quality of vocational education, 
including employers requests for training; 
4) create conditions for equal access of citizens to industry and professional labor 
market by forming the basis for the certification of personnel; 
5) form the structure of demand for professional education services according to 
market demand to develop youth programs of vocational guidance and organize professional 
promotional campaigns; 
6) encourage the participation of employers in training and employment of 
professionals which require changes and additions to the Law of Ukraine “On 
Entrepreneurship”195 (adopted by U-SSR in 1991, recent changes in 2015) and the Tax Code of 
Ukraine196 (2011, revision planned in Spring 2017) regarding taxation of profits of enterprises, 
including the release of businesses, organizations and institutions from charging fees for 
obligatory state social insurance payroll of employees-graduates who work in the specialty 
within the first three years of their work; preferential taxation of business entities that provide 
the basis for students practical training of universities; tax exemption for the transfer of inputs 
from balances undertakings on balances of higher education institutions; 
7) amend the classification of professions, to ensure the development of 
professional standards and increase the role of these standards; 
8) develop a new concept of economics of higher education, based on the objectives 
of the State Target Scientific-Technical and Social Program “Science in the Universities”197 
after 2017, since previous was canceled for the purpose of saving expenditures. Since most 
universities still have only educational function, they do not participate in advanced research 
and development, particularly related to determining staffing requirements; 
In 2013 provisions on age restrictions was modified for admission to universities of 
the I-II level of accreditation by making appropriate changes to the article 5 of the Law of 
Ukraine “On Vocational Education”198 and article 1, para. 1.3 of the Order of the Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine “On Approval of the Model Rules of Admission to 
Vocational Educational Institutions of Ukraine”199. This allowed to include to vocational 
training older people and expand the circle of experts’ workers’ specialties; 
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199 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0823-13; 
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Also, provisions on sex restrictions was canceled on admission to universities of 
the I-II level of accreditation as contrary to the articles 21 and 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine 
and the Law of Ukraine “On Vocational Education” by making appropriate changes to the 
article 1, para. 1,3 of the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine “On 
approval of the Model Rules of Admission to Vocational Educational Institutions of 
Ukraine”200. It is specifying:  
“Citizens of Ukraine have equal rights to obtain vocational education 
according to their abilities and inclinations regardless of nationality, race, gender, social and 
economic status, philosophical and political beliefs, religion, creed, health status, place of 
residence and other circumstances. 
Foreign citizens, stateless persons acquire vocational education in the 
educational institutions of Ukraine in accordance with applicable law and international 
treaties. 
A person recognized as a refugee or a person in need of additional 
protection is equal with the citizens of Ukraine in the right to education. 
The restrictions allowed by age, sex and medical condition, as well as 
indicators of proficiency defined by the government of Ukraine” 
We need to drive away from the “anchor” relation of the number of university 
teachers to the number of students; 
9) expand the list of indicators collected by the SSSU on the situation in the labor 
market and to expand the reach of the observations of the various categories of employers and 
employees; 
10) create trust funds in enterprises to finance employment processes release, 
redistribution and retraining; 
11) encourage the development of public-private partnership (PPP) in the field of 
employment and integration into business strategies and inter-sectoral training programs; 
12) carry out financing of conversion by raising funds of interested companies; 
13) foster the development of skills through their related professions; 
14) establish a voluntary certification of enterprises with respect to performance of 
personnel development. 
  
                                                          
200 According to the Order “On Approval of the Model Rules of Admission to Vocational Educational 
Institutions of Ukraine” / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0823-13; 
123 
2.3 Reform of remuneration 
 
The ability to use “cheap” workforce will never be a comprehensive incentive for 
the employer for implementation of innovative technologies and will remain as the factor of the 
preservation of low productivity, if only guaranteed extra surplus is not the case here. The 
ability to stimulate economic growth by raising wages (and, consequently, consumer demand) 
are proved by macroeconomic management practices of developed countries. It is therefore 
appropriate to use the situation of crisis since 2014 in order to level wages by economic activity, 
promotion of labor flows, including mechanisms of remuneration. 
The direct route to a rapid increase in labor income — ensuring conditions for 
sustainable economic growth. Within the Ukrainian model to improve the economic situation 
of enterprises it is quickly translated into wage growth. This is the experience of pre-crisis 
development in 2000-2003 (chart 8), when real wages increased by almost half. And that 
potential for sustainable economic growth can be undermined when the state is on the path of 
continuous escalation of wage standards. 
However, economic growth is not a guarantee for automatic improvement of living 
standards. Example confirms the case of Latvia: from 2005 to 2007, a huge inflow of foreign 
capital stimulated a significant growth of private consumption and investment in Latvia201. The 
average annual growth rate of GDP exceeded historical 11% in 2006202. According to Latvian 
Institute of International Affairs 203, economic growth in the country did not affect the social 
welfare of most of the population. Reason is obvious – unfair distribution (remuneration) by 
trans-national corporations (TNC) arrived together with partial state loose of its economic 
freedom driven by EU regulations. Latvia remains the poorest country in the EU204. 
As for Ukraine, when GDP is growing, there is increased social inequality and 
reckless spent of non-renewable natural resources, such growth cannot be considered as 
appropriate high quality. Secondly, economic growth is primarily due to the increase in 
revenues of economically successful areas when they are in the forefront of growth: in this case, 
economic growth affects primarily on wealthy stratum of the population whose incomes are 
rising as a result of the success of these sectors. At the same time increasing the share of social 
                                                          
201 Ministry of Economics of Latvia, Report on the Economic Development of Latvia (2016) / 
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spending for the poor segments of the population from the state budget. Thus, spreading the 
effect of economic growth on the economy as a whole depends critically on integral economic 
system involvement of growing sectors in the overall national economic system. Actually, the 
explanation lies in the weak social effects of economic growth in Ukraine, the driver of which 
for a long time has been export-oriented commodity sector, taking weak part in shaping 
domestic demand. 
Significant Increase of minimum and average wages is possible under certain 
conditions. Let’s consider the main ones. 
a) Increasing the share of wages in production costs. The share of registered wages 
in GDP (PPP/2011 USD) of Ukraine decreased from 17,7% in 2007 to 15,5% in 2014 (chart 8). 
Today the share of wages in production costs is unacceptable: from economic and social 
prospective means excessive exploitation of labor. 
Huge resources that contribute to economic growth in Ukraine, mainly export-
oriented and concentrated in the primary sector and secondary sectors, the secondary 
competitive advantage of which is the low price (primary we discussed before is a cheap 
labour). So globally interests of employers focused on the international market and weakly 
related to purchasing power, which has to be intensified by increased labor costs. The 
manufacturer (owner, employer) has no interest in their workers as consumers and buyers. 
Rising purchasing power is an important incentive for the development of industries that are 
focused on the domestic market. 
b) Reducing tax rates payroll slightly happened with introduction of the new Tax 
Code in 2011. We believe that high payroll taxes for individual entrepreneur that persists for 
decades, has negative consequences: the higher the tax rate, the lower wages there legally. 
Wage increases must be accompanied by a simultaneous decrease rates of payroll tax to a level 
that does not exceed 20% (since 2016 only single social contribution rate is 22%, see table 16), 
according to small and medium business polemic in Ukraine. Increasing salaries will increase 
its share of the cost, while significantly decrease the share of expenditure on compulsory state 
social insurance. The simultaneous increase in costs of one part and reduction of another will 
not lead to significant changes in the cost, and therefore — to higher prices. 
Expectations for the legalization of wages after the introduction of a reduced rate 
of income tax in 2004 and 2011 did not come true. Despite the tax rate for each employee 
decreased, rates for the calculation of social contributions on payroll remained high, thus for 
businesses wages that officially charged are uneconomical (not profitable and unacceptable). 
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c) Limiting the amount and cost of resources required for production. In particular, 
limit the amount of energy used per unit of GDP. Ukraine belongs to a group of resource-
deficient countries whose demand for conventional primary energy resources is supplied 
principally by imports: 
“According to the State Committee on Energy Conservation, Ukraine 
annually consumes about 210 million TEF of fuel and energy resources (FER). The country’s 
own production meets 20% of the demand for oil, 25% of the demand for gas, and 80% of the 
demand for coal. Ukraine’s GDP energy intensity is 2,6 times [higher] that of the average for 
developed countries, which can be explained principally by extravagant approaches to energy 
use” 205. 
Energy-saving and conservation measures in all sectors of the economy would 
improve the problem. 
d) Modernization of state and contractual regulation of remuneration should be put 
in place. The initial part of national labor regulation is the regulation of the minimum wage. 
Contractual regulation of wages of employees of enterprises is based on a system of tariff 
agreements concluded at the inter-industry (general tariff agreement), sectoral (industrial tariff 
agreement), manufacturing (tariff agreement as part of the collective agreement) levels 
according to the Law of Ukraine “On Collective Agreements and Contracts”. The main 
principle in this case is to prevent deterioration of worker’s current state: no possibility of 
reducing the guarantees provided by a higher level of agreement or legislation. However, the 
Law of Ukraine “On labor” allows to overcome temporarily the financial difficulties of the 
company, for a period up to six months in collective agreements provide standards for wages 
lower than general and sectoral agreements, but not below to the state standards and guarantees 
to pay. 
Since the establishment of appropriate wage formation system equally affects 
employers, employees and the state, wage procedure formation must involve their 
representatives and equally taking into account the interests of each party. This principle shared 
by most EU member states (see the table below). 
Table 20. Mechanisms of minimum wages in the EU 
Procedure States, peculiarities 
 
Defined as a result of 
negotiations 
Austria, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Germany, Finland, Poland, France 
(the special tripartite body), Sweden 
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Set by the government United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania (in accordance with the recommendations of the social 
partners); Romania (after consultation with the social partners), 
Slovakia (subject to negotiations), Hungary (after consultation with 
the social partners), Czech Republic (under negotiation with the 
social partners) 
Set by law Portugal (outcome of negotiations), Ukraine 
 
Source: author’s aggregate grouping based on data of the ILO and of Paul MARGINSON 
and Christian WELZ (2014), Changes to wage-setting mechanisms in the context of the crisis 
and the EU’s new economic governance regime / 
eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/changes-to-wage-
setting-mechanisms-in-the-context-of-the-crisis-and-the-eus-new-economic-governance 
 
Besides Ukraine, the minimum wage is set by law only in Portugal, but as the results 
of negotiations between social partners. Set by the government at their discretion only in Spain 
and the Netherlands. In nine countries by the governments, but according to the 
recommendations of the social partners. In the other nine countries (see above) minimum wages 
determined in negotiations between the social partners, and in France and Poland there is a 
special tripartite body. In other words, in one way or another the social partners involved in 
setting minimum wages in all EU countries. 
Formally, the procedure for determining the minimum wage in Ukraine is similar. 
According to article 10 of the Law of Ukraine “On Remuneration” (1995)206: 
“The minimum wage is set by the Parliament of Ukraine on the 
submission of the Government of Ukraine at least once a year in the State Budget Law of 
Ukraine on the basis of proposals made by the negotiating joint representative body of trade 
unions and the joint representative body of employers' associations at national level. 
The minimum wage may not be reduced when reducing the size of the 
subsistence minimum for able-bodied persons. 
Changes in the minimum wage and other laws of Ukraine and 
regulations is in force only after amending the Law on the State Budget of Ukraine for the 
year”. 
In other words, the minimum wage is fixed at the legislative level with the previous 
fixing agreements in the General Agreement by three interested parties, one of which is the side 
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of unionized workers. That is according to the law, trade unions have the opportunity (and even 
obliged) to influence the setting of minimum wages. 
In practice, the consensus among stakeholders on the level of minimum wages is 
not a prerequisite for negotiations, regulation of negotiations does not provide for consensus, 
but the final word rests with the government and legislators. Therefore, under the General 
Agreement (recent is for 2016/2017) on regulating the basic principles and norms of social and 
economic policy and labor relations in Ukraine, amount of minimum wage is determined by 
collective bargaining under the relevant Regulation207. According to bullet 18 of the Regulation 
to establish the minimum wage when collective bargaining “In case of disagreement of the 
parties the Government add to the Bill on the State Budget of Ukraine for the relevant year 
certificate of the positions of the Parties”. 
We reckon, it should be noted the following: 
Firstly, under the current legislation the provisions of the agreement do not apply 
to companies that did not participate directly or through their representatives in collective 
bargaining, then compliance with its provisions for such enterprises is not mandatory; 
Secondly, even for those companies that participated in the signing of the 
agreement, there is no mechanism responsible for the implementation of its provisions. Both of 
these factors make the General Agreement generalized formal document such as a “protocol of 
intent” (similarly concerned sectoral agreements). 
Common approach to setting minimum wages does not persist. Most of the 
benchmarks for this are consumer prices and minimum employee requirements for goods and 
services essentials sufficient to restore its ability to work (reproductive function of the minimum 
wage). Such requirements are calculated through a performance similar to the national 
subsistence minimum. In the developed countries the size of the minimum wage is higher than 
the subsistence minimum, while in Ukraine until January 2017 (subsistence minimum is 
roughly 57,6 USD/month and minimum wage – 119,5 USD), was almost equal (discussed 
before). But the law still states: “The minimum wage is set at not less than the subsistence 
minimum for able-bodied persons”. 
A similar approach is declared in the national legislation. Thus, article 9 of the Law 
of Ukraine “On Remuneration” states that the minimum wage is determined by the needs of 
workers and their families’ costs value sufficient to ensure the normal functioning of the able-
bodied person, preservation of health, food set, a minimum set of non-food products and 
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minimum set of services necessary to meet basic social and cultural needs of individuals and 
the overall level of average wages, productivity and employment. 
In practice, there is no conceptually coherent approach to the determination of 
minimum wages. The side of the unions attributed the standard capabilities of providing vital 
needs of the worker and his family. The employer insists on filling its purely economic basis of 
the situation at the enterprises (industries). The government guided by forecasts of 
macroeconomic nature, particularly as the budgets of all levels and the forecast increase in 
expenditure from these budgets. 
At first glance, all three competing approaches should be considered reasonably 
pragmatic. But in fact the position of employers often than not be considered a veiled attempt 
at preserving inefficient production due to reluctance to increase efficiency. 
The position of the state to establish minimum wage is twofold. On the one hand, 
increasing the minimum wage leads to increasing revenues from tax on income of individuals, 
stimulates domestic consumption. On the other — the result of increasing the minimum wage 
is an increase in government consumption, thus guaranteed a necessity in structuring efficient 
expenditure items of the budget. Thus objectively state and employers are often “on the one 
side of the barricades”. 
The position of trade unions’ side to the socio-economic context to be considered 
the most weighted, provided the specific level of minimum wages based on objective and 
reliable economic forecasts and underpinned by appropriate calculations. But the establishment 
of minimum wages until 2017 was dictated mainly by the possibilities of the state budget and 
there is a residual feature. 
However, the indisputable fact within national dispute is that cheap labor does not 
encourage employers to its economy through the introduction of modern technologies, creation 
of high employment. This in turn slows productivity growth and complicates the task of 
increasing the competitiveness of the national economy. 
Increasing the price of labor forcing the owner to introduce advanced technology, 
which entails improving its performance. Significant impact on the cost of labor in general is 
done by minimum wage and even when doubled recently in UAH it is still traditionally low, 
since services and goods went up two times and UAH depreciated three times since 2014. 
Also, since post-Soviet times in Ukraine has developed export-oriented economic 
model based on low and traditionally cheap labor as one of the competitive advantages. The 
competitiveness of this model — on the verge of exhaustion, as evidenced by the high 
dependence of the national economy from external conditions that fully evidently proved during 
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the global crisis (steel prices’ example discussed before). Therefore, we believe that the first 
step to improving productivity should be considered in increasing the minimum wage based on 
the experience of successful developed countries. 
 
2.4 Institutional reforms 
 
The focus of public policy should gradually move from the practice of adjusting the 
current situation that prevails in the labor market, to take proactive measures and care of the 
quality of labor, maintenance and consolidation of progressive changes in the regional and 
sectoral structure of employment. 
The revision of the system of governance of employment is needed. Viewing of 
public administration in the field of employment should provide, inter alia, broader regional 
participation in the labor market, the separation of powers of state and regional authorities. 
At the national level it is advisable to determine the legal regulation, strategic 
planning, control and oversight of executive power authority, as well as to establish: 
a) system of professional standards with criteria and gradation; 
b) minimum and maximum size of unemployment benefits; 
c) list of occupations which are carried out training, retraining and advanced 
training according to the requirements of the SESU; 
d) list of priority categories of unemployed who have difficulties in employment 
and for which the SESU implemented special programs; 
e) quotas on attracting and using foreign labor; 
f) list of priority occupations for which it is advisable to attract and use foreign 
labor. 
At the regional/local level – corresponding authorities and governments208 to 
provide: 
a) monitoring the situation on the labor market, forecasting of demand and supply 
in the labor market in terms of professional and qualification groups; 
b) based on the previous of the item above, to refine strategies and plans for the 
development of vocational education, clarify priorities and plans in the field of labor market 
regulation, plan to involve of foreign experts; 
                                                          
208 Elected (and other) bodies of local communities empowered to decide local issues; non-government 
mechanism; occupies a special place in the political system; 
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c) regulate the distribution of human resources, development and implementation 
of programs of territorial labor mobility, regulation of attracting and using of foreign labor; 
d) development and implementation of programs to inform the public about the 
situation on the labor market, vocational guidance of youth projects aimed at popularization of 
blue-collar workers. 
Potential of the SESU are not fully used: we discussed above low productivity 
performance, half of unemployed prefers not to register within SESU, informal and shadow 
sector. Its positive impact on the labor market, especially during current crisis must be 
increased. One of the most powerful institutional factors that affect the efficiency of active and 
passive labor market policies are the degree of integration of three key functions: 
1) selection of workplace and employee; 
2) administering payments of unemployment aid (benefits); 
3) directing unemployed in active programs. 
Among the measures for saving expenditures of the SESU, was changes introduced 
in July 2012 to the article 6 of the Law of Ukraine “On Compulsory State Social Unemployment 
Insurance” (2000)209: uninsured individuals, who did not contribute to the appropriate insurance 
Fund, were no more receiving financial aid as it was for a long time before. 
Further step we suggest to regulate the legal status of officials working in 
departments of the SESU — payroll for the Executive Board and for the staff of mentioned 
above Fund is paid from the same money of this very Fund (see the Statute210 articles 36 and 
37), which is contrary to the Law “On Civil Service”, which states that civil servants receive 
salaries only through the State Budget of Ukraine211. Even development of material and 
information base covered from the mentioned Fund too, while the Fund is not included in the 
State Budget of Ukraine. 
Also, there is a need to ensure that the Register of the Social Insurance Fund for 
Unemployment reflects all potential contributors (see footnote 161 regarding registration 
inconsistencies within compulsory funds). 
Comprehensive SESU information should be considered when preparing the state 
order for training, to bring it in line with the requirements of the labor market, thus needed: 
                                                          
209 Official web-site of the Parliament of Ukraine / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1533-14; 
210 SESU / dcz.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/category?cat_id=338204; 
211 Official web-site of the Parliament of Ukraine / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/889-19; 
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a) to provide basic employment centers for studying market conditions, professions 
and specialties when holding events on training, retraining and advanced training of the 
unemployed; 
b) to provide a clear certainty in national and regional employment programs 
sufficient sources of funding for performance indicators to be achieved; 
In order to improve monitoring and forecasting of the labor market the SESU should 
provide an analysis of the labor market, including: 
a) determining the size and professional qualification structure extra needs of 
employers in the labor force due to the implementation of priority national projects, government 
programs, government investment projects; 
b) forecasting the size and professional qualification structure of labor supply in the 
labor market considering demographic changes and the structure of vocational education that 
has been developed; 
c) formation of the state register of recipients of public services to promote 
employment. 
Improving territorial labor mobility should involve the following steps: 
a) to create favorable conditions for attracting human resources to the regions, 
which has labor scarce, facilitate citizens’ access to regional housing markets, use of the 
accessible mortgage lending, to develop accessible regional housing programs for the direct 
participation of employers; 
b) to extend assistance to unemployed citizens and their family members for 
resettlement to work scarce regions, particularly in rural areas, establish a list of expenses that 
are reimbursed and the amount of financial assistance to families that move; 
c) to promote the development of regional competition in providing services to 
promote employment and coordination of public service employment, promote a common 
information space in the area to promote employment, to adopt standards for the quality of 
services with comprehensive criteria to promote employment. 
Decentralization of employment policy is needed. The mechanism of regulation 
of employment contains a whole range of social and economic relations of entities, legal, 
organizational and psychological techniques, methods and tools to ensure the functioning of the 
system of labor relations, in particular: 
a) coordination of supply and demand of labor; 
b) development of employment and professional mobility of workers under the 
labor market; 
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c) regulation of unemployment through labor activation of the unemployed. 
Needed forms and methods of regulation: 
a) active labor mediation in the open labor market; 
b) investing in the workforce, aimed at increasing competitiveness and mobility; 
c) social insurance versus involuntary unemployment (charts 10 and 11); 
d) additional selective (targeted assistance) maintenance of jobs and the 
development of forms of employment, taking into account labor market peculiarities. 
Depending on the further course of economic and political processes in Ukraine and 
in regions there are different approaches to the state employment policy. We may support the 
least developed regions and vulnerable populations by enhancing social and financial systems. 
It is possible for the slightest opportunity to invest in production, restore the dynamic domestic 
consumer market, and thus preserve existing and create new jobs. 
However, we must admit that after the economic crisis expected production 
increase is usually not accompanied by a simultaneous and adequate expansion of hiring new 
workers. 
Employers are trying to increase firstly working hours of available workers, to 
eliminate “idleness” in the production and then hire new ones. Therefore, employment growth 
usually occurs with a certain time lag. Moreover, unemployment may rise until the mode of 
economic recovery is established definitively. In this case, the higher the deviation of the 
number of employees on the value of effective demand, the more limited will expand 
employment opportunities by hiring new labor. 
The rate at which the expansion of employment following the economic recovery 
depends not only on macroeconomic conditions, and other factors of institutional, structural 
nature. In turn, the labor supply parameters are determined primarily by demographic dynamics, 
migration mobility of the population and other socio-economic factors. There are many other 
reasons that can prevent possible positive changes. Can be created more jobs with part-time 
than the usual full employment. The jobs generated by the economy may be low wages. 
Experience of developed countries shows decentralization of employment policy 
bringing positive results, decentralization should be adapted to regional conditions. Regional 
regulation increases the importance of local initiatives, local authorities in the development of 
production and business, raising employment in their regions. To alleviate the situation in areas 
of concentration of depressed industries by programs directed to early development, 
implementation of targeted assistance from government should be provided to rise and reorient 
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production. Employment policies should be inherent in a flexible and dynamic way, in 
particular it has to combine active212 and passive213 employment policies. 
The general vector of the necessary changes today is to ensure that the reform 
program should combine steps to deregulate the labor market with measures to strengthen law 
enforcement and disciplining mechanisms. Raising the “price” for the deviations from the 
law and contractual guidelines is necessary while making compliance to formal restrictions 
easier, simplifying their content via criteria of transparency and accountability. 
However, we should note the existence of a real danger that the reform of labor 
legislation can go in the wrong direction. For example, the expansion and complication of the 
list of prohibitions and restrictions may increase the rigidity of administrative control (see 
table 15 for “Doing Business measurements”). 
In view of many participants in the legislative process there is only normative, but 
no real “portrait” of the labor market. As a result, much of the demands and proposals ignore 
reality. It is poorly understood, which opportunities opens and restrictions imposes a real 
working model of the Ukrainian labor market. 
Therefore, labor legislation and legislation on employment should be improved in 
the following areas: 
1) Develop and adopt a new national employment program, current214 is until 2017; 
2) Ensure and accelerate the adoption of the new Labor Code of Ukraine (discussed 
already, pending this year); 
3) Further harmonization of labor legislation and legislation on employment relying 
on international standards. 
The Ukrainian Government has taken crucial steps towards shaping minimum 
benefit levels under severe austerity measures since 2014 and towards fulfilling the goals of the 
EU Association Agreement obligations. With the notion of the trade unions and employers’ 
organizations, the Government adopted the Law on the ratification of the ILO Social Security 
Minimum Standards Convention, No. 102 (1952) on 16 March 2016215. Recently the 
Government is also considered ratifying the European Code of Social Security216. All of these 
                                                          
212 Active employment policy is a set of measures aimed at reducing unemployment through stimulation of new 
jobs, retraining unemployed; 
213 Passive employment policy is a policy aimed at mitigating the negative effects of unemployment. It 
includes: subsidizing employment, registration of early retirement, social security. 
214 Official web-site of Ukrainian Parliament / zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1008-2012-%D0%BF; 
215 ILO (2016), Social security system of Ukraine in 2014–15 and beyond: towards effective social protection 
floors / ILO DWT and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest, pg. 10; 
216 Council of Europe / www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/048; 
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actions will contribute to approaching the integration of the Ukrainian social protection system 
in compliance with the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation No. 202 (2012)217. 
Further preparation of relevant bills needed, including: 
a) the professional development of staff in the workplace; 
b) amending article 46 of the Law of Ukraine “On Vocational Education”,218 aiming 
to improve the qualification requirements on the participation of “highly qualified 
professionals” instead of “qualified professionals” in the educational process of production and 
provide relevant criteria; 
c) amending the laws of Ukraine concerning the removal of restrictions on the 
assignment to the gross expenditure of funds that were used by the taxpayer for training of the 
personnel needed to fulfill own production capacities; 
d) amending the Law of Ukraine “On the Procedure for Settling Collective Labor 
Disputes (conflicts)” binding decisions on labor arbitration if a collective labor dispute arose in 
connection with the violation of labor rights, and simplify the process of announcing a strike; 
For instance, railway trade unions technically cannot announce the strike even if 
followed the procedure lawfully, since railway transport as a mode and the relevant law 
(1996)219 on rail transport treats it as a category of strong compliance with increased security 
on a national scale – “sets limits of increased danger zones”. 
e) the creation in Ukraine of a guarantee fund to ensure the protection of employees’ 
claims in case of insolvency of the employer due to bankruptcy. Worth mentioning, Ukraine 
ratified in October 2005 the ILO “Protection of Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency) 
Convention 173” (1992).220 
f) Further steps are to ratify ILO “Employment Service Convention 88” (1948)221 
and ILO “Private Employment Agencies Convention 181” (1997).222 
In order to determine the legal principles of organization and procedure of social 
dialogue in Ukraine, improving labor, social and economic relations, mutual understanding and 
social cohesion in society a framework law in the field of industrial relations — the Law of 
Ukraine “On Social Dialogue in Ukraine” (2010)223 – was adopted. During the drafting of 
                                                          
217 ILO / www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R202; 
218 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/103/98-вр; 
219 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / article 22: zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/273/96-вр; 
220 ILO / www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C173; 
221 ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT 
_ID:312233:NO; 
222 ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT 
_ID:312326:NO; 
223 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2862-17; 
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legislative conditions for the functioning of social dialogue, prospects for practical 
implementation of the results was not foreseen. Since the implementation of the agreements of 
the social partners depends largely on the state, implementation of regulations did not include 
mandatory provisions if consensus is not reached according to the procedure. 
4). In order to strengthen state supervision and control over observance of labor 
legislation to create a system of labor courts, whose activities will enable the employee easier 
and faster to defend their rights, will avoid excessive delays in the proceedings, to ensure 
prompt and impartial review. Today in Ukraine this issue handled by the local commissions on 
labour disputes at firm level and by local courts. 
This idea was discussed in due time during the development of labor Procedure 
Code in our neighbor the Russian Federation: the possibility of specialization of judges in labor 
matters and, consequently, the creation within civil procedure, administrative procedure and 
labor procedural law of specialized courts in employment matters. A similar system exists in 
Canada, US, Japan, Italy. 
5). Develop a mechanism for improving the division of powers in the area of labor 
market regulation between state and regional authorities, local self-government called to avoid 
duplication of responsibilities and, as sequence, for finance harmonization. 
Projections (forecasting) of the labor market have to become an integral part of 
strategic development for the economy and the country. They should be developed in 
partnership and dialogue of participants of social and labor relations. At the stage of 
development of such forecasts, and especially towards their implementation, it is crucial those 
proposals for vocational guidance and (re) training staff to be: 
a) coordinated within policies and major programs of economic and social 
development; 
b) taken into account the specific regional (local) labor markets, which are a 
reflection of the structure of economic complex of a territory and its place in the economic 
environment of the country and the cross border interactions; 
c) grounded of the need to advance a specific content training on technical and 
technological level of production, as it has been steadily increasing constantly; 
d) relied on local features adapted to global trends in the development of market 
conditions for qualified personnel. 
An important role in leveling (smoothing) disparities of vocational qualification 
structure should play mechanism of forming the prestige of skilled blue-collar workers and 
other technical employees, a fundamental reorganization and expansion of career guidance 
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activities. This work should not be limited only to the efforts of the State Employment Service 
of Ukraine. Much of this work should take over the trade unions, unions and business 
associations, unions of employers, educational institutions. 
We should enter a long-term forecasting and planning our horizon over the years. 
Thus, comprehensive document was adopted on paper it is now a great challenge to implement 
it in the real life – the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine – 2020”, document which 
determines the direction and priorities of Ukraine till 2020. The strategy was developed at the 
initiative of the President of Ukraine in 2014. The main prerequisite for implementation of the 
Strategy is a social contract between government, business and civil society, where each party 
has its own area of responsibility. “Strategy – 2020” consists of four motion vectors: sustainable 
development; security, business and citizens; responsibility and social justice; pride for Ukraine 
in Europe and worldwide. 
The aim of the reforms set reaching of the European best standards of living and 
decent place of Ukraine in the world. “Strategy – 2020”224 includes in total more than sixty 
reforms. Out of total as priority reforms identified 8 and 2 programs. Defined 25 key indicators 
of successful development. 
As a priority were defined the reform of national defense and security, updates on 
authorities and anti-corruption reform, judicial reform and reform of the judicial system, 
decentralization and public administration reform, deregulation and enterprise development, 
health care reform and tax reform. 
Among the priorities of the Strategy are implementation of two programs – the 
energy independence of Ukraine and promotion in the world, and promote the interests of the 
state in the global information space. 
It is necessary to further develop and finally adopt (two tries failed in 2010 and 
2011) the Law of Ukraine “On State Forecasting and Strategic Planning”, which will promote 
the development of mechanisms of “management by results” and provide a clear correlation 
between the results of the public authorities and the budget funds allocated to achieve them on 
regular basis. 
  
                                                          
224 Official web-site of the Ukrainian Parliament / zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5/2015; 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Implementing of the sterling social model of labor market in Ukraine is prevented 
by low productivity and a big shadow sector, which leads to the undemanding attitude to 
resources, limited investment resources, slow job creation in the private sector and low incomes, 
due to lack of interest from the national capital. Corruption corrodes and destroys the country 
from within. 
Unfortunately, Ukraine remained as export-oriented country in industry, with very 
big share of primer and secondary sectors of economy composing its GDP in both: formal and 
informal dimensions, where cheap labour is the main competitive articulation. 
The labor market in Ukraine is immature, unbalanced and ineffective. It combines 
opposing trends: labor shortages and redundant labor, which manifests itself in existence, on 
the one hand, involuntary part-time employment, on the other — redundant employment. Due 
to the phenomenon of “involuntary part-time” employment qualitative support is achieved at a 
stable level, when the “crisis costs” apply to all employees through lower wages and not through 
localization costs using mechanisms of proper support of released jobless by the state (SESU). 
This loses, applying on the shoulders of ordinary hardworking people, are an outcome of unfair 
distribution of national wealth in general as well. 
The prevalence of flexible, informal employment as one of the major structural 
features of the labor market in Ukraine is mitigating the short-term market cycles, but it is 
unable to support sustainable organizational and technological development in long-term 
perspective. A common and wide spread self-employment, formed mainly in the form of micro-
enterprises without their inclusion in a network of powerful industrial clusters or weak inter-
regional links objectively rolling Ukraine back to archaic organizational and technological 
structures. As a result, significant labor resource potential is used for recreation and expanding 
the law productive sectors driven by non-progressive management. 
Structural changes in the economy and labor market characterized by slow 
deindustrialization trend that manifested in the redistribution of inter-branch structures in favor 
of value-added industries, service providers, and this is not conducive to qualitative structural 
changes in industry and in accordance the workforce. Because of the existence of such a 
structure of the labor market in Ukraine it is not able to ensure the accelerated development of 
technology and high-tech industries. 
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The deficit of skilled labor is an important factor that blocks the formation of 
competitive territorial industrial innovation type structures. Skilled labor is one of the scarcest 
resources in Ukraine, which turns on the labor market to one of the largest sources of economic 
and socio-political risks for the domestic economy. 
The financial and economic crisis started introducing “temporary” adaptive 
mechanisms to adapt domestic enterprises during the multiple economic crisis. Steps by the 
state seen by the executors as politically justified measure, but not forward-looking. As in 
periods of 1990s the government regulation mechanisms are reduced to “defensive 
restructuring", which manifests itself in the form of part-time compulsory administrative leave, 
followed by secondary employment of the labour market agents as the only solution to survive. 
The adaptation is mainly due to the elasticity of wages, not employment, which leads to 
preserving inefficient structure of employment: employers (CEOs) are not shaping management 
policy properly. On the background of the formation of labor market with high flexibility of 
salaries the institutional arrangements for its functioning contributed to the development of non-
standard forms of payment that actually derive wages beyond statistical supervision. 
The current labor market model provided moderate socio-political stability until 
2014 but not anymore and remains an effective buffer to the growth of social tension, leads to 
the deterioration of human capital and the preservation of inefficient jobs, thereby slowing the 
modernization of the economy at the stage of the current crisis. 
Natural liberal self-regulation of the labor market and the lack of a holistic concept 
of public policy led to massive “denationalization” of enterprises, development of microscopic 
entrepreneurship, frequently out of state accountability, economic crushing of integrated 
technology systems that have lost their competitive edge. 
To change the Ukrainian model to such, which adjusts employment to shocks rather 
than wages, followed by compulsory and proper, and decent SESU aid and active policy 
provisions, the labor market needs strong institutional reconstruction, which necessitates a 
focused powerful state intervention, i.e. the development and implementation of relevant 
national policies, taxation simplification within approaches of transparency and accountability, 
and overcoming of overregulation. 
Long term trends of demographic catastrophe, which have not been attracting 
proper attention from the state during 1990s, 2000s and during this decade resulted in 
outstanding shrinking of labour force, massive emigration of qualified personnel and 
unprecedented loss of people’s trust to the authorities. Majority have lost faith in building the 
country for the benefit of our future generations. 
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I hope this thesis would be of use for decision making bodies in Ukraine when 
shaping policies and to all who is interested in the labor market improvement for the benefit for 
our long-suffering society and the development of democracy in Ukraine. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. The law-making activity of the Ukrainian Parliament 1991 — q1 2017, 
quantitative indicators 
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Annex 2 / Table 21. TOTAL employment (%) of the population of Ukraine by age  
in 2004 — 2015 
 Total 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60-70 
Working 
Age 
2015 56,7 28,2 71,8 74,3 79,1 78,6 61,7 14,5 64,7 
2014 56,6 29,5 71,6 74,9 77,9 78,4 59,4 15,5 64,5 
2013 60,3 32,5 73,8 79,8 80,5 63,8 23,8 67,4 
2012 59,7 33,7 73,8 78,8 80 62,2 24 67,1 
2011 59,2 33,9 72,4 78,1 79,8 62 24,1 66,5 
2010 58,5 33,5 72 78,1 78,9 61,3 24,1 65,6 
2009 57,7 34,5 72,2 77,8 77 59,5 23,8 64,7 
2008 59,3 37,3 76,4 81,5 79,8 61 21,8 67,3 
2007 58,7 36,6 76,5 80,8 79,7 60,3 21,6 66,7 
2006 57,9 35,1 75,4 79,9 79,6 60,4 21,3 65,9 
2005 57,7 34,2 75,2 78,6 78,8 61,6 22,8 65,4 
2004 56,7 33,9 74,7 78 78 60,5 19,7 64,6 
NET 0 -5,7 -2,9 -1,3 0,6 1,2 -5,2 0,1 
Table 22. Employment (%) of the RURAL population of Ukraine by age in 2004 — 2015 
 Total 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60-70 
Working 
Age 
2015 55,1 32,7 66,3 68,6 75,7 75,7 60,9 17,5 62 
2014 55,9 31,8 65,2 69,8 75,4 76,6 61,2 22,9 62 
2013 63,5 39,7 71,7 76,9 79,6 69,8 41 67,8 
2012 62,7 40,3 72,5 76,9 79,5 66,4 39,8 67,4 
2011 63 41,3 71,4 76,3 79,5 67,6 42,1 67,5 
2010 62,7 42,3 71 75,8 79,4 67,1 41,3 67,4 
2009 62,2 42,1 70,8 77,8 78 66,2 40,1 67,1 
2008 61,8 43,1 72,7 79,3 78,6 65,5 37,3 67,8 
2007 61,5 42,3 74,4 79,5 79,3 64,7 36,6 67,8 
2006 60,5 41,5 73,1 77,9 78,6 64,4 35,7 67 
2005 60,5 40,4 72,4 77,4 79,1 65,1 35,9 67,1 
2004 56,1 37,8 70,9 75,2 75,5 60,5 25,3 64,4 
NET -1 -5,1 -4,6 -3 0,2 0,4 -7,8 -2,4 
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Table 23. Employment (%) of the URBAN population of Ukraine by age in 2004 — 2015 
 Total 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60-70 
Working 
Age 
2015 57,4 25,6 74,4 76,4 80,5 80 62,1 13,1 66 
2014 56,9 28,4 74,2 76,6 78,9 79,3 58,6 12,5 65,5 
2013 58,9 28,9 74,5 80,9 80,9 61,3 16,5 67,3 
2012 58,5 30,5 74,3 79,5 80,3 60,5 17 66,9 
2011 57,6 30,4 72,8 78,8 80 59,8 15,9 66,1 
2010 56,8 29,4 72,4 79 78,7 58,9 15,8 64,9 
2009 55,8 31,2 72,7 77,9 76,6 56,8 15,6 63,7 
2008 58,2 34,8 77,7 82,4 80,4 59,2 13,7 67,2 
2007 57,4 34,2 77,3 81,4 79,9 58,6 13,5 66,3 
2006 56,8 32,5 76,3 80,7 80 58,9 13,2 65,5 
2005 56,5 31,8 76,3 79,2 78,7 60,3 15,1 64,7 
2004 56,9 32,4 76,4 79,2 79,1 60,5 16,4 64,7 
NET 0,5 -6,8 -2 -0,75 0,9 1,6 -3,3 1,3 
 
Table 24. Employment (%) of the MALE population of Ukraine by age in 2004 — 2015 
 Total 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60-70 
Working 
Age 
2015 62,2 31,3 80,1 81,3 83,1 79,4 68,2 17,9 68,7 
2014 61,8 33,6 80,2 81,9 81,2 78,2 65,3 18,1 67,8 
2013 65,9 36,3 82,2 85,6 81,5 70,6 27,5 71,1 
2012 65,2 37,9 82 84 81,1 69,3 27,4 70,3 
2011 64,4 37,9 81,2 82,6 80,3 69,5 27,4 69,3 
2010 63,1 37,4 78,6 81,6 79,2 68,1 27,1 67,8 
2009 62,1 37,8 78,9 81,6 76,5 66,3 26,9 66,6 
2008 65,2 41,8 85,1 85,9 81,1 70,4 25,3 70,6 
2007 64,3 41 84,5 85,1 81 69,4 24,7 69,8 
2006 63,5 39,4 82,6 84,7 81,5 68,7 24,5 69 
2005 62,8 37,9 82,5 82,9 80,3 70 26,6 68,2 
2004 60,9 36,3 81,4 81,5 79,6 66,6 23 66,7 
NET 1.3 -5 -1,3 0,7 -0,2 1,6 -5,1 2 
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Table 25. Employment (%) of the FEMALE population of Ukraine by age in 2004 — 
2015 
 Total 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60-70 
Working 
Age 
2015 51,7 24,8 63,1 67,1 75,1 77,8 56,4 12,2 60,9 
2014 51,9 25,2 62,7 67,7 74,6 78,7 54,6 13,8 61,1 
2013 55,3 28,5 65 74 79,6 58,2 21,4 63,8 
2012 54,8 29,3 65,3 73,6 79 56,5 21,7 63,8 
2011 54,5 29,8 63,4 73,6 79,4 56,1 22 63,5 
2010 54,4 29,3 65,2 74,6 78,6 55,8 22,1 63,3 
2009 53,9 31 65,2 74,2 77,5 54,1 21,8 62,7 
2008 54 32,5 67,5 77,2 78,7 53,4 19,5 63,9 
2007 53,7 32 68,4 76,7 78,6 53 19,7 63,6 
2006 53 30,6 68,1 75,2 77,9 53,7 19,3 62,8 
2005 53,1 30,4 67,8 74,4 77,5 54,9 20,3 62,4 
2004 52,9 31,3 68,1 74,5 76,6 55,7 17,5 62,4 
NET -1,2 -6,5 -5 -3,4 1,2 0,7 -5,3 -1,5 
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